
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2697

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PLO OFFICIAL ON TERMS FOR FEDERATION WITH JORDAN

AU221230 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 20 Dec 82 p 3

[Interview with Mahmud Khaldi, Palestine Liberation Organization representative in Damascus by I. Stepankova, in Damascus: "Unity Is the Most Important Thing"--date of interview not given]

[Text] We are sitting in the Damascus headqaurters of the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] and because only 2 weeks ago the Syrian capital was the venue of a session of the PLO Central Council, whose results are being widely discussed in the world, I am asking Mahmud Khaldi, the PLO representative in Syria, the following questions:

[Question] What did the PLO Central Council discuss in Damascus?

[Answer] The war in Lebanon has changed the situation in the Middle East and, even more so, in the Palestinian movement to such a degree that we will need a lot of time before we can absorb all the implications and adapt to them. The main objective of Tel Aviv's invasion of Lebanon was to destroy the PLO both militarily and politically and thereby the Palestinians as such because the PLO reflects, in fact, the existence of the Palestinian entity. It is not merely a liberation movement and that is why it was Israel's objective to destroy all its structures. It is immensely important for us that we do not permit the implementation of these goals of Israel. I think that our nation has already succeeded in it. Our troops left West Beirut undefeated, maintain a high combat morale and have faith in the victory of our ideas. Nor have the Israelis succeeded politically. The Palestinian issue now attracts even greater attention in the world than was the case before the war in Lebanon.

Aside from absorbing new facts, we must also determine our further strategy. I do not say that the strategy has to be completely new but it must be adjusted to the new conditions. The present situation is completely different [from the situation before the war in Lebanon] and that is, in fact, why the PLO Central Council met here in Damascus, to give us the opportunity for a thorough exchange of views on all questions and, believe me, the questions on the agenda were very many. As regards the Reagan plan for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, the members of the PLO Central Council arrived at the conclusion that the Americans are once again

bypassing the basic right of the Palestinians--to set up an independent state. Instead, the plan proposes, in fact, a complete destruction of the PLO.

For 64 years now the Palestinian people have been waging an armed struggle for their main goal—a state of their own. In all these years we have shed rivers of blood, hundreds of thousands of our people have been killed. Nonetheless, in his plan Reagan does not even mention an independent Palestinian state. His plan completely disregards the principle that if a problem is to be resolved one has to negotiate primarily with the people it concerns. They cannot negotiate just with the Jordanians and the Israelis. Therefore, we have rejected Reagan's plan.

[Question] What about the relations between the PLO and Jordan?

[Answer] We are Arabs and are not opposed to the idea of unifying the Arab world. However, we cannot discuss this as we do not yet have our own state. The Palestinian nationality must be recognized and there must not be any pressure whatsoever on the Palestinians to disperse among the population of various Arab countries. Every Palestinian should have his own Palestinian passport and not a Jordanian or Syrian one. We also insist on the Palestinian flag as a symbol for which we have shed so much of our blood. Nor shall we surrender our own army because it is a sign of sovereignty for us. Jordan must thus realize that any form of a future federation [spojeni] must respect these our demands, including a Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as an expression of our sovereignty.

[Question] The results of the Damascus session of the PLO Central Council must yet be approved by its Executive Committee and discussed by the Palestinian National Council. When will this body be summoned?

[Answer] The PLO tradition is such that sessions of the Palestinian National Council always take place at times crucial for the Palestinian movement and discuss issues of key importance. That cannot be done without thorough and serious preparations. Consultations of the leaderships of individual segments of the PLO are underway to prepare everything necessary for the planned session so as to demonstrate our unity. In 1974, following the war of October 1973, our movement also had to face up to changed conditions in the whole Arab world. At that time the National Council adopted so clearly formulated a political program that the subsequent Arab summit in Rabat designated the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people. The preparations for the 1974 session took 500 hours. Now we are proceeding in the same way. Almost every day we negotiate and discuss. The most important thing is to find a joint platform. We expect the Palestinian National Council to meet within a month.

BRIEFS

LIFTING OF CUSTOMS DUTIES FOR W. BANK--The Arab countries have abolished the customs duties on produce coming from the territories. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that the Judaea and Samaria Chambers of Commerce have received an announcement on this matter from Jordan. It probably came as a result of a visit by Gaza Strip agriculturers who detailed to the Arab League Center the dire economic situation in the territories.

[Text] [TA231617 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 23 Dec 82]

PLO'S KHALAF ENDORSES AL-QADHDHAFI CALL-Nicosia, Rabi' Al-Awwal 13, 28 December, Jamahiriyah News Agency-Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf], member of the Executive Committee of Fatah movement, welcomed the call made by the revolution's leader to the leaders of the Palestinian Resistance and Lebanese national movement to meet urgently in the Jamahiriyah. Talking to AL MAWKIF AL ARABI weekly published in Cyprus, he said there should be a meeting between the leaderships of the Palestinian Resistance and Al Fatah Revolution to endorse new plans on the Palestinian, Lebanese and Arab levels. [Text] [LD281606 Tripoli JANA in English 1417 GMT 28 Dec 82]

COOPERATION TALKS WITH MALTA PREDICTED

LD101130 Algiers APS in English 1010 GMT 10 Jan 83

[Text] Algiers, 10/1/83 (APS)—The Maltese foreign affairs minister, Mr Alex Sceberra Trigona arrived yesterday here, for a five day visit in Algeria.

The visit of the Maltese foreign affairs minister comes within the frame of the works of the Algerian-Maltese Joint Commission.

The Algerian-Maltese Commission started its works yesterday. It was jointly presided by the Maltese foreign affairs minister and the secretary of state to fisheries and transport from the Algerian side. On this occasion, the two parties praised the quality of bilateral relations reinforced by the historical and geographical factors linking the two countries.

The two parties also pointed out the objectives of the Algerian-Maltese Joint Commission aiming at starting a new phase in the relations between the two countries at the very moment where the world (?slump) is making from the developing countries the first victim of an economic order which does not cope with the current situation.

On another turn, the two parties put a stress on the quality of political relations between the two countries which are developing thanks to the political leadership willingness to make from the Mediterranean Sea a lake of peace.

The Algerian-Maltese Commission appealed for the adoption of a South-South [as received] cooperation policy in the frame of a new international economic order. On this occasion, the two parties hailed Algeria's attitude and part in all the international forums notably in Cancun for the setting up of a new international economic order.

CSO: 4500/53

BRIEFS

CABINET RESHUFFLE PREDICTED--Dubayy, 8 Jan (QNA)--The newspaper AL-BAYAN published here today quoted knowledgeable Algerian sources as saying that Algerian President Chedli Bendjedid will make a sweeping and important cabinet reshuffle during the next weeks which will include the prime minister, and information and culture, interior, agriculture and agrarian reform, planning and national development, commerce and energy and petrochemical industries ministers. Quoting these sources, the newspaper said most of the present ministers will hold other portfolios and those who will leave the cabinet will be appointed to other posts, such as the information and culture minister, who will be appointed ambassador to one of the Scandanavian capitals. The sources indicated the only exception in this regard is Prime Minister [title as received] Col Mohamed Abdelghani who is tipped to succeed Planning and National Development Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi in supervising the economy and economic planning which began with the rule of President Bendjedid. The sources noted that this ministerial reshuffle will be mostly a technical nature. However, the sources did not rule out the possibility that President Chedli Bendjedid will appoint a political, and not a technocratic figure, as prime minister due to the heavy responsibilities in the future which will include the convocation of the National Liberation Front Party General Congress in 1984. The congress will nominate the party's secretary general and the president. [Text] [GF081234 Doha QNA in Arabic 1005 GMT 8 Jan 83]

CREDIT LINE OPENED--Portugal has opened a \$ 20 million line of credit to Algeria to finance purchases of Portuguese goods such as chemical products and pressure cookers. In return, Algeria will supply Portugal with 253,000 tonnes of crude oil and 700 million cubic metres of natural gas. The agreements followed an official visit by Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes to Algeria, where Portuguese service firms are involved in prefabricated housing and dredging. It is thought that Algerian Airways may soon extend its Madrid flights to Lisbon. [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 44, 20 Dec 82 p 6]

CSO: 4500/49

BAHRAINI FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED BY 'AL-HAWADITH'

PMO61323 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 31 Dec 82 pp 22-23

[Interview with Bahraini Foreign Minister Muhammad ibn Mubarak Al Khalifah by Nash'at al-Taghlabi in Manama--date not given]

[Excerpts] AL-HAWADITH: How do you see the situation in the Arab region in general now that the PLO has rejected the Reagan initiative, although it had announced earlier that it would consider the positive points in the initiative and a PLO official then said that there was an inclination to establish a common denominator between the Fes summit resolution and the Reagan initiative?

Muhammad ibn Mubarak: I think that we have a collective Arab commitment for the first time. It is a commitment to the Fes summit resolution. That resolution was unanimously approved and we and the PLO are committed to it. President Reagan's plan was announced days before the Fes summit conference was held and therefore had not been sufficiently studied when Arab strategy was under discussion. We have laid down a clear Arab strategy and said that we would discuss this strategy with all states in the world. We know that the United States has its own concept as outlined in the Reagan initiative. Britain also has its own concept and so has the EEC as a whole although, its member states may have different views. This is why we decided to initiate a dialogue on the basis of the Arab concept. As regards the recent Palestinian position, I believe that it will not affect the Arab course of action in this respect. After all, the PLO is a member of the Seven-Member Committee and has participated in the steps so far taken. There will be a full assessment of the results of these steps. I do not think that any submitted plan gets accepted as it is. There is no inclination to reject the initiative. I believe that what was said at the Damascus meeting was that the U.S. initiative did not meet Palestinian requirements, which is a fact nobody can deny. The Reagan plan does not meet Palestinian requirements despite its positive aspects. What is important is not how others think but how we think about achieving a just and comprehensive solution. The Arabs have a strategy for this and on this basis they will negotiate with others, including the United States.

AL-HAWADITH: Europe, or rather the world in general, insists that there should either be a unilateral PLO recognition of Israel or a simultaneous

mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. Of course, Israel refuses to recognize the PLO and the PLO refuses to recognize Israel in advance. So what is all this leading to?

Muhammad ibn Mubarak: It is not, in my opinion, a question of recognition. It is a question of results. The Palestinian people say: How could we recognize Israel when the requisites for a peaceful settlement are not available? Before the Palestinians are asked to adopt a certain position, the side expecting them to do so should show them what solutions they would be getting. Would there be a state and would there be complete withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967? So far the position of these states on the question of a Palestinian state and the Palestinian people's legitimate rights has not been made clear to the PLO. I believe that the only way is to hold an international conference attended by all parties, including the Palestinians, to discuss and crystallize the issues.

AL-HAWADITH: Is an international conference possible when the United States has made and is making great efforts to keep the Soviet Union out?

Muhammad ibn Mubarak: I believe that it is generally difficult to exclude the Soviet Union. Even the United States maintains that, while initially contacts should be confined to the parties concerned, Soviet participation under an international umbrella is natural. Israel itself was established on the basis of a UN resolution. Therefore any settlement should be within the framework of international legitimacy. It should not be a bilateral agreement because peace cannot prevail in the region unless guaranteed internationally. Otherwise, it would quickly collapse.

AL-HAWADITH: Does the new Arab strategy include a plan of what must be done if the United States and Israel insisted on their views?

Muhammad ibn Mubarak: I believe that it is not in our interest to resort to threats. I have said that when the Arabs take a step they should take other factors into consideration like, for example, what the reaction would be and how to respond to any eventuality. We are at a stage where for the first time we have a specific concept. We are now compiling the reactions and views expressed about this concept, and soon we will assess these reactions and views and then consider the possibilities and ways of dealing with the various states. If the present Arab attitude is maintained I am confident that we will win and that Arab rights will triumph.

AL-HAWADITH: Would the direct political negotiations between Lebanon and Israel not entail commitments? For example, Israel might insist on a peace agreement with Lebanon.

Muhammad ibn Mubarak: The truth is that the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory has complicated things considerably in the Middle East. As you know, the situation in Lebanon is very complex. We support the efforts aimed at ensuring the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and restoring Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanon. As regards the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, we support them if they are held in the same manner as in the

past, that is, as proceedings to bring about a withdrawal of the enemy forces from Arab territory, but I believe that our Arab commitment is that any agreement with Israel must be within the framework of the Arab nation as a whole. The Lebanese president has supported this view. He agreed that no agreement should be concluded unless it is within the context of a comprehensive settlement. At present I cannot judge negotiations which have not even started yet, but we hope that they will only deal with the questions of an Israeli withdrawal and border arrangements, as in the past.

AL-HAWADITH: What is the state of political coordination within the GCC?

Muhammad ibn Mubarak: The GCC, as you know, is only 2 years old, but I think that it has made important and essential strides in the field of political and, especially, economic coordination. We now have a common perception. The summit and ministerial meetings reflect the clarity of our common vision.

AL-HAWADITH: What do you think of the increasing American presence in Lebanon?

Muhammad ibn Mubarak: I do not want to comment on the relations between an Arab state and any other state because every Arab state is free to establish relations with any state as it wishes and in any form it considers satisfactory, without prejudice to the general pan-Arab interests. We hope that the American presence in Lebanon will be temporary and for the purpose of solving a problem, not creating another one. We want Lebanon to be a united, independent Arab country enjoying complete sovereignty and with no foreign forces deployed there. We believe that the presence of the American, French and Italian forces is temporary. These states have made a commitment that their forces' presence was a matter of emergency and that they would only remain for a limited period of time.

COMMENTARY ON U.S. POLITICS IN WEST BANK

TA051825 Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 5 Jan 83 p 14

[Commentary by Rafiq Halabi: "The U.S. Embassy in the Territories"]

[Text] The U.S. consultate general in Jerusalem has been trying to please Palestinian ears. The Americans have turned the consulate into a meeting place for moderate West Bank personalities, and people like Bethlehem's Ilyas Frayj, B'ir Zayt Professor (Nafaz Nazzal), Dr Hatim Abu Ghazala from Gaza and even Raymonda al-Tawil are regarded as regulars there.

As everyone knows, to this very day the U.S. administration has not recognized West Jerusalem as the capital of Jerusalem. This is why the embassy continues to sit in Tel Aviv. Nor did it recognize the conquest of East Jerusalem and the West Bank in 1967. Two U.S. consulates are officially active, one in the eastern part of the city and the other in West Jerusalem, and their staff is not answerable to the Tel Aviv embassy. Rather, they are directly subordinate to and get directives from Washington. And this is not all: Despite the U.S. refusal to accept the conquest of the territories, the Gaza Strip is within the purview of the ambassador in Tel Aviv. Lewis frequents Gaza occasionally and meets with its leader. On the other hand, he meets with West Bank figures only rarely.

In fact, the United States takes advantage of the formal complexity in order to advance its political interests with regard to the Palestinians. The Tel Aviv embassy has been insisting that there is absolutely no difference between what the consul in Jerusalem says and what the ambassador in Tel Aviv does. There are some Palestinian personalities who can, however, discern discrepancies. They maintain that the consulate staff definitely supports the establishment of a Palestinian state, and moreover expresses reservations about the autonomy idea.

Since Israel is a democratic country, the embassy refrains from identifying with any particular political figure. But in the West Bank the rules of the game are different. Through its consulate, the United States has nurtured such personalities as Fahd al-Qawasimi and Muhammad Milhim, who were West Bank mayors expelled by the Israeli Government. Sometimes they, and particularly al-Qawasimi, are viewed as U.S. supporting cast members. Now when there is talk about their possible participation in the talks with

Israel along with other Jordanian representatives, the United States can have the feeling that it has fostered the right people.

"We believe we should encourage Palestinian leaders whose basic position toward the United States and the future of the territories is relatively moderate," a U.S. diplomat was heard saying recently. "People who were elected mayors in the West Bank in the 1976 elections are regarded in the United States to be authentic leaders and possible candidates for the autonomy leadership. The fact that Israel deported them does not alter our position."

The United States has been directly investing some \$4 to \$5 million per annum in the West Bank as part of a relief plan approved by Congress. This is political money whose purpose, the diplomat stated, is to persuade the Palestinians to believe that the United States is interested in reaching an understanding with them. Nonetheless, this is a negligible sum compared to what the United States invests in Israel.

U.S. Consul Brandon Grove is the person to whom complaints about the administration activity with regard to land expropriation and damage to the status of the mayors are being directed. The consulate is also the recipient of Palestinian petitions, particularly against the settlements and military government moves, and also serves as the meeting place for senators and other U.S. administration members and Palestinian notables.

The consulate has failed to get a foothold among the leadership that is identified with the PLO. It has likewise failed in establishing ties with members of the National Guidance Committee, who refused to confer with U.S. representatives when invited. In the past there were bitter clashes between those who favor and those who object to contacts with the United States among the Palestinian public figures. The only one to cooperate with the consul was Fahd al-Qawasimi, and he was dubbed in the West Bank a U.S. "collaborator." Rashad al-Shawwa from Gaza also has good contacts with the U.S. diplomats.

The ousted al-Birah mayor, Ibrahim al-Tawil, has a large family in the United States and this is one of the links between himself and the consulate personnel. He told me: "The consul employs a style we like. He, too, believes that the autonomy is not the right solution. His views are not distant from mine."

Several U.S. philanthropic organizations are also active in the West Bank. ANERA [American Near East Refugee Aid], for example, has a large budget to carry out projects in the territories. Its leaders consult with the consul as to where to channel the money. The Christian organizations that donate money to municipalities and charity organizations also maintain close links with the consulate. The military government is struggling to weaken these organizations' impact, and has even taken action with the mayors to prevent their meeting U.S. consulate members. The Israeli administration officers feared these contacts and said they grant "patronage and security" to

Palestinian figures. When Fahd al-Qawasimi was dispatched on a lecture tour in the United States sometime in the past, a senior administration officer told the members of the Hebron City Council: "Let us just hope Fahd is not found out to be a CIA representative."

U.S. organizations wanted to build a vegetable market in Halhul, and the administration prevented it. The consul, too, intervened, but to no avail. The U.S. consul tours the West Bank very often, and a few days ago he visited Ramallah and met with al-Tawil.

The Americans have succeeded in reaching the parlors of the moderate leadership in the West Bank, and in some instances have even encouraged Palestinian personalities in the territories to express opposition to the Israeli solutions. If they wished to constitute a decisive element in shaping the political views in the territories, well so far they have failed.

INCREASED U.S. GRANTS TO WEST BANK STUDENTS DISCUSSED

TA281325 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Dec 82 p 16

[Report by Yosef Tzuri'el]

[Text] Academic institutions in the United States are allocating study grants to graduates of colleges from East Jerusalem and the territories on an unprecedented scale.

The grants are being given to students without any direct link to their economic situation. The students are required to provide personal details to show that they were not involved in criminal activities.

The willingness of the institutions of higher education in the United States to help young Arabs from the area on such a large scale is a new phenomenon. A great number of students who asked for grants have already received positive answers. This year 70 students have already received grants, while 3 years ago only 20 received them.

The explanation for the change in the attitude of the institutions of higher education in the United States to Arab students from the administered territories lies in the change that has taken place in the political positions of the heads of these institutions. Arab elements explain that one should also take into account the Palestinian lobby, whose status in the academic institutions is becoming increasingly stronger. Another explanation is the Arab money flowing in to research funds in universities in the United States.

PEACE NOW MOVEMENT WARNS AGAINST WEST BANK ! CONTROL TEAMS!

Movement Issues Warning

TA041542 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 4 Jan 83

[Text] The Peace Now Movement has demanded that the IDF authorities in Judaea and Samaria act as soon as possible to prevent acts of violence which they believe is expected on the part of groups of settlers. The movement based its belief on a section in a military government document which fell into its hands. According to the section, Minister Yuval Ne'eman and Mk Hanan Porat are involved in the establishment of control teams, as they called them, possessing far-reaching authority. Peace Now said that the setting up of these teams is an effort to give official sanction to the acts of troublemakers and destructive persons from the school of Gush Emunim and Tehiya. Peace Now members also reveal that the document says that the military governors have been called on to ignore illegal building carried out by those associated with the village leagues, and not to act against them as against other lawbreakers.

Ne'eman Denies Existence of 'Control Teams'

TA051417 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 5 Jan 83

[Text] Science and Development Minister Yuval Ne'eman has denied the contention raised by the Peace Now Movement that he was initiating the establishment of control teams [tzivtey piquah] in Judaea and Samaria. Minister Ne'eman said that in his opinion the same standards applicable to the entire country in regard to taking control over state land should also apply to Judaea and Samaria, and the same legal measures the green patrol implements in the Galilee and the Negev should likewise be implemented in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

COMMENTATOR NOTES WEST BANK UNION ORGANIZATIONS

TAO41245 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Jan 83 p 9

[Commentary by Tzvi Bar'el: "Workers of the West Bank, Unite"]

[Text] Feverish vocational organization has recently swept the West Bank and East Jerusalem. All sorts of groups of professionals, from shoemakers, street cleaners, shoe repairmen to doctors, teachers and owners of travel agencies have "decided" in the last 3 months that they would be better off organizing in trade unions that would take care of their "professional" interests. This new vogue began, not accidentally, at the close of the Lebanon war, immediately upon word of the PLO's military defeat in Beirut.

At that stage, the Jordanian Government decided to revitalize its footing in the West Bank and broaden its channels of influence beyond those traditional envoys who have borne and still bear the Jordanian flag in the West Bank. Jordan has learned a long time ago that in order to gain popularity among the Palestinians it cannot make do with just slogans and speeches; in this the Palestinians are good enough themselves. However, under the circumstances where the Israeli Government's support is virtually nonexistent and the funds being funneled into the West Bank from the civilian administration fail to meet the requirements of routine needs, much less private needs, the way is clear for the Hashemite kingdom to show its generosity, with it knowing it will soon reclaim the interest for this kindness in a political way.

It is true that Jordanian money flowing into the West Bank is nothing new, still the framework in which this funding has taken place, under the umbrella title of "Amwal al-sumud," (funds of the steadfastness) occasionally assume a different form. This time it takes the shape of the trade unions, which serve as a new cover for Jordanian meddling in the region's affairs.

Some 15 new trade unions were created in the last 3 months in East Jerusalem alone, and parallel unions bearing identical names were similarly established in the various West Bank districts. Each trade union, which includes groups of professionals numbering between 30 and 300 or more, has its own regulations and administrative team with a chairman, secretary and budget director. They take care to publicize the establishment of the trade unions right from the start. This is usually accompanied by a propaganda and publicity campaign conducted over the pages of the East Jerusalem press, and in a

number of political announcements made by the chairman in the opening session. Thus, for example, one could find in al-Sha'b that the Janin Porters' Trade Union welcomes the fellow union established in Hebron and supports the chairman, who declared that the Palestinians should get their legitimate rights.

After the festivities of the opening, nothing is usually heard about the public work of that union. Matters move on to a more practical level. The executive committee of that specific union rushes to depart for Jordan to obtain a formal confirmation of the fact that the union actually exists and was set up in accordance to the Jordanian trade union law. This affirmation is of extreme importance, because without it there would be no point in trying to establish the union.

The moment the license was granted, a new valve opens, allowing the members of the union to enjoy Jordanian money, that country being more than ready to provide for any supporter and faithful loyalist of the king.

Thus, for example, the members of the Carpenters' Trade Union received funds somewhere in the vicinity of 700 to 1,000 dinars (or 65,000 to 90,000 shekels) each in order to "promote the field of carpentry in East Jerusalem and in order to allow the professionals to use new machinery." Similar sums were granted to the members of the Shoe Repairmen's Union in Hebron.

These "professional" dinars are given as a long-term loan (for 5 to 10 years) and no real examination is made to ensure that new equipment and machinery has really been purchased with that money; as far as Jordan is concerned, these funds are an innocent cloak it can cover itself with whenever it is accused of not caring to develop an industrial infrastructure on the West Bank, and the carpenter who gets the money can hardly buy his son a wife with that kind of money.

More practical significance is attached to the unions in a totally different sphere. Building a house on the West Bank, even when the land in question belongs to the family, costs a lot (the average cost of a private, 3-room, 100 square meter house is about 166,000 dinars). Up until the Lebanon war, the Jordanian Housing Ministry [name of ministry as published] granted mortgages of between 8,000 and 10,000 dinars. It was made conditional upon the level of income and upon obtaining a signature of a Jordanian citizen as collateral; moreover, he needed to be known as an owner of some kind of property who is on the government payroll (in which case he could also be a resident of the West Bank). Yet the most difficult condition to meet, which was virtually impossible recently, is obtaining a construction license from the civilian administration. Only someone who could get one could obtain the Jordanian mortgage.

The new blueprints the civilian administration has issued for the areas stretching from south of Bethlehem to the northern edge of Ramallah leave very little room for private building or supplementary construction work. The planning maps are covered with green lines marking the agricultural areas closed to construction, or with yellow marks encircling the areas slated for military camps and/or settlements—this, in addition to public

zones, nature reserves and areas "whose future will be determined sometime." Thus, only very narrow strips of land, very distant from inhabited areas, are left, and they are not fit to live on. But even for those the appellant needs to undergo a Draconian series of hurdles until he can get the building license: Again, without the permit there is no money.

The problem of the license cannot be solved by the unions, unless they pledge alegiance to the area village leagues. Thus, they may be able to get a license, but certainly not Jordanian funding for building. However, the advantage involved in the unions is that as a collective they can get budgetary allocations from Jordan and distribute them among the members of the union after each one of them has obtained a building permit, allowing it to build housing units for its members on land it purchased.

Thus, just as much as "professional" settlements of aircraft industries or postal workers crop up, so residential areas of Arab teachers, Arab postal workers or Arab doctors and carpenters also mushroomed. The policy of withholding building permits as exercised by the civilian administration, as well as the land seizures and the absence of aid have actually channeled the majority of the West Bank inhabitants, particularly those who cannot be grouped under any professional trade title, to the Jordanian method. Moreover, this does not entail a concession—at least not at this stage—on the national demand for a Palestinian state, because for the moment Jordan is not asking for any political payment for the money with which it purchases its holdings on the West Bank.

Furthermore, Jordan has recently concluded that "it is possible to survive without the caviar as well" and has cut the mortgages down to half. Besides, these are given in three to four installments requiring new underwriters each time, as well as visits to Jordan and contact with the Jordanian red tape. Thus direct, strong ties between the inhabitants of the West Bank and Jordan are being formed, making it possible for Jordan to keep its hand on the pulse and on the "oxygen" pipe nourishing the West Bank.

So it happens that as a result of the Lebanon war and due to the Israeli policy in the territories, Jordan's practical involvement in the West Bank is more convenient and cheaper from its viewpoint. It no longer needs to compete with the vast sums of money the military government invested in economically developing the West Bank in the initial years of conquest, nor is it any longer unwholesome from the national Palestinian point of view to receive money from Jordan for the purpose of building or "carrying out professional improvements." That is because for the Palestinians this, just like higher education, has become part of the national struggle.

One should remember that the new organizing of the trade unions might create an infrastructure for a future pseudo-political framework that will compete against government-appointed frameworks, because these organizings are representative, popular and control the finances.

DATA RELEASED ON ARABS' EMIGRATION FROM WEST BANK

TA261049 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Dec 82 p 1

[Report by economic affairs correspondent El'azar Levin]

[Text] About 94,000 Arabs emigrated from Judaea and Samaria in the 7 years between 1974 to 1980. This is disclosed in a report by the Bank of Israel's Research Department about the economic developments in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in the years 1970 to 1980. Due to this emigration the pace of growth of the Arab population in Judaea and Samaria has largely slowed down in recent years.

The report, written by Mr Refa'el Meron, discloses that since the Yom Kippur war there was a steep increase in the rate of Arab emigration from Judaea and Samaria: From 3.6 per thousand between 1969 to 1974 to 19.6 per thousand since 1974. The main reason for increased emigration is the rising demand for manpower in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Emirates which enjoy economic prosperity based upon the rise in fuel prices. The slowing of economic growth in Israel which brought about a decline in demand for Arab workers also contributed to the increase in emigration.

Between 1974 to 1980 about 680,000 inhabitants lived in Judaea and Samaria on a multiannual average. The emigration is estimated by the Bank of Israel at about 13,400 people per year, which totals about 93,700 people in the 7 years up to 1980. There is no information on the scope of emigration from Judaea and Samaria over the last 2 years. It should be noted however that there was even a larger emigration under Jordanian rule, emigration which reached about 25 per thousand per year. Most of the emigrants today are men.

As a result of the large emigration from Judaea and Samaria to the Arab countries (including Jordan), a very slow increase of less than a percent per year, was noted in the number of the Arab inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria which amounted to about 704,000 in 1980. This is an increase of 42,000 people compared to the number of inhabitants in 1974 and is a result of the natural increase minus the number of emigrants.

ABBA EBAN CRITICIZES POLICY TOWARD TERRITORIES

TA201505 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1340 GMT 20 Dec 82

["Abba Eban Communique"]

[Text] Tel Aviv, 20 Dec (ITIM)—The chief danger lurking above Israel's head does not come from external attacks, but from erroneous domestic (concepts), that is to say, the danger emanating from Israel's permanent control of 1.3 million members of a foreign nation who will against their will be held inside a country toward which they feel nothing, harboring no sentiments of loyalty or adherence either toward its flag, or its national anthem or unique identity and tradition.

There is not in the whole wide world even one free country in which one-third of the inhabitants are being held under that country's rule by virture of forceful coercion only. There are no grounds to believe that such a country could withstand the dangers involved in shocks, social disintegration, the decline of moral standards and international isolation, all of which are accompanied by the war coming at the end of that road.

The philosophy of Israeli rule over an unpartitioned Eretz Yisra'el stands in total contradiction to Zionism. Were it not for the concept of partitioning the state of Israel would not have been born the way it was. By eliminating that very principle, the country's Jewish and democratic character would be in jeopardy.

Some of the accompanying phenomena that go with the Likud's plan of controlling an unpartitioned Eretz Yisra'el can already be sensed. Masses of people live without the kind of protection offered by the Israeli laws pertaining to its citizens, and yet they are subject to regulations and limitations that are unparalleled in any democratic society. That includes the realm and sphere of the Israeli law and jurisdiction, the house arrests imposed on newspaper editors, the lethal clashes with students and schoolchildren. There is an utter absence of relations between the rulers and their subordinates. The skepticism and questions shared by the entire world regarding Israel's image and character are unavoidable and will only be further exacerbated the more the Israeli permanent control policy is embedded in the foundations of the Israeli policy. The efforts exerted

by the labor movement to extract the country from such dangers by way of abolishing the Likud rule and opening the door to a territorial compromise are a life-saving element for Israel and its people.

Addressing himself to the war in Lebanon, Abba Eban said: "Had the government agreed to be satisfied with the first stage of the war alone and then work out a cease-fire without proceeding into Beirut, we would have been stronger today, more secure, more united and more devoted to national and Zionist objectives. The hundreds of soldiers who fell would have been among the living and the thousands of civilians that were hit in the bombings and in the course of the siege of Beirut would not have encumbered Israel's conscience and image.

In view of these great difficulties, anyone who presently triggers petty account-settling over candidacies, and competition toward elections that neither are scheduled or expected to take place in the near future is doing the Labor Party a great injustice."

NEW POLICY SEEN EMERGING IN WEST BANK

TA031142 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Jan 83 p 17

[Report by Yosef Tzuri'el]

[Text] Professor Menahem Milson has left. Col Yig'al Karmon followed in his footsteps. Col Ya'aqov Hartabi has also left and made room for someone else.

"A housecleaning" in the top echelon of the Israeli administration in Judaea and Samaria. From the viewpoint of the area's Arabs, this is the beginning of hope for new relations, not based on "good guys" and "bad guys," collaborators and those refusing to cooperate in a spirit of defiance.

Two men stand in the upper echelon: Shlomo Ilia, as head of the civilian administration, and Col Shmu'el Tzuqer, as the area's military commander. During the Milson-Hartabi days, there was no cooperation between the military and civilian administrations. Even worse, there was open hostility between them, hostility that manifest itself in the way they functioned.

Today, Ilia and Tzuqer talk to each other, and understanding between them on basic matters is beginning to take shape. What they agree on is carried out. The administration officers see this, and Arab figures are also aware of this.

But the main thing has yet to be done. At issue is the turning over of a new leaf in relations with the Arab leadership—in all its forms—in the area. The method fostered by Colonel Karmon and adopted by Professor Milson has gone bankrupt, as it has been proven that confiscations are of no benefit. Similarly, it has become clear that harassment does not help, and the pitting of the village leagues against their opponents has not yielded tangible results.

Discussion with everyone and at all times—that is the new line, one involving no "discovering of America," but it is likely to check the hostility against the Israeli administration and make dialogue possible not only between the administration and docile men in the field, but also with those possessing ideas at odds with those of the civilian administration.

And if what Arab figures say in the drawing room expresses—even slightly—their true feelings, then today they are willing to cooperate with the Ilia-Tzuger team. And this achievement is important in itself.

ECONOMIC TRENDS OF WEST BANK DISCUSSED

TA012016 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 1 Jan 83

[Text] The Arab population of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza has dwindled since 1974, and the economic growth rate has fallen from 14 to 7 percent. These figures are disclosed in a study on economic development in the territories over the past decade by Bank of Israel researcher Refa'el Meron. Reporter Dan Eisenberg spoke with Meron about some of his findings:

[Begin recording] [Eisenberg] Refa'el Meron, you write that gross national product in Judaea and Samaria has dropped from 14 to 7 percent between the first and second half of the 1970's. Is the current rate of growth still high in comparison to other countries, and what are the prospects for the future?

[Meron] Seven percent is still a very high rate of growth. We will compare this to the rate of growth in Israel during this period, which has only been 2 percent. As for forecast, it is really very difficult to say, but data from 1981 indicated that 7 percent is still the rate at which these economies grow.

[Eisenberg] Despite the high growth rate you write that Judaea, Samaria and Gaza have only some of the indicators of an economy undergoing modernization. For example, there is virtually no industrialization in the territories. What does that mean in the long term about the viability of the economy of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza?

[Meron] Well yes, it is true that the growth patterns in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip have been idiosyncratic, but the reason is that these economies are exposed to a very highly developed economy such as Israel, on the one hand, and depended on it to a large extent. As for trends in the future it is very difficult to say, but I think it is always going to be a dependent economy.

[Eisenberg] Why has there not been a process of industrialization in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza?

[Meron] Well, there are several reasons. For one, because there are no custom barriers between Judaea, Samaria and Gaza and Israel, there is no possibility of developing infant industries, by surrounding these economies

with protection barriers, and so they suffer from competition with relatively advanced economy such as Israel's economy. But beyond that the reasons are that social structure in these areas is such that kinship element is very strong, so you do not find any organization which cuts across this structure. Even the largest factory in these areas is owned by a family. This is the usual pattern in these places. So as a result you do not have stock exchange, you do not have anything which cuts across this pattern.

[Eisenberg] You write that emigration from the territories has jumped since 1974 from 4.5 per thousand to 16.5 per thousand. Were labor opportunities in the Arab countries less attractive before 1974, or is there some underlying reason for the increase of the number of people leaving the territories since then?

[Meron] It is not so much that. One has to realize that the West Bank and to a lesser extent the Gaza district have always been labor exporters, there has always been emigration from these areas, especially from Judaea and Samaria. Now, until 1973 the big pool for labor was the Israeli economy, which grew at a very rapid rate in that period between the 6 day war and the Yom Kippur war. And there also it is simply that the Arab oil producing countries, because of the fast growth, have attracted labor because there was pressure of demand in these Arab countries. Incidently, one has to realize that the extent of labor migration in the Middle East is 3.5 million, so whatever the number of emigrants from the areas is, it is very small. [End recording]

MILITARY EXPERT ON MILITARY PRESENCE IN WEST BANK

TA280759 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Dec 82 p 3

[Report by defense correspondent Hirsh Goodman]

[Text] Israel will have to maintain a military presence on the West Bank for many years after a political settlement for the area has been reached. This contention is made in a book published today by the former deputy commander of military intelligence Tat-Aluf [Brig Gen] (Res) Arye Shalev currently with the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Shalev recently published an authoritative paper on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. In his book, the West Bank: Line of Defence, he writes that in the event of an attack by Syria and Jordan, supported by an Iraqi move west, Israeli forces would be outnumbered six to one for the first 48 hours of the war.

The basic political thesis of the book, which is published by the center in conjunction with Hakibbutz Hame'uhad, is that future talks between Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians and Egypt on the future of the West Bank will, by necessity, result in a political settlement.

His second point is that, regardless of the nature of the settlement, there will be a transitionary period of "tens of years," during which there will be many points of tension, almost leading to total breakdown.

Israel's military presence on the West Bank will be minimal in terms of territory, allowing only for the deployment of early-warning stations, two brigades, either armored or motorized, and intelligence installations. Israel's air defences will start at the Jordan River and Israel will reserve the right to fly aerial reconnaissance missions over the West Bank. These are the minimal security requirements Israel will need, no matter how propitious the political nature of the agreement, Shalev contends.

He is critical of the Alon plan, opposes an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and rejects demilitarization as a solution—arguments he documents in great detail. But he believes the problem is soluble. He also rejects Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon's plan for the West Bank, arguing that it is not plausible to assume that the Palestinians will come to terms with having autonomy over only 25 percent of the West Bank.

SHEHORI COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH EGYPT

TA051608 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 5 Jan 83 p 3

[Commentary by Dalya Shehori: "The Short Period of Glamour"]

[Text] One of the better things to happen lately in Israeli-Egyptian relations is that if in a cabinet session one of the ministers expresses anger or dissatisfaction over an Egyptian comment or propaganda in the Egyptian press, the prime minister and the foreign minister try to cool him down. As far as the policymakers in Jerusalem are concerned, there is an attempt to keep a low profile to the bad relations between the two countries. There is no hurry to react to Egyptian statements, and it seems as if no one does react. The impression is that they are trying to close an eye, not to develop an open quarrel, for fear that if feelings are heated things will get out of control.

This is good, because this is an indicator of the fact that Jerusalem, after all, is interested in peace with Egypt. Although Israel did evacuate the Sinai according to the peace process, and this was apparently a clear testimony to its will for peace with Egypt, Israel also did a number of things (the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq, the bombing of civilian population in Beirut, the annexation of the Golan, the war in Lebanon), that put Egypt in an impossible situation. It comes to mind that if Begin does these things without considering the great difficulty they cause Egypt, it is a sign that in weighing the importance of peace with Egypt in face of his other political goals, he is ready to give up on peace with Egypt, or endanger it. This is not an encouraging conclusion.

What is happening in relations with Egypt today?

In retrospect it seems that there was a period of glamour in the relations, and this period was very short: A little over a month—since the IDF with—drawal from the Sinai in 25 April 1982 and until the beginning of the war in Lebanon on 6 June 1982. It seems that the Egyptians made promises and kept them. In the same period there were many bilateral meetings. There was a tendency to complete the handling of subjects that had dragged on until then. Summaries were accepted. Papers were signed. And then came the war with Lebanon. Egypt began cooling. It cancelled all the meetings that were supposed to be held with Israeli representatives, including the

meeting on the subject of Tabah. Later, after the bombing of West Beirut (by chance this fell also on the date of the massacre in Sabra and Shatila) Egypt returned its ambassador in Tel Aviv, Sa'd Mortada, for consultations.

The ambassador is still consulting. For quite a long time already. Egypt's willingness to discuss Tabah was met with an Israeli refusal. The movement of tourists from Egypt to Israel, which was always very sparse, is close to zero today. Only 50 agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt, in commerce, economy and culture areas. In the area of culture, nothing is happening. There were supposed to be exchanges of youths. There are no such things. The Egyptians do not issue import permits, or give them sparingly. All the meetings of the committees, which were supposed to handle problems arising from carrying out the peace agreement (problems of commerce, problems of mail between the two countries, etc), were cancelled. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce did announce that last year Israel exported \$15 million worth of merchandise, but the total commerce between the two countries did shrink.

There are diplomatic relations between the two countries, Egypt sells oil to Israel, there are flights, there are border crossings and tourist movement. But the movement of tourists from Israel to Egypt went down as well: From more than 6,000 visitors in March, and the same number in April, this number went down to 1,000 in June (the month of the war) and the same number in July and September. August was different and 2,600 Israelis visited Egypt then. On the whole, the Israeli follows his country, and where relations are not so good he is also not jumping to go.

Egypt says that when Israel withdraws from Lebanon, the relations will reassume their normal character. If one is to analyze the Egyptian statements, they are prepared to be satisfied with reaching an agreement [sikum] on a timetable for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in order to bring the relations back to normal.

Meanwhile, Egypt is interested in revitalizing the debate over the Tabah problem—which is the Achilles heel which Israel seized in order to claim: "Discussion of Tabah? Fine, but as part of a debate on the implementation of the peace agreement regarding other problems as well, such as commercial problems, problems in transportation, tourism and so on and so forth." In fact, Israel is saying "no" to Egypt without using this word. Israel is not prepared—and there is some logic behind this—to discuss with Egypt only things Egypt wants to discuss, and not discuss issues Israel is interested in raising but Egypt is not.

Jerusalem pointed out today that there are three outstanding problems on the road to normalizing relations between the two countries: The war in Lebanon, the Tabah dispute and Palestinian participation in the autonomy negotiations. Senior political elements in the capital are working hard examining the impact of each of these problems on Egypt's moves. They note that the ties with Egypt are something new, with no historic past or precedent, which is why it is difficult to come out with prognoses. But is it

really true that after a timetable for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon Egypt would resume full relations? Or would it then use the pretext of the Tabah problem in order to pile up difficulties? Or would it raise new conditions for resuming the autonomy talks?

These thoughts run through the minds in Jerusalem, which is oblivious of Egypt's authentic intentions. The basis for these contemplative thoughts are statements made by President Mubarak and other Egyptian leaders who have often said that peace with Israel is not static, but strategic, stemming from Egyptian interest.

FORMER AIR FORCE COMMANDER INTERVIEWED

TA061156 Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 5 Jan 83 pp 10-12

[Interview with former Air Force Commander David 'Ivri by 'Oded Feldman and Ya'ir Lapid: "'We Change Doctrines a Week After the War'"—date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Did the fears that accompanied you (and which you even expressed) at the time the Camp David agreements were signed come true?

[Answer] The fears that accompanied me then were justified. There were fears from several aspects: That of my personal viewpoint as a commander who received a deployed air force and had to give back a shrivelled air force. I fear that when I left I would yet be called the "national disbander of the Air Force." There were other fears about the shortened early-warning space, an infrastructure that has been cut down. I think that we have succeeded in providing a certain compensation for these problems by fighting weapons, the development of fighting doctrine and certain classified exercises.

[Question] In a previous interview you said that you would have preferred to first attack the Syrian missiles and not only after that, attack the atomic reactor in Iraq. Would the Air Force have attacked the Syrian missiles even if the peace for Galilee war had not broken out?

[Answer] In order to answer such a question, I have to go into the field of predictions. In my assessment, we would have reached a situation of attacking the Syrian missiles both as part of the peace for Galilee war and in another conflict. The missiles were a strategic change in the Middle East, in which the Syrians took a strategic field that does not belong to them. Personally, I would have preferred to attack the missiles first and only after that, the reactor, from my military viewpoint. The longer the missile system exists, the stronger and more powerful it becomes. The threat is stronger and the challenge more difficult. Since there was a cabinet decision on the issue, in April 1981, I preferred to attack the missiles first, simply from the military viewpoint.

[Question] Can we say today that the Syrian missile threat has been removed?

[Answer] That is simply not true. There are surface-to-air missiles both of new types and in greater quantities than in the past. It is true that they are not in the al-Biqa' region of Lebanon, but in Syria, but the threat exists. Since the Syrian missile system is a prestigious one, and to a great extent, the backbone of Syrian security, I think that a great deal more will be invested in it in the future.

[Question] Can we say that following the peace for Galilee war, western weapons are preferable to the Soviet ones?

[Answer] In general, we can say so. Here we have not only a matter of western weapons, but also of a view. The West, as opposed to the East, builds itself on quality versus quantity. The attitude to human life, to training, is completely different. The West aims at a minimum of military force at a time of calm, in order to create a small army that will hold firm until the recruitment of additional forces. Qualitative weapons must be given to such a force. In places where manpower is cheaper, you can solve the problem by having more weapons. Therefore the Soviet weapons are generally simple, cheap, credible and in quantity, while the Western weapons are qualitative, sophisticated and devastatingly destructive.

[Question] Development of the Lavi began during your time in office. Is this project a part of the trend toward ridding ourselves of the dependence on the United States?

[Answer] No. This is not an element [last word in English] that can be decisive in a project of this type. First, because of the fact that in the Lavi too, there is a U.S. engine since after all, we do not at present have the ability to develop such an engine. In general, countries at present depend on each other more than in the past. Once you could build a Piper in your own country and say that you did not depend on others. That suited the 1930's and 1940's. Today developments and technologies are such that I am not sure that even the superpowers themselves are always independent. For example, take the issue of fuel or strategic materials. A country should have aspirations for independence, not only from the security aspect, but also from the economic one. At the same time, I do not think that the Lavi project boasts of creating security independence. The Lavi will fit in as a plane that will in the future replace the Skyhawk or the KFIR in the correct mixture for building up the Air Force strength. As such, we came to the conclusion that it will give us maximum security "per shekel" for the next few years. It was the economic viewpoint that led us to the situation in which we will not be able to purchase too many aircraft abroad and must build a plane which is relatively cheap and modern and will give the Air Force what it needs, both economically and nationally, both from the aspect of how a future enemy sees it and in accordance with the Air Force's scale of priorities from the aspect of maintenance.

INCREASED DISSATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT NOTED

TA041056 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Jan 83 p 3

[Pori poll]

[Text] Dissatisfaction with the government's functioning increased last month, but the public still sees no better alternative rulers. This emerges from a national public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ.

Only 40 percent of the public believe that the government is handling state affairs in a satisfactory to a very good way, compared to 56 percent who think that the cabinet is handling state affairs in a "not so good way, or totally unsatisfactory manner."

Today only 30 percent believe that the Likud is the most suitable party to run state matters, whereas 35 percent do not think there is any other party in Israel that would be better suited to tackle the country's problems.

At the same time, 55 percent believe the incumbent government accurately represents the Israeli public, while 31 percent said the Likud government is no longer representative.

A higher rate (60 percent) also believe that it would be better for the current cabinet to remain in power and not be replaced before the end of its term. On the other hand, 31.5 percent would like to see a change of administration now.

Finally, only 9 percent think that the Alignment would have won the elections "if Knesset elections were held today," whereas 69 percent are convinced the Likud would have won once again.

The poll involved a representative cross-section encompassing some 1,200 men and women interviewed in private all over the country.

COST OF LEBANON WAR 38 BILLION SHEKELS

TA290941 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Dec 82 p 3

[Report by Avi Temkin]

[Text] The direct cost of the war in Lebanon and its aftermath totals IS38.2 billion, IDF and Defense Ministry representatives told the State Control Committee yesterday. The figure includes the estimated cost of IDF deployment in Lebanon until March 1983.

The committee meeting which was called to discuss the cost and financing of the war, gave the Defense Ministry an extra opportunity to present its case for a larger budget for 1983 and a larger share of the money collected by the treasury to finance the war.

The IS38.2 billion figure includes restocking of stores, engine utilization time, and sums needed to acquire new equipment to replace that lost during the war. It does not include the indirect cost of the war on the economy as a whole.

The treasury has disputed the IDF's estimates and has questioned their accuracy. According to the treasury, the Defense Ministry does not include in its estimates the money saved through missed or deferred training and operational duties.

According to the treasury the ministry has based its estimates of the cost of lost equipment on the basis of the Yom Kippur war experience, when many soldiers failed to return equipment. This is not the case with the present war due to far more stringent safeguards, treasury representatives told the committee.

The Defense Ministry has requested an additional IS13 billion for its 1983 budget and IS12 billion during 1984-1988 to finance its war expenditures. An additional IS13 billion was transferred to the ministry during the current fiscal year.

The Finance Ministry has announced that it will only transfer some IS6.5 billion to the Defense Ministry during 1983 to cover war expenditures.

Treasury representatives told the committee that the treasury expects to collect some IS34 billion from the taxes and levies imposed to finance the war.

Only a third of the IS34 billion will be transferred to the Defense Ministry. The treasury representatives justified that by saying that the levies were planned months before the war and had no direct relation to it.

The committee decided to ask State Comptroller Yitzhaq Tunik to draw up a report estimating the true cost of the war and detailing the manner in which the treasury has used the money collected to finance it.

POLL VIEWS BEIRUT MASSACRE COMMISSION IMPACT

TA291149 Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 29 Dec 82 p 7

[Report on poll by Elihu Hasin]

[Text] When the letters of warning sent by the Commission of Inquiry to the nine persons "liable to be harmed"—including the prime minister and the defense and foreign ministers—were made public with much noise, a political attack was launched against the Kahan Commission. The fears, complaints and protests, which had been whispered behind the scenes, burst out and became a kind of public campaign with two complementary aims: To erode as much as possible the Commission of Inquiry's authority in the public's eyes, and to neutralize in advance the political implications its findings are liable to have.

The assault to attain the first aim was best expressed by green Knesset member Yitzhaq Ziger. From every possible platform, with the utmost sharpness and extremism, the liberal MK voiced the argument of principle that a commission like the Kahan Commission did not have the authority to discuss considerations of the political level. In the MK's view, all that the commission should have investigated was "whether there had been a deviation from the "chain of command" without "summoning the prime minister and the cabinet ministers to testify."

KOTERET RASHIT tried to check the public's stand, and to this end the 1,164 interviewees of the regular survey conducted by the Dahaf Research Institute were asked the following question in the third week of December: In your opinion, are state commissions of inquiry justified in investigating cabinet ministers' considerations? The responses were clearly divided: Justified-64 percent; unjustified-32 percent; and, no answer-4 percent.

It is natural that given such a ratio, a majority was found in all the relevant socio-demographic categories—age, sex, education, origin, and so on—in support of the first view, "justified," though in different proportions from category to category. However, particularly interesting is the fact that also in the category of Likud voters was there a majority holding this view, though it was smaller than in the overall findings. Likud voters: Justified—49 percent; unjustified—46 percent; no answer—5 percent. An

overwhelming majority was registered among the "floating vote," a group which now accounts for more than a fifth of the population: Justified-72 percent, versus unjustified-25 percent.

Different and less clear results were received with respect to the argument that whatever the commission's findings, the government will have to resign. This question was examined in the survey by means of the following question: If the Commission of Inquiry finds fault with the political level, must the government then resign? This question is not as concrete and simple as its predecessor. Among other things, it lacks the major variable: How severe a judgement will the commission pass—if it does pass judgement—on the political echelon, and how will it divide, if it does divide, the responsibility between the three figures who received warning letters: Begin, Sharon and Shamir. But even with this serious reservation, the findings are more than slightly enlightening: The government will have to resign—44 percent; will not have to resign—53 percent; those who abstained from answering—3 percent.

This shows that in this issue, which is strongly connected to the respondents' party-political preferences, the public mood is fairly well-disposed to the government, but not decisively so by any means. After the commission submits its findings, substantial shifts may occur in this or that direction, and only then will the scales of public opinion tip. As stated, much depends on the nature of the findings, though perhaps no less so on the protagonists' behavior and on the public dynamics which develop—if at all—following the findings' release. In the meantime, it seems that there is no reason for any side in the dispute to despair of its chances, just as there is no reason for it to belittle the weight of the other side. Both views today—on the eve of the beginning of the second roundof testimony—have a considerable basis in public opinion.

YARON MEMORANDUM TO BEIRUT MASSACRE COMMISSION

TA231306 Jerusalem Government Press Office in English 22 Dec 82

[Memorandum of Brig Gen 'Amos Yaron to the Commission of Inquiry investigating the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, submitted by Yaron's attorney, Ori Slonim, on 22 December]

[Text] To the honorable members of the commission:

1. Further to my letter of 21 Kislev 5742 (7 December 1982--ed), I respect-fully submit to your honors a written memorandum in the name of my client, Brigadier General 'Amos Yaron, chief IDF paratroop and infantry officer, in which reference will be made to section 8 (a) (b) (c) (d) of the commission's letter of 8 Kislev 5742 (24 November 1982--ed).

In this memorandum, I shall refer to section 8 of the commission's letter with all its subheadings, and prior to this detailed breakdown I shall refer to the general principle by which, in my humble opinion, one should view Brigadier General Yaron's response to what was said in the letter.

- 2. When the honorable commission comes to consider the body of evidence and testimony which lies before it and which refers to the actions and thoughts of Brigadier General 'Amos Yaron, it is only fitting to view them in two main dimensions: The first dimension is that of real time—i.e., the real time in which the events occurred. And the second dimension, the degree of caution (taken) by any tribunal, whether judicial or not, in coming to involve itself in (the question of) reasonable discretion exercised by the subject under discussion, who is a reasonable and experienced professional whose discretion and actions are subject to criticism before the tribunal.
- 3. From section 8 of the commission's letter, which refers to Brigadier General Yaron, it appears that the commission, in examining Brigadier General Yaron's acts and decisions on the relevant dates, will inter alia, examine the discretion and the actions of a senior IDF commander, a professional and (a man) with 25 years of experience as a field commander in the paratroops.

The subject of the investigation by the Inquiry Commission is indeed not given to judicial arbitration; but examination and weighing of the facts as they stand, in view of things which have already been voiced in Supreme Court decisions on the issue of professional discretion, will lead to the

acceptance of Brigadier General 'Amos Yaron's clarifications of what was said in section 8 of the commission's letter, and to the conclusion that he, as a senior commander with much experience, a professional who does not pass on responsibility to other ranks whether above or below him, took all the actions required after having employed reasonable discretion—and more—in accordance with the date, the information, and the reality prevailing at that time in the field where he commanded his division, and as will be explained in the continuation of this memorandum.

4. Re: Section 8 (a) of the Commission's Letter

In this section, the honorable commission calls Brigadier General Yaron's attention to the following facts: "(That he did) not appropriately evaluate and did not check the reports regarding acts of killing or acts deviating from regular combat operations," and the fact that he "did not report this to the GOC and the chief of staff" that same night.

One should view as background to the events (that are the subject of the inquiry) which are mentioned in this section a number of facts which were clearly proven before the honorable Commission of Inquiry by many witnesses who testified before it.

- a. The very sending of the Phalangists in to fight in the refugee camps—this was adopted as a resolution at the cabinet level.
- b. Brigadier General Yaron's division has already been fighting in the field for a number of months, and this combat is continuing also at the time of the events occurring within the camps, with a clear order being received not to enter the refugee camps.

A detailed description of the fighting may be found in the numerous testimonies by division officers who testified before the commission.

- c. Alongside the Phalangists' combat assignment within the camps, Yaron's division has many other tasks, and alongside the great attention the division commander devotes to the Phalangists' action, he devotes time and attention to other combat activities of the division.
- d. Brigadier General Yaron knows the Phalangist commanders and the Phalangists as a "peer" fighting force that has fought by the side of the IDF in its war in Lebanon; the experience of cooperation with them is good and regular, and he has no advance warning that they are liable to carry out atrocities and massacre.
- e. Brigadier General Yaron cautions the Phalangists prior to battle, and repeats this warning several times, that they not shoot women and children and those who surrender—and this in addition to and above and beyond a regular warning in which it is customary to caution every force, including IDF forces, going into action in built—up and crowded areas.

- f. The aim of the Phalangists' combat in the refugee camps is liquidation of the terrorists, with combat at night and in an extremely crowded, built-up area, and with the advance knowledge that many hundreds of active terrorists are in the camps and are shooting at our forces all the time, both before the Phalangists' entry and during their stay inside the camps.
- g. The terrorists employ the method of exchanging army uniforms for civilian clothing so as to conceal their identity: And they use in combat, among others, even children from the age of 12. These facts are known in accordance with advance information from intelligence.
- h. Brigadier General exercises, in sending in the Phalangists, precautionary measures above and beyond what is usual under the circumstances, and this, inter alia, in taking into consideration that the IDF is not involving our forces in the Phalangists' combat in the camps; he stations a Phalangist liaison officer equipped with a communications set at the forward command post, to serve as a liaison with the force fighting within the camps and to maintain continuous contact with him during the evening and night hours. He arranges for his own listening in on the Phalangists' communications equipment—and this in addition to the repeated and reiterated warnings during the night in the matter of being careful during the fighting about women and children and those who surrender.
- i. Observation into the camps is impossible during the day, because of the size of the camps, (and) the congestion of the 7-8 storey houses; obviously, therefore, this observation (ability) is meaningless at night, and therefore Brigadier General Yaron used other means of monitoring.
- j. After the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, and during the time they were there, there was continuous firing from the camp on the forward observation post on the division (and) on a battalion of paratroopers located outside of the camps, and members of our forces were even wounded.

Powerful explosions were heard from within the camp, and the activities of the additional division continued, as was detailed in the testimonies of the divisional officers, brigade and battalion commanders, and others.

- k. In the course of the evening, a Phalangist officer comes out of the area of the camps and, in response to Yaron's questions, does not verify any reports of acts of murder deviating from regular war actions.
- 1. Reports are received of a number of wounded among the Phalangist force within the camps and also of fighting with some 2,000 terrorists located in the camps.

Against the background of the details specified above, and concerning which the testimonies of the IDF officers who were in the forward command post of the division are available, come the "reports" that are the subject of section 8 (a) of the commission's letter.

The source of the reports is the Phalangist force which is fighting in the camps, the Phalangist liaison officer who is stationed in the forward command post; the reports concerning the number of dead among the terrorists and civilians speak of 300 terrorist and civilian dead—and soon after, the report turns into only 120 killed.

The drastic changes in the reports on the number killed cause Brigadier General Yaron to relate to these reports as irregular and unverified. At this stage, the division's intelligence officer requests that there be further monitoring, and at a higher level to that which already exists, of the Phalangists' communications channels—this, for the purpose of receiving additional reports about what is happening within the camps, and this while in the camps there is no one of our forces, as per the order which was already mentioned above not to send the IDF into the camps.

In parallel, the intelligence officer of Brigadier General 'Amos Yaron's division gives a situation report about all the events in which the division is involved that evening; and, i.e., the report says that information from Phalange sources had been received about 300 terrorists and civilians killed inside the camps.

This report—which has been submitted to the commission, among the other numerous exhibits which have been submitted—was distributed during the night of Thursday in a telegram to intelligence officers of the northern command, as well as of all the divisions and brigades in the vicinity of Brigadier General Yaron's division.

At that stage of Phalange fighting, and with the exception of the aforementioned irregular reports about people killed in the camps, neither Brigadier General Yaron nor any of his staff officers receive any report or confirmation of the report about "killings deviating from regular combat actions."

At this stage, at night, neither Brigadier General Yaron nor any of the other officers with him at the forward command post has any information or indication of irregular actions, and certainly not of "massacres." The testimonies of all the officers at the forward command post have been heard by the commission and have confirmed this state of events.

The actions of the intelligence officer of Yaron's division, upon hearing the reports he had received, are his immediate request for increased monitoring of the Phalangists' radio frequency (and) his transmission of the item in his intelligence report at 2310 hours; and other, additional actions have merited the professional esteem of other intelligence officers who have testified before the commission after the fact, who even point out that in these actions he showed unusual sensitivity.

But this action of the division intelligence officer, and the non-receipt of any verification of irregular activity in the camps—as well as the actions and conversations of Brigadier General Yaron with the Phalangist officers at the forward command post—do not add another layer to the very

little weight of the reports of what is happening in the camp; and at this stage of the night, Brigadier General Yaron does not see fit to report the events to the GOC--and thus certainly not to the chief of staff--this due to the simple reason that he does not have, according to the data at his disposal, any ripe and verified information to transmit to that echelon.

Brigadier General Yaron requests to reemphasize in his reply to this section of the commission's letter that—in addition to the above, that essentially at this stage of the night, he has no proven and verified material to transmit to the level senior to him—he does not believe that it was proper, under the circumstances, and as a senior division commander in the IDF, to take, at this time of the night, actions of transfer of responsibility to the level senior to him, and this without harming any other argument that has been clarified directly concerning the matter.

In conclusion to the clarification of section 8 (a), I believe that the distinguished commission, when it comes to weigh the reasonableness of Brigadier General Yaron's discretion and actions on the night between 16-17 September 1982, should weigh one more important question, and that is: What is the evidence, and what is the certainty, that indeed at that period of the night "irregular killing actions" indeed took place? And should not the uncertainty regarding the substance of the actions in the camps, their time, and irregular scope, which weighed carefully today, and tip the scales in justification of the actions and discretion of the commander in the area, who on that night is weighing and checking, has feelings which are not good, and in the morning transmits them to the level senior to him, including the doubts he still has.

To illustrate the aforementioned uncertainty, the distinguished commission is referring to exhibit No 75 in the inquiry material.

5. Re: Section 8 (b) of the Commission's Letter

This section, like section 8 (a) of the commission's letter, poses a question whose answer is a direct consequence of everything said regarding the substance of the scope and reliability of the information which was at Brigadier General Yaron's disposal on the evening of 16 September 1982, and also poses the important question—was it incumbent upon Brigadier General Yaron to stop the Phalangists' action in the camps at that time, as said in the commission's warning letter.

The basic question is whether it is at all incumbent upon a division commander in the IDF to stop a military action of a Phalangist Army fighting beside the IDF, though it is not militarily subordinate to the IDF, on the basis of information of the reliability-level which Brigadier General Yaron had at that time. The basis of the decision to send the Phalangists in was, as mentioned above, in the deliberations and resolutions of the cabinet meetings: And in the order to send the Phalangists into the area it was explicitly pointed out that the IDF is not entering the camps.

From many witnesses who appeared before the commission, and in many testimonies which were submitted in writing, the commission has before it, extensively, the justifications and the background to the dispatch of the Phalangists into the camps, the desire to include them in the fighting, the desire to minimize IDF casualties and wounded in the war in Lebanon, etc.

Against this background, in consideration of all the aforementioned in our reply to section 8 (a) above, and in consideration of the very small qualitative and quantitative weight of the conflicting reports of what was occurring in the camp, it is not at all incumbent on Brigadier General Yaron to stop the Phalangists' action in the camps, immediately upon hearing the reports which arrived on the night between 16-17 September.

The distinguished commission should examine this important question against the background of what was known solely on that evening, and disregard all the testimonies and evidence heard from witnesses who "heard" and "knew" in retrospect many additional facts.

6. Re: Section 8 (c) of the Commission's Letter

The answer to this section is also a direct consequence of all of the aforementioned regarding the significance and quantity of information Brigadier General Yaron has at this time; but at this stage, and despite the paucity of information, Brigadier General Yaron takes a number of actions which constitute fulfillment of the duties incumbent upon him as a commander in the IDF when Brigadier General Yaron hears on Friday morning of a woman who was hit on the head and of a father searching for his son—and these are the only ones leaving the camps—Brigadier General Yaron decides to transmit his feelings to the GOC.

And after his conversation on Friday morning, 17 September 1982, with the GOC, Amir Drori, who had arrived at the divisional forward command post, the Phalangists' action in the camps is stopped, and they are ordered to stay in their places and not continue further.

After a telephone conversation between the GOC and the chief of staff, it is brought to Brigadier General Yaron's attention that the chief of staff is to arrive in the area personally. It is superfluous to point out that throughout that morning there is still no verification of any reports, and no exit of people from inside the camps in the direction of the forward command post.

After arriving in the area, the chief of staff, after a conversation with the GOC, travels—before speaking with Brigadier General Yaron—to a meeting with the Phalangists' chief of staff and his officers at the Phalange headquarters. During the trip to the Phalange headquarters, the chief of staff and the GOC ride together in a car, while Brigadier General Yaron travels in his car. At this stage, Yaron knows that the chief of staff has been called to the area following Yaron's "bad feelings," which had been transmitted to the GOC; and the latter had seen fit to call the chief of staff.

In this body of facts, and still against the background of unchecked and unconfirmed information, it is impossible to see--in any context, military or otherwise--in Yaron's action any sort of breach of duty.

Yaron testifies in his opening testimony that he knew that the chief of staff is arriving at the meeting with the Phalangists in the wake of his bad feelings, which had been reported to the GOC of the command on the morning of Friday, 17 September; and he has no information of any additional weight according to which it is incumbent upon him to take action further to what he had done that morning—action which was reasonable, both in essence as well as concerning its timing.

After the meeting with the Phalange chief of staff and his officers at the Phalange headquarters, Brigadier General Yaron receives no verification or reinforcement of his existing bad feelings; rather, it would be correct to say the opposite: That the doubts which he had harbored at that time tended, after the meeting with the Phalange officers, (to be modified) in the direction of fighting that does not deviate from the usual—and this, from remarks made by Phalange officers that report to the IDF chief of staff about fighting activity that had come to an end, and do not mention any deeds of horror or massacre; and the proof (is) that after this lengthy meeting, none of the senior IDF officers or other Israeli security men came out with the knowledge, or the feeling, that a massacre had been perpetrated in the camps.

No reasonable person would imagine, after such a meeting with such senior participants, that is is possible to attribute to Brigadier General Yaron knowledge—even a smidgen of knowledge—that there indeed had been a massacre in the camps, and that accordingly his duty had been to take some steps in order to protect the population there.

According to the test of reasonable persosn, can it be imagined that Brigadier General Yaron was at that point supposed to receive a feeling different from that which he and his colleagues—both officers and security men—received?

After the meeting with the Phalange chief of staff, Brigadier General Yaron returns to the divisional forward command post; and in accordance with the conclusion of and with the things said at the meeting—and which have been submitted in writing to the commission—Brigadier General Yaron understood—as could be understood also from the document summarizing the meeting—that the Phalangists had ended their fighting activity in the camps, and that they were given approval to stay in the camps until Saturday at 0500 hours, for search and mopping—up actions, and that even authorization to give them a tractor had been given.

At this stage, Amos Yaron does not approve the admittance of any new forces to the camps, as specified in section 8 (c) of the commission letter; and indeed, the organized force that was at that time at the airport awaiting approval did not enter the camps.

As to individual Phalange soldiers who entered the camps afterwards, Brigadier General Yaron does not prevent them from entering because he thought and believed that their entry does not signify admitting new forces into the camps, but rather help in the evacuation tasks which they had asked to carry out until the morning hours, and that the circumstances of their stay in the camps and the appointed time which had been approved them to exit from the camps (Saturday morning) do not constitute an action of resumption of the fighting.

There is no reasonableness in the assumption that—after a meeting of such senior rank between the senior command of the IDF and that of the Phalange, and the non-reception of confirmation of the reports of irregular killings or "massacre"—Yaron committed any sort of unreasonable action under the circumstances at that time, and given the information in his possession up to that time as it was and of the quality described above.

7. Re: Section 8 (d) of the Commission's Letter

This paragraph refers in fact to the facts specified in paragraphs (a) (b) (c) of section 8 and sees in them--albeit prima facie--some "breach of duty or non-fulfillment of duty incumbent upon Brigadier General Yaron."

Section (d) does not contain any reference to any specific stipulation of law which Brigadier General Yaron allegedly breached or did not fulfill; and to the best of my knowledge, neither is there any such legal stipulation relating to this issue. The essential and determining question, in the humble opinion of Brigadier General Yaron, is whether under the circumstances at the time when he made his decisions about taking—or refraining from taking—specific steps, he acted in accordance with accepted military norms, as a senior IDF officer in an office such as that of Brigadier General Yaron, as division commander, would have reasonably acted.

This question can have but one answer, and that is: That under the circumstances at the time of the making of the decisions, and according to the information in the possession of Brigadier General Yaron at that time, and after having given full consideration to all the circumstances and all the implications of his decisions, it was impossible to act reasonably in any other way but the one in which Brigadier General Yaron in fact acted. Brigadier General Yaron, in all his actions, as well as in his presentation of the events before the honorable commission, including this memorandum, has assumed upon himself full responsibility for every action he has taken and has not attempted to transfer responsibility to anybody else.

Brigadier General Yaron did not refrain from personally taking decisions concerning actions, or avoidance of actions, which—to the best of his judgment at the time of the occurrence of the events—he was obliged, by virtue of the authority of his standing and office, to take on the spot, by himself, without trying to rid himself of personal responsibility by receiving backing from higher—ups.

In light of all the above, Brig Gen 'Amos Yaron has the honor to request of the distinguished commission that it determine that not only did he not breach or not fail to fulfill the duties imposed on him, but that all of his decisions and actions (actions and avoidance of actions) were made and taken after reasonable consideration had been given, given all the circumstances at the time of the occurrence of the events.

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTS ON SENTENCE FOR KILLING ARAB

TA301109 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Dec 82 p 7

[Commentary by Mati Golan: "The Danger of Losing the Image"]

[Text] "Soldier found guilty of illegal use of arms to disperse a demonstration in Judaea and Samaria"—a headline in HA'ARETZ on 27 December reported. The body of the report said that the case in question was a reserves sergeant who was found guilty by a military court on his own admission.

The result of the shooting was one killed and two wounded, a boy and a girl. In other words: The illegal use that the accused made of his weapon ended the life of one person and caused the wounding of two others. There were no differences of opinion over these two facts. This is because, as stated, they were confirmed by the reservist himself.

On the positive side, the military court found that "regretfully, the accused failed as a commander and deviated from his orders." On the debit side, the court decided that "the situation in which he (the accused) acted cannot be ignored, when a barrage of stones fell endlessly on him and his men." If we translate these findings into simple language, then the court found the following picture before it: The accused and his men served as a target for stones (from the school courtyard). In order to save themselves from the distress, the sergeant used his weapon illegally.

The unavoidable conclusion is that the situation in which the accused found himself did not require that weapon to be used as it was. If the situation had demanded such use, it would have come under the orders meant to provide suitable defense for IDF soldiers. Or, alternatively, the court would have decided that the accused had acted reasonably in his own self-defense and would have found him innocent.

Against the backdrop of these court findings, it is clear that in this case a very grave crime was committed. It is true that he did not commit murder, since what was missing from the act was the element of premeditated intention to kill. However, according to any legal criterion, the act was murder, whose sentence is laid down by law as many years in prison. Nevertheless, the sentence was 3 months in jail. And this, too, was not in practice, but on condition. That is to say: If he does not repeat his act, the person

found guilty will get off without anything. The practical conclusion is, then, that people in Judaea and Samaria may be killed and wounded, against the law, without any genuine punishment being given for this.

How is this possible—after all, on the face of things, the sentence appears to be the opposite of everything determined by the sentence. The explanation for this is found in another of the judges' reasons for the sentence. On the one hand, the three judges agreed that "we must not permit ourselves the custom of opening fire on a civilian population, even if our honor is injured, and particularly if it is a question of school students." On the other hand—and here is where the explanation lies—the judges said:
"...We do not agree to the civilian population in the territories permitting itself to treat IDF soldiers like stray dogs and turn them into something diseased that can be stoned without fear."

The hypocrisy in these cases shrieks to the high heavens. First, if the stone-throwers really do turn the living targets into "stray dogs" and something "diseased," what analogy can be found for such targets when they are hit by live fire? The judges provide no anser to this question. They also reveal complete deafness to the possibility that a "stray dog" is better than a dead man, and an imaginary but healthy "disease" is preferable to genuine, wounded school students.

The question is also asked: When does stone-throwing turn IDF soldiers into "stray dogs" and "as something diseased?" Is this also true when the stone-throwers belong to Gush Emunim? Let us assume that the very same incident had occurred in Yamit, except that the person killed had been an observant Jew and a member of Gush Emunim. Would there have been use of such expressions then, too? And would that, too, have had such extenuating circumstances?

Even when getting down to the affair itself, it is not clear what the connection is between such descriptions as "stray dogs" and "as though diseased," and the situation of the IDF soldiers in Judaea and Samaria. There is no evidence that the inhabitants of those areas really do regard our soldiers in this way; the fact that they throw stones at them actually tells us that they see them exactly as they are: conquering soldiers.

What attitude do the respected judges expect from the inhabitants of the territories? That they should throw rice and bouquets of flowers? Has there been a different situation in other conquered zones? Did we ourselves behave differently to anyone considered a conquerer?

Such questions rise far above any political platform of any kind. One may favor territorial compromise, or support a greater Eretz Yisra'el without reservations. One may claim that we are holding the territories justly, or may oppose that claim. However, as long as we are in the territories, we cannot expect the inhabitants to behave toward us other than as one treats conquerers.

There is nothing in all this to justify violence of any sort whatsoever. However, the only answer to violence lies within the framework of the law. From this aspect, there must be no difference in law to manifestations of violence inside or outside the Green Line. On the contrary, if we return to the comparison of Gush Emunim, then the difference, if there is one, should work just for the benefit of the inhabitants of the territories. When good Jews throw stones at IDF soldiers, that is an evil act that could incite a civil war. When this is done by inhabitants of the territories, it is an act that cannot be justified—but can be understood.

The court judges' instincts have been turned upside down. The facts that they mentioned as mitigating circumstances should have served as circumstances making matters more grave. It is precisely because the stone-throwing is a reaction expected of people from conquered territories that the conquerers' punishments should be made more severe—for it is they themselves who are treating the conquered as though they were "stray dogs" whose blood is superfluous.

If the sentence had been a deviant view, one could possibly have passed it over, but the views expressed in it reflect an increasingly widespread atmosphere of indifference and obtuseness toward human life and citizens' rights in Judaea and Samaria. This is the genuine danger threatening us. If we are defeated, it will not be by stones, or even bombs—but because of the loss of our image.

SHAMIR ON DISAPPEARED JEWS IN ARGENTINA

TA251031 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0805 GMT 25 Dec 82

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir by 'Oded Ben-'Ami on 24 December--recorded, with interview portion apparently recorded earlier]

[Excerpts] [Ben-'Ami] A few days before Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir left to visit Argentina and Uruguay, the committee of relatives of the people who had disappeared in Argentina requested that he try to learn the fate of the Jews, including the relatives of about 30 Jewish families now living in Israel, who had disappeared there. Shamir promised the committee that he would discuss this with the leaders of the Buenos Aires regime and try to bring hope to those grieving families. Shamir returned from South America yesterday, and the families are now waiting to hear what happened with their request.

[Shamir] As I promised, when I went to Argentina, I raised this matter in my meetings with the regime's leaders. I said that as a Jew I want and have a duty to inquire after the fate of members of my people. I asked them, based on the friendly relations between us, to check the names on the list we submitted and to try to make a friendly gesture toward us. They described the developments to me, of course, from their point if view. However, they said that they would check the lists and see what could be done to satisfy our request.

[Ben-'Ami] That request would seem to be Israeli intervention in the internal affairs of a friendly country.

[Answer] That is true. However, since we are friends and since those countries recognize the organic link between Israel and the Jews, this is not an exceptional thing for them. The Jews of Argentina are considered by that country's authorities to be citizens of Israel—of today and tomorrow.

[Question] Mr Shamir, you also met with Jewish families living in Argentina whose relatives have disappeared. What do they say about the authorities' treatment?

[Answer] Among those with whom I met was a delegation of parents whose children are victims of those tragedies. Of course, there were very difficult periods in Argentina. I will not say that the authorities are continuing along this path. The authorities are showing a liberal policy toward the Jews, and in every case and on every opportunity they have expressed their appreciation of the Jewish public there.

[Question] Mr Shamir, will you meet with the committee of relatives who gave you the list before you left and report to them about your meetings and the results of those talks?

[Answer] This is possible. If they want, then I, or Foreign Ministry personnel who handle this matter, will meet with them.

BI'R ZAYT LECTURERS FAVOR RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL

TA281541 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Dec 82 p 2

[Report by Avraham Peleg]

[Text] The first symposium of its type was held last night with Palestinian academics in the Weizman Institute of Science in Rehovot.

A large audience filled the hall in which four lecturers from Bi'r Zayt University appeared before the Weizman Institute staff and, together with several lecturers from the institute, discussed the relations between the two groups. The four Palestinians were (Dita Qaman), an expert in community health, sociologist Salim Tamari, the physicist Nabil Qasis and the lecturer on education, Khalil Mahshi.

The Arab speakers pointed out that most of the students in Bi'r Zayt, and even the majority of Arabs of the territories, now support territorial compromise with Israel which would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders.

They said that the Arab countries, and in their wake Palestinian leaders and intellectuals, are no longer afraid to declare openly the need for Arab recognition of Israel and its right to exist. Salim Tamari said that he and the physicist, Nabil Qasis had for several years been preaching for a solution involving peace with Israel, but on condition that sovereignty be granted to a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that Israel retreat from these areas.

He says there has been a great change in the Palestinian approach to Israel since the 6-day war and the wars that followed it. "In the 6-day war the Palestinians realized that they could not expect genuine help from Arab countries—because of the weakness of those countries—in fulfilling their national aspirations. Therefore, the Arabs now recognize the new reality and the Israeli national unity," he said.

Salim Tamari said that after the 6-day war there was a prevalent "explanation" of why the car licenses in the West Bank began with the figures 630. "The reason is that in the 6-day war three Arab countries turned into...0."

He said that after the Lebanon war recognition that the solution would only come through a dialogue between the two peoples had increased "and it is tragic that it is now that Israel is turning its back on this solution, led by a government in which Begin and Sharon are serving." At the same time, the speakers commented that the Arabs in the West Bank regard the PLO as their political leadership and that of all the dispersed Palestinians.

The Arab lecturers attacked the restrictions that the civilian administration is imposing on the territories' inhabitants. They say those restrictions include negating freedom of expression and citizens' rights, expropriating land and water and so on.

According to them, about 40 percent of the goods in the West Bank are Israeli and that they are flooding the market and destroying the Palestinian economy.

The hosts were the professors from the Weizman Institute—-Yo'el Gat, Avraham Rinat, (Wolfie Traub) and (Harry Lifkin). The first speaker, Professor Katz, said that the Israeli academics were well acquainted with distant universities such as those in the United States, but they did not at all know the neighboring universities in the territories and "the time has come to change this situation."

MODA'I DISCUSSES JUDAEA, SAMARIA OIL POTENTIAL

TA281613 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 28 Dec 82

[Text] A geological mapping survey of Judaea and Samaria has recently been conducted in order to find out what the oil potential in that region is. This was disclosed today by Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i to the members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. On another issue, he reported that over the last few days Israel has been trying to obtain further permanent deals for oil purchases. Here is a report by our Knesset correspondent, Gil'ad Mishori:

[Begin Mishori recording] In answer to a question presented to him at the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee session, the energy minister said that until recently Judaea and Samaria were not considered potentially oil—rich, but now geological mapping surveys are underway there for the sake of oil prospecting. The minister, who reviewed the world and Israeli oil markets, said that Israel is seeking additional permanent deals with oil—supplying countries. He revealed that Egypt was prepared to supply us with more oil than it now does, but Israel is not interested in being dependent on one supplier.

As early as in the days when Iran supplied Israel with oil we reduced our demand and purchase from it by 20 percent, Moda'i said, because of the belief that we should not rely on the regime being stable in Iran. The minister disclosed that Israel and South Africa are among the countries with the largest oil reservoirs in the world.

The minister believes world oil prices will remain stable unless an unexpected international shock occurs. Israel now purchases oil at the cost of \$1.7 billion per annum. Oil prospecting inside Israel is allocated \$15 million only.

All the speakers from among the committee members noted that the sum is disproportionately small. Mk's Harish, Lynn and Hurvitz demanded that more be allotted to oil prospecting, and the minister himself even said that this is truly very little.

Mk Beni Shalita proposed inviting the finance minister to brief the committee so that its members could explain their opinions to him regarding the appropriate order of priorities. All the experts say that there is oil in Israel, Moda'i said, and we found signs indicating as much in the south, in the north and in the center, but we have not actually located large quantities. [End recording]

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OREN REVIEWS SETTLEMENT EMPLOYMENT PICTURE

TA240659 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 24 Dec 82

[Text] Some 20,000 Jews are living in Judaea and Samaria, apart from the Jordan Rift Valley, where most of the settlements are agricultural. From this population of less than 4,000 families, about two thirds work within the Green Line area. In the settlements next to the Green Line, 80 percent work inside the Green Line, and in the settlements farther away, only 50 percent or less. Let us emphasize that this refers to average figures. Here is more about this in a report by our correspondent Shalom Oren:

[Oren--live] The lack of employment in the settlements of Judaea and Samaria is holding up development of the settlements and the absorption of new families. This problem is especially grave in the distant settlements such as Elon More, 'Ofra, Qeddummin and Shilo and even Ma'ale Efrayim, where the settlement's breadwinners are trying to bring employment and industry to the spot. In the settlements that are even relatively closer to the Green Line, most of the inhabitants are working inside the Green Line area, and this situation will continue in future. On average, only about a third of the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria, apart from the Jordan Rift Valley, are working inside the settlements or around them. And of this figure, almost 50 percent are working in service branches. The number of those working in production is still small, says Me'ir Har-Noy of the Company for the Development of Judaea and Samaria.

[Begin Har-Noy recording] At present, from the total inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria, about 20-30 percent are employed in production on the spot. Now, according to the planning and current development, this may change within the next 1-2 years, with the Barqan area being intended for several thousand jobs and the industry zone being established in Qarne Shomron also intended to contain several hundred and maybe thousands of workers. Within a year or two, this will double. [End recording]

[Oren] There has recently been a great demand from the private sector to build in Judaea and Samaria, because of the largescale benefits being given to private enterpreneurs in this preferential development area. All the elements planning the employment are basing it on the Jewish purity of labor, and it will include technology-enriched industries, computers, electronics and military industries.

ARAB WORKERS IN SETTLEMENT CONSTRUCTION VIEWED

TA241555 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Dec 82 p 15

[Commentary by Dani Rubinstein: "To Build Someone Else's House"]

[Text] A few days after Mk's Yosi Sarid and Shulamit Aloni raised the affair of the massive involvement of Histadrut-affiliated companies in building the settlements in the West Bank, I happened to meet a Solel Boneh [Histadrut-affiliated construction company] foreman and we exchanged a number of words. He invited me to visit one of the building sites near Qalqilyah, and said: "Come and see for yourself. All the subcontractors and all the employees are West Bank Arabs, and if the Arabs build the settlements and annex the West Bank to Israel, what do you want from Solel Boneh?" I had some reply for him, and recalled the famous affair of the establishment of Elon More in Jabal al-Kabir 3 years ago. Following the High Court of Justice ruling that forced the settlers to evacuate the site they squatted in Rujayb, and after the "peace now" demonstration, then Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon harnessed the IDF and the settling bodies in an enormous effort to build the new settlement east of Nabulus quickly. Heavy equipment was brought in on helicopters, Jewish national funds tractors were directed there as well as many dozens of workmen, and they were all Arab. True, they did not come from local villages or from Nabulus, but from other areas, but still they were all employees from the West Bank who were thus serving Gush Emunim. Arab workmen have built and still continue to build not only settlements, but also IDF installations in the West Bank, and this is common knowledge. 'Al Hamishmar's Gavri'el Stern told me once that the security forces ordered an Arab house in East Jerusalem, whose owner was convicted of terrorist acts, demolished. He came there and was astonished to see that those who carried out the order were all Arab employees who came to work for a Jewish contractor hired for that purpose.

I have often talked to the Arab workers and acquaintances from Ramallah and Bethlehem, and they enlightened me on the norms of conduct in the territories that make it possible for the Arabs to work and make a living off Israel, and the justification for the fact that the income from Israel makes it possible for them to remain on their land. This is why even the PLO hardly acts in this sphere. "After all, what is the alternative?

To have them immigrate to Kuwait? Will that make for a better situation for the Palestinian people?" (This is how an East Jerusalem Arab writer put it.)

This was the background against which I read a scientific article by Professor (Shalim Tamari) from Bi'r Zayt University, published in the PALESTINIAN RESEARCH REVIEW about a year ago. The writer is a sociologist from Yafo who studied in the United States and resides in Ramallah. He entitled his article: "Building Others' Homes," and analyzed the social phenomena that accompany the work of employees from the territories in Israel. The analysis is made on the basis of research work conducted in the village of Ra's al-Tin in southwest Samaria. The basic facts are well known: The vast majority of the Arab employees working for Israelis come from the villages (some 77 percent), not from the cities. Most of them are untrained labor, unorganized, whose average wages are some 40 percent lower than the wages Jewish labor employees in the same field earn.

Why do they work for the Israeli conqueror? Professor (Tamari) presented the question only in a covert manner, but his analysis provides for a detailed explanation of this. Apparently work in Israel, and particularly in the construction field, harmonizes exceedingly well with the villagers' lifestyle in the region. This work is basically part-time and seasonal, so that the farmers employed in them can at one and the same time till their lands in the village and make money in Israel. The Arab agriculture in Samaria, founded on the olive tree branch, is seasonal and is not enough to eke out a living for an entire family. Had there been no work in Israel, the farmers would have been forced to seek employment in Amman, in the oil countries or overseas and would have gradually lost contact with the village and the land. Subsequently, working nearby, for instance for an Israeli contractor, even helps them, to an extent, maintain their land and honor, as the local idiom says: "Without land there is no honor."

The village farmers working in Israel are organized in small groups comprising family members employed as subcontractors and they are dependent and more closely connected to their work than to the foreign employer. They use their time according to the agricultural season, preferring the large Israeli contractor over a local Arab employer. The Israeli contractor gives them missions to carry out, one after the other, and pays fast so that they finish and proceed to the next job, whereas the Arab contractor or employer, who is much smaller, needs them only sporadically and can delay payment. The Israeli employer is easier to work for than his Arab counterpart and when one works in Israel the possibilities of finding entertainment and doing shopping are also open. An interesting point raised in the research is that the Arab labor force in Israel divorce their work from political affairs. Their business is with the Jewish contractor, with the foreman, the policeman at the roadblock and possibly also with a prostitute on the roads leading out from Tel Aviv, but with those one does not talk politics.

The implied conclusion from this analysis is that despite the substantial aid the Arab workers give Israel, their work should also be attributed to the contribution they thus make to strengthening the Arab hold over the homeland. They save money, build houses and open businesses in their local

places of habitation. In this context, there was an interesting article that appeared at the time in the East Jerusalem AL-QUDS describing the fear and apprehension felt in 1980 in the Gaza Strip, whose inhabitants were afraid that normalization with Egypt might bring thousands of cheap Egyptian workers in and that they would snatch work in Israel from the laborers from the territories.

In view of all these explanations, the question of the Histadrut-affiliated companies carrying out the annexation and Gush Emunim policies still remains. The planners of the annexation created the most successful catch-22 situation from their point of view: The Histadrut companies and the contractors want to make money; the Arab workers want to live and the Israeli wants to live better. Thus the West Bank is being inadvertently annexed, perhaps even contrary to the wishes of the contractors, the employees and the new tenants. The Histadrut secretary general ordered an examination of the extent to which the employees from the territories have weakened the Histadrut's power and position as a trade union; to what extent the image of a whole range of labor branches in Israel have been altered, what kind of changes occurred in the Moshav and other places, and what is the new image of the (former) Jewish laborer who annexed the territories.

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MED-DEAD CANAL FEASIBILITY STUDY CONCLUSIONS

TA300918 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 Dec 82 p 1

[Report by Charles Hoffman]

[Text] The final economic feasibility study of the Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal plan has concluded that the benefits of the ambitious hydroelectric project will just cover its \$1.3 billion cost, making it a break-even proposition. Estimates 2 years ago put the net economic benefits at \$550 million.

The study's conclusion was disclosed yesterday by Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i in an interview with THE JERUSALEM POST. Moda'i plans to recommend that the cabinet give its final approval to the project next month, once the study is officially published.

Moda'i stressed that the cost-benefit calculations examined only the value of the electricity to be produced over a 50-year period, and not the indirect benefits such as cooling for inland power plants, industrial uses, and salt-water fish ponds in the 'Arava.

No definite plans exist now for these associated projects, and a recent report by the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Company concluded that "at this stage, it is difficult to place a direct value on such projects." An official associated with the plan said that when the pre-feasibility calculations were made in 1980, the direct benefits were so obvious that there was no need to take the indirect benefits into account.

The project calls for water from the Mediterranean to be pumped through a canal and tunnel system into storage pools some 400 meters above the Dead Sea. The water will generate electricity at peak-consumption hours in an 800-megawatt power plant as it cascades down to the sea.

Over a 20-year period starting in 1990, the project will raise the level of the Dead Sea to from-408 to -393 meters at which point the flow will be reduced to maintain a stable level.

The earlier cost-benefit estimates were based on lower rates of interest for the capital needed to invest in the project, and on projections of a

steady increase in the price of fuel to be replaced by the hydroelectric power. Recent shifts in the world capital and oil markets have forced the planners to revise their calculations.

Asked how the economy could carry the simultaneous burdens of the Med-Dead project, a nuclear power plant and another coal-fired power plant, Moda'i replied that the main investments in these projects would be staggered over a 15-20 year period.

BRIEFS

NEW GROUP IN LABOR PARTY—A third group has been established in the Labor Party for the purpose of replacing the current party's leadership. Mk Eliyahu Speiser, one of the founders of the new group, told our correspondent Pe'erli Shahar that about 12 Knesset members, mayors, district secretaries, party center members and others are part of this camp. According to Speiser's definition, this group opposes the leftist label associated with the Labor Party. It advocates renewed ties with the religious parties and hopes to replace the current party leadership in preparation for the 1985 elections. Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres refused to comment on Speiser's disclosure while Mk Yitzhaq Rabin said that Israel is a democratic country and the Labor Party is a free party. Labor Party Secretary Hayim Bar—lev said: We have elected leaders and a determined policy and all forces should rally behind the members who have been chosen to discharge their various functions.

[Text] [TA030833 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 0820 GMT 3 Jan 83]

NEW GROUP PROMOTES LINKS WITH USSR-Haifa-A national society for the promotion of tourism and cultural exchange with the Soviet Union has been founded there. Dr Yuly Nudelman of the Ramban Hospital, who immigrated from the Soviet Union, was elected chairman. The society is made up of non-political personalities, including Rabbi Shmu'el Avidor and former prisoner of Zion Valeriy Kokoi. The organizers say they have already contacted Soviet officials and that the Israeli authorities have also been informed of the organization's existence. They believe that tourism and cultural exchange will pave the way for the resumption of normal relations between the two countries. [Text] [TAO40650 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Jan 83 p 2]

POPULATION FIGURES IN NORTH—The chairman of the Galilee Settlements Council, Menahem Ari'av, told our correspondent Yo'el Dar that there was a 1.5 percent drop this year in the proportion of Jews in the north, which now stands at 50 percent. In 1981, the Jewish population increased by 10,000 people, while that of the Arabs grew by 17,000. Ari'av called on the government to adopt a new policy that would encourage Israelis, including new immigrants, to settle in the north, especially in the Galilee settlements. Moreover, the chairman of the Labor Party's Minorities Department, Ra'anan Kohen, says that 10 Jewish settlements in the Galilee and the triangle have decided to try to increase understanding and cooperation with the inhabitants of

neighboring Arab villages. He also urged the Education Ministry to prepare a school program about the national problems of the Arab citizen. [Text] [TA251013 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 25 Dec 82]

RETURNING EMIGRATION STATISTICS—Last year marked a substantial rise in the number of former emigrants who returned to Israel. This was despite the slump in immigration registered in 1982. According to Absorption Ministry statistics, more than 1,400 former emigres returned last year, compared to some 900 in 1981. Partial data compiled by the Absorption Ministry and the Jewish Agency's Immigration and Absorption Department indicates that in 1982 Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union reached an all-time low, unprecedented ever since the gates of that country were first opened in the early 1970's. Thus only some 3,000 Jews left the Soviet Union in 1982, compared to 9,500 in 1981. Of them, only 700 made it to Israel. However, there was a marked rise in immigration from Romania, from where 1,420 immigrants came last year compared to 990 in 1981; and from Argentina, with 1,200 coming last year as against 950 in 1981. There was also a slight rise in the number of immigrants from Britain, the United States and France. [Text] [TA052036 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Jan 83 p 3]

FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES—The Bank of Israel's foreign currency reserves in 1982 grew some \$150 million, growing from \$2,847,000,000 at the end of December 1981 to \$2,995,000,000 at the end of December 1982. [TA052036 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Jan 83 p 10]

GOVERNMENT MONEY INJECTION—Last month the government injected: 900 million shekels into the market, and this injection reached 22 billion shekels since the beginning of the year. Government injection of money means money the government spends beyond the money it took in. [TA052036 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 4 Jan 83 p 1]

CABINET APPROVES SPACE AGENCY—Israel is to have a Space Agency. A cabinet committee yesterday accepted Science and Development Minister Yuval Ne'eman's proposal for the creation of such a body to coordinate and initiate local projects for exploitation of space. It charged him with drawing up specific plans for the agency's structure. At his first meeting with science correspondents last December, after his appointment as minister, Ne'eman described space research and exploitation as a top priority of his ministry. [Text] [TA060832 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Jan 83 p 1]

OIL PURCHASING STATISTICS—In 1982 Israel bought oil for \$1,625,000,000, which is \$200 million less than it paid for oil last year. Our correspondent Gadi Sukenik, who got this information, reports that Israel paid \$29.5 a barrel compared to the official OPEC price of \$34 per barrel. The oil purchased was of higher quality than that bought last year. [Text] [TA271137 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 27 Dec 82]

LABOR W. BANK POLICY MISUNDERSTOOD—Mk Yitzhaq Rabin has said that the public misunderstands the Alignment's political position, stressing that the Alignment opposes withdrawing to the Green Line. Real changes in the map are necessary in the context of a peace agreement with Jordan, and

accordingly, the Jordan Valley, the eastern slopes of Judaea and Samaria, greater Jerusalem and its associated town, Gush 'Ezyon, and the southern Gaza Strip will always be part of Israel. At the same time, Rabin said in a conversation with our correspondent Shalom Oren that he opposes settlement in the area which the Alignment is willing to hand over in order to reach a peace agreement with Jordan, settle the Palestinian problem, and preserve Israel's Jewishness. Rabin said he would be very happy if Jordan joined the negotiations on the basis of the Camp David accords. [Text] [TAO41041 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 4 Jan 83]

FUNDS FOR URBAN BUILDING—The Knesset Finance Committee decided by a majority vote to transfer 375 million shekels to urban construction work in the West Bank, Ari'el, 'Immanu'el, Qarne Shomron and Alfe Menashe. The committee also held a second vote on Mk A. Melamed's objection to the allocation of 19 million shekels to establish Kokhav Ya'ir. [Text] [TA041110 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 4 Jan 83 p 2]

HEBRON ELECTRICITY POLE TORN DOWN--The Qiryat Arba' local council this afternoon tore down high-voltage poles belonging to the Hebron Municipality, which it claims were placed on Qiryat Arba' grounds. The head of the Qiryat Arba' local council told our correspondent Arye Gus that these poles were put up in areas intended for the development of Qiryat Arba'. Involved are some high-voltage poles that supply power to 25 houses in Hebron, about 1 km north of Giv'at Harsina. Some of the inhabitants of these houses have filed a complaint with the police. [Text] [TA061529 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 6 Jan 83]

HAMMER AGAINST ANNEXATION OF TERRITORIES—There was a confrontation today between Education Minister Zvulun Hammer and Rabbi Moshe Levinger from Hebron when the latter tried to prevent Minister Hammer from appearing before the World Conference of the Bene 'Akiva Movement [affiliated with the National Religious Party], which is taking place now in Jerusalem. Rabbi Levinger told the conference delegates that due to Minister Hammer's political views, he must not appear before the conference. This issue was voted upon by the delegates and all 200 of them voted in favor of Minister Hammer's appearance. Minister Hammer explained his world outlook to the conference, criticized the phenomenon of verbal violence in Israel, and told them why, in his opinion, Judaea and Samaria should not be annexed. He also called on the movement members abroad to immigrate to Israel. [Text] [TAO51604 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 5 Jan 83]

RESCINDING CONFINEMENT ORDERS CALLED FOR--The Arab-language Israeli paper AL-ANBA' today calls for the rescinding of all confinement orders in Judaea and Samaria. In its editorial, the paper writes that Israel has a democratic regime and is a nation of law. The citizens in Israel have a right to express their views freely and if their remarks are an offense against the law they should be put on trial. In these special days, AL-ANBA' writes, when an agreement with Lebanon is expected and when King Husayn may embark on a political initiative, the barriers should be removed so as to allow every citizen to express his views. Yesterday, confinement orders were rescinded for three members of the former National Guidance Committee. [Text] [TA211249 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 21 Dec 82]

FATAH LIST WINS STUDENT ELECTIONS—In the student council elections at Bi'r Zayt University, the supporters of the Fatah Organization have had a narrow victory, winning four seats on the council, as did George Habash's supporters. The majority to be obtained by the Fatah supporters now depends on an independent candidate, who is also considered a supporter of the organization. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari notes that in the Bi'r Zayt elections, a joint list of Nayif Hawatimah and the communists and that of the Muslim Brotherhood were totally defeated. [Text] [TA191038 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 19 Dec 82]

VILLAGES JOIN TULKARM-QALQILYAH VILLAGE LEAGUES--Tulkarm, 19 Dec (ITIM)--Half of the villages in the area of Tulkarm and Qalqilyah have joined the local village league over the past year. ITIM's correspondent in Judaea and Samaria reports that additional villages in this area have asked to join the league. During the past year, the Tulkarm-Qalqilyah area village league received about 52 million shekels, which were invested in developing road and water networks and expanding schools. The league is now trying to obtain funds to link the villages up to the electricity network. [Text] [TA190949 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 0930 GMT 19 Dec 82]

NEW SETTLEMENT IN GAZA STRIP--A new settlement called Ele Sinay has gone up in the northern Gaza Strip. The settlers have set up a temporary structure and said that they are beginning to prepare the site for a permanent settlement. Yaron Enosh reports that the settlers are formerly of Yamit. [Excerpt] [TA190911 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 19 Dec 82]

NAHAL TO ESTABLISH FIVE NEW FOOTHOLDS--"Next year, the Nahal will establish at least five new footholds, and will also turn three of them into civilian settlements," the head of the Defense Ministry's Youth and Nahal Branch, Levi Mann, said in an interview with BAMAHANE NAHAL, which will be published this weekend. Levi Mann added that "two of the new footholds will be built in the Negev: Zofar, 25 km north of Faran in the Sappir Center in the central part of the 'Arava; and another one, whose location has not yet been finally determined. Two additional footholds will be set up in the Jordan Rift Valley, and another one on the southern slopes of the Hebron hills. The footholds that will become civilian settlements will be: Elifaz in the southern part of the 'Arava, which will turn into a civilian settlement next month; and Shelah in the Mehola area in the central part of the Jordan Rift Valley, which will become a civilian settlement in the middle of next year. So will another foothold, about which no final decision has yet been made." [Text] [TA221112 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 22 Dec 82 p 2]

SECURITY PRISON TO BE ESTABLISHED—In about 10 months, a central prison for security prisoners is to be inaugurated in Nabulus. Our correspondent Shlomo Raz reports that the new prison is included in a plan to jail the 2,700 security prisoners in prisons intended only for them. [Excerpt] [TA240700 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 24 Dec 82]

VILLAGE LEAGUES WANT YOUTH MOVEMENT—The heads of the Arab village leagues in Judaea and Samaria want to establish a youth movement that will support the same principles guiding them and namely total opposition to the PLO. The control over the youth is considered very important by the village

league leaders, more so even than dozens of kilometers of new roads and several new infirmaries. The village league leaders believe that the war in Lebanon has enabled them to strike deeper roots among the rural population, but that this achievement is liable to evaporate if the area's youth do not receive special guidance that conforms with the principles guiding their parents. If this youth movement is set up, its functions will be as follows: To neutralize the negative influence of teachers on students in the area's schools with respect to the PLO's status in the territories, and to emphasize the need for a peaceful solution to the conflict between the territories' Arabs and Israel. [Text] [TAO31250 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Jan 83 p 2]

W. BANK ORGANIZATIONS BYPASSING RULES—Cooperative unions from the territories have recently been registered in Jordan without having received the authorization of the Israeli military government. In this way, the unions are bypassing the military government's attempts to prevent the transfer of PLO funds to Judaea and Samaria. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari has learned that over the last few months scores of cooperative unions from Judaea and Samaria have been registered in Jordan, most of them unions for construction. Their members are being given an allocation from the joint Jordan—PLO Committee and afterward they submit personal requests to receive building permits, and this without disclosing the fact of the cooperative union's existence. [Text] [TAO21522 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 2 Jan 83]

SETTLERS UPROOT ARAB TREES——Settlers from Gush 'Ezyon have uprooted saplings planted by Arab villagers on a parcel of land which is the subject of an ownership dispute before the High Court of Justice. Local police confirmed that villagers from Nahhalin, south of Bethlehem, have complained that settlers from one of the communities in the Gush 'Ezyon bloc had uprooted the saplings, but noted that they had been planted despite an interim court order barring anyone from entering or working the disputed tract. East Jerusalem sources have also reported a dispute between villagers from Bayt Amin in the Tulkarm area and earthmoving contractors building the settlement of (Suirya). [Text] [TA300920 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 Dec 82 p 3]

WEST BANK COUNCIL HEAD DISMISSED—Yesterday the head of the civilian administration in Bethlehem dismissed the head of the Village Council of Za'tarah near Bethlehem. The council head, (Musa Mahmud Muhsin), who was previously dismissed from his post as mukhtar, had complained some weeks ago about the fact that the administration was expropriating hundreds of dunams of land around the village. The council head was also known to be a bitter opponent of the village leagues, and he was involved in a prolonged dispute with the head of the village league in Bethlehem. Sources in the village estimate that it was for these reasons that he was dismissed from his post. It has been reported from the civilian administration that the head of the council was dismissed because "he was holding up development actions in the village." It will be noted that (Musa Muhsin) backed the establishment of an electricity grid in the village, and had intended to open several more classes in the local school. [Excerpt] [TA231211 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Dec 82 p 3]

CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID QUITTING—Aluf-Mishne [Col] Yig'al Karmon, Arab affairs adviser to the head of the Judaea and Samaria civil administration, and its acting head at one time, has gone on leave, apparently prior to leaving his position and possibly the army. Karmon is credited with being one of the Israeli administrators largely responsible for the West Bank village leagues. He replaced Prof Menahem Milson when Milson resigned as civil administration head last September. Karmon was expected to succeed Milson, but was passed over in favor of another veteran army intelligence officer, Tat-Aluf [Brig Gen] Shlomo Ilia, who assumed the position several weeks ago. [Text] [TA280755 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Dec 82 p 2]

PLANNED NAVAL INSTALLATION—Mordekhay Tzipori, the Israeli Minister of Communications, noted that a military port for the Israeli navy is now being established in the city of Ashqelon. A school for naval officers will be constructed there as well. About 50 billion shekels will be invested in this project. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 262, 29 Nov 82 p 10]

CSO: 4404/174

AMMAN DAILY ON U.S. CONGRESSMEN'S HOSTILE STAND

JN201008 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 20 Dec 82 p 26

[Tariq Masarwah's "Everyday" column: "Receiving Enemies"]

[Text] The U.S. congressmen who received King Husayn with such hostility in Washington represent this unethical phase of U.S. policy. They are the flagrant enemies of Third World peoples and world peace and are the reason for the swift collapse of the U.S. empire.

No arms for Jordan? We accept that a country might refuse to export arms to another country. However, it seems that U.S. arms are a paradise which only the pure and pious can enter. It also seems that U.S. arms are a charity which Washington kindly gives to this or that country. This is not a policy it is impudence, ignorance and arrogance.

No arms for Jordan? We would not mind but the reason given for refusing to supply the arms is that Jordan is an enemy of peace, adopts hostile stands and threatens the security of its neighbors. Such an accusation indicates ignorance and bias because the enemies of peace are those who occupy the territories of UN member states using U.S. arms and money, adopt positions that ignore the United Nations and the U.S. President and defy all the principles and norms of modern society. They are the ones who threaten the security of their neighbors with arms, attacked Lebanon and killed and wounded 30,000 human beings and destroyed the cities and villages of Lebanon using the most sophisticated U.S. weapons and with complete U.S. financing.

No one can blame the Zionist agents in the U.S. Congress because theirs is a democratic society, it is the Arabs who should be blamed because they are the ones who invest their money in the U.S. treasury bonds, open their hungry markets for U.S. products and entrust the future of their peoples and nation in the U.S. auction market. No one can blame the U.S. representatives and senators because they are free to exercise their short-sightedness and political immorality. The Arabs should take the blame for accepting this unjustified humiliation of their nation. The United States will not give any one arms equal to those it gives to Israel. The United States wants everyone to understand that the required peace is the one that Israel imposes using U.S. arms.

DEPUTY PREMIER ON GCC, RELATIONS WITH USSR

LD071146 Kuwait KUNA in English 1016 GMT 7 Jan 83

[Text] Kuwait, Jan 7 (KUNA)--Deputy Premier Foreign and Information Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad has said that Algeria might be the only country (?able) to mediate for an end for the Iraqi-Iranian war.

In an interview with a Kuwaiti paper published Friday, Shaykh Sabah described the war as disastrous and hoped that Iran would respond to the voice of logic in order to keep the superpowers away from the region.

The Kuwaiti chief diplomat said that 'those fleets cruising the Arabian Sea were not for tourism or fishing... They are awaiting the opportunity to intervene and we alone shoulder the responsibility of not securing a pretext for such intervention'.

Answering a question on the Gulf Cooperation Council which groups Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar, Shaykh Sabah said the council is not an agreement among heads of states but it has been set up for the peoples of the region and that is why the economic agreement was signed and the free movement of Gulf nationals and the abolition of visas were achieved.

On the question of why Kuwait has not signed the GCC security agreement, Kuwait chief diplomat in his interview with AL-ANBA' [words indistinct] that 'we in Kuwait have a constitutional obstacle and we have [word indistinct] on certain clauses of the proposed agreement.

'That was why the agreement was postponed until an acceptable formula is reached', he said adding, 'The GCC Secretariat is preparing a new draft formula'.

On Reagan peace plan, Shaykh Sabah said the Arabs have their own [word indistinct] in Fes summit conference but added however, that the Palestinians in the first place are having the first and final words on those peace initiatives.

Answering a question on reports of a setback in relations between Oman and South Yemen after the recent joint manoeuvres with the U.S., Shaykh Sabah

said we were delighted by the agreement normalizing relations between the two Arab countries reached [word indistinct] Kuwait and [word indistinct] mediation and that the agreement is still standing. As for the military exercises they were planned one year ahead.

He added that 'we in the Gulf want to [word indistinct] fears, because when one feels he is threatened he resorts to those who are stronger than him.'

Commenting on the U.S. setting up a central command for the rapid deployment force in the Gulf, Shaykh Sabah said, 'I cannot prevent the U.S. from announcing such a plan, but, we according to the GCC Charter, agree that the Gulf states and not any one else are the only side in charge of security in the region.'

On Kuwait's relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, the Kuwaiti deputy premier said we have good ties with those countries and at the same time we establish good relations with the European states and the U.S. because we seek to balance our relations with all those countries.

Questioned on the possibility that relations might be established between the Soviet Union and the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Sabah said, 'We do not draw the Saudi policy or any one's else plans but we hope that a form of relations be established between countries of the region and the socialist bloc, particularly the Soviet Union in order to achieve an equilibrium in the region as we have interests with the West and the East.

BAN ON BOOKS RIDICULED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 23 Dec 82 p 11

[Text] Cartoon



CSO: 4404/172

DRUZE LEADER EXPLAINS RELATIONS WITH IDF, INTERNAL PROBLEMS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT In Hebrew 12 Nov 82 Seven Days Supplement pp 12-13, 61

[Interview with Kam'al Mantzur, government advisor on minority affairs, by Rafa'el Bashan, date and place unspecified]

[Text] A warning bell rang in my ears when Kam'al Mantzur, government advisor on minority affairs and an expert on the unusual customs of the Druze community in Israel, appeared on the television screen looking angry and troubled—so out of character for a man known for his moderate views and his calm exterior. He had some serious accusations to make against those responsible for the treatment of the Druze in Lebanon, who—according to their brothers in Israel—are being pursued, persecuted, degraded and abused by the Christian Phalangists, while the IDF looks on. I went to visit him in his village, Oasfiya, in the Karmel hills, and in a conversation which lasted several hours it became clear that his words were those of a wounded friend (as in the Biblical passage: "Faithful are the wounds of a friend...").

Kam'al Mantzur, who is very familiar with the underground currents in Lebanon's political, social, religious and psychological reality recently visited Lebanon about a dozen times. He toured the land of the cedars from border to border in the context of what he defined as a "family visit," meeting with Druze leaders, prominent, influential Christians and Muslims. He describes a situation, a scenario straight out of a surrealistic, Kafkaesque film, one which contradicts all logic and accepted morality in the western world. And Kam'al Mantzur says: "What can you do? That's the way it is in Lebanon. Anyone sitting in Israel today who thinks he can predict in advance what will happen in Lebanon tomorrow, is wrong."

[Question] To what degree did the Galilee Peace operation effect the friendly, traditional relations between the State and the Druze population in Israel? is there a serious crisis brewing, a rift caused by the IDF's neutrality in the confrontation between Druze and Christians, as you claim?

[Answer] The Druze in the State of Israel were and still are loyal citizens who identify with every sovereign campaign aimed at strengthening Israel's position and security. The Druze who serve in the IDF have integrated exceptionally well into the army. The Galilee Peace operation provided us with the emotional opportunity to meet with our relatives and friends in Lebanon, from whom we had been cut off for so long.

[Question] Where, then, did the anger, disappointment and frustration come from that swept the Druze community at the beginning of the operation, which found its expression in bitter statements to the government and the IDF leadership?

[Answer] All we asked was that the IDF demonstrate real concern for our Druze brothers in Lebanon. IDF soldiers did not find even a single terrorist in any of the Druze villages in Lebanon. No enemy elements hid there. The reasons: The Druze leaders ordered back in 1947 that strangers would not be allowed to enter their villages. If someone who was not Druze had managed to sneak into one of the villages, it would have been forbidden to sell him land, rent him living quarters, or even sell him food. If he still insisted on staying—he would have been thrown out, unceremoniously!

In my television appearance, I responded emotionally to things which had occurred at the time in Lebanon, things which were troubling the entire community. We are all aware that the IDF did a great deal to help the Druze. But not nearly enough! Today, the IDF is acting in Lebanon in a fashion that has calmed our fears, maintaining order and even trying from time to time to bridge the gap between Druze and Phalangists. And I want it to be perfectly clear: The Druze, in Lebanon and in Israel, do not oppose an alliance between Israel and the Christians in Lebanon, as long as it is not at our expense! If you ask me, I don't see any signs indicating that such a pact is likely to become a reality in the foreseeable future!

Turning a New Leaf

[Question] What, in essence, is the background of the hatred and bitter animosity between the Druze and the Christians in Lebanon, which has been in evidence for several generations?

[Answer] For hundred of years, the Druze were the "Amirs" (the princes) of Lebanon. I'm talking about the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century. The Druze Amirs rules then over most of the land of Lebanon and part of Israel--extending even into the Karmel mountains. The outstanding Amirs were Fakr al-Din al-Ma'ani the first and the second. The Christains worked for the Druze as servants and agricultural laborers. The Amirs, who were kindhearted, gave the Christains land. The fact is that most of the Christain churches, monasteries and religious institutions in Lebanon were built on Druze land. Even today, the Christains live alongside the Druze in Lebanon and the Shuf hill areas. For Years, everything went smoothly and all was fine and good. Druze and Christians lived alongside each other in an atmosphere of "live and let live", until in 1860 the Ottomans began to incite the Christians to revolt against the Amirs, and France, due to her own interests, stoked the fire, too. Unrest fomented among the Christians but the Druze exercised restraint. However, when the Christians started kidnapping men, raping women, beating the elderly, stealing and murdering, the Druze reacted--and they squelched the revolt with a heavy hand. I would even say they were cruel. To this day, whenever there is a confrontation with the Druze, the Christians throw the "massacre of 1860" up at us. And I say, peoples cannot live forever on past mistakes! Take France and Germany, who reconciles with each other. And Germany exterminated 6 million Jews, but the State of Israel maintains diplomatic and economic relations with Bonn none the less.

[Question] Do the Druze leaders in Lebanon agree with this approach, or is it your personal opinion?

[Answer] In conversations I have had recently in southern Lebanon, the most prominent political and religious leaders in the community made it clear to me that they are willing and ready at any time to open bilateral talks and to turn a new leaf in their relations with the Christians. However, this must be based on mutual respect. They would also agree to the return of the traditional structure of the Lebanese government, which worked for many years. That is—the President, Amin Jumayyil, a Christian; Prime Minister Shafiq al—Wazan, a Sunni Muslim; the President of the parliament, Kam'al al—Assad a Shiite Muslim, the Minister of Defense, as has always been the tradition, a Druze. The fact is that until recently, the position was held by the Amir Majid Arsalan, who was forced to step down due to his age and health. The opening belongs to us.

[Question] When you say that the Druzein Lebanon are willing to enter into an agreement with the Christians based on mutual respect, what exactly do you mean?

[Answer] The basic cornerstones in the life of a self-respecting Druze are:

- a. respecting his wife
- b. caring for his land
 - c. carrying arms to protect his respect and his freedom

[Question] Can a government with such a complex make-up as the one you've described work effectively?

[Answer] In fact, that government worked very well for many years, until the Palestinians infiltrated into Lebanon and destroyed the fibers of the regime. Anyone who spreads the idea that the hatred between Christians and Druze is like an axiom or a void which cannot be filled, does not know what he is talking about. There is no basis for that belief. To the best of my understanding, based on dozens of conversations with people in Lebanon, both sides are interested in reaching a solution as soon as possible. Israel, in this context, can play a very important and significant role. My feeling is that the Druze and Christians alike are waiting for the Israeli initiative!

My Brother's Keeper

[Question] Do you fear that the Phalangists might perpertrate a massacre in the Druze villages such as the one in Sabra and Shatila?

[Answer] Of course! We were well aware of the close ties which existed at the time between Israeli factions and the Phalangist leadership. We warned those responsible ahead of time that the Christians might exploit those ties against us. We explained to the Israeli government that if something were to happen, or if there were even attempts made in that direction, the consequences would be very serious, in the long run, insofar as the relations between the Druze in Israel and Lebanon and the State.

[Question] And what was the reaction of these warnings?

[Answer] Those in power--among them Prime Minister Menahem Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, Chief of Staff Rafa'el Eitan and senior IDF officers--faithfully promised the Druze leaders that not a hair on the heads of our brothers in Lebanon would be touched. The instructions that were given, however, were not followed in the field.

[Question] For example!

[Answer] Gladly.

- a. The Phalangists set up barricades at the entrences to and exits from Druze willages, an action which had no military justification. Our brothers had always prevented terrorist activity in the area and the actions of the Phalangists were no more than provocations!
- b. The Phalangists started kidnapping our men, Even today, the fate of 20 Druze men is unknown and all trace of them has been lost. They also raped women and abused women and children.
- c. The Phalangistys set up army bases in southeast Lebanon and began to penetrate the village centers, something they had not dared to do for years, either on foot or in vehicles.

The situation, in the end, was brought to a boiling point. The Druze could not stand the abuse and the disappearances any longer. We advised our brothers in Lebanon to exercise restraint, so that they would not, God forbid, get into a violent confrontation with IDF soldiers. We relayed the promises which the Israeli leaders had made to us! But in the end, they broke down and fired back with their own weapons when the Phalangists shot at them. Both sides, Druze and Christians, have ample ammunition. Weapons, in Lebanon, are practically free for the asking. You don't need a license!

It was also the first time that Druze women actually participated in battle, helping to drive off attacks and taking part in retalliatory actions! And allow me at this juncture to say to my many Israeli friends who, when we demonstrated and made ourselves heard to the world, said: "What is all the commotion? You've been cut off from them since 1948." To them I say: "I am my brother's keeper!" It does not matter how long we have been out of touch with our brothers. Our solidarity with them is like the identification of every Jew and Israeli when one of your brothers is wounded, or killed God forbid, in Paris, or Rome, or Moscow or Athens. It hurts everyone of you. Like an earthquake that shocks the heart of the entire Jewish people! For us, it is exactly the same! What's more, our solidarity with our brothers in Lebanon is ethnic and religious, but not political in any way, shape or form. We do not get involved in their internal affairs, just as they do not interfere in ours.

Four Delegations a Week

Kam'al Mantzur is 50 years old. His wife is Lebanese-born and they have five daughters and two sons. Mantzur is an important figure in the Druze community. Handsome, sophisticated, always impeccably dressed, he is from one of the most respected families in the Druze community. His moustache is carefully trimmed. he is an academic and a renowned author (his book, "Out of My Saddlebag", the first two copies of which were given to Presidents al-Sadat and Navon, has already met with great success in Lebanon and the newest printing has already sold out). He is a popular lecturer in Israel and abroad, and he is researching the history of his people. Mantzur is a very active public figure. Among other things he is a member of the board of trustees of the Haifa and Beer Sheva universities, a member of the national cultural council, a judge on the Histadrut high court, honorary president of the Druze scout movement, member of the Labor Party's central and political committees, propaganda officer for the northern command and the President's advisor on minority affairs. In his home in Osafiya, he has hosted more than 150,000 people over the years, discussing Israeli-Arab relations, with the goal of effecting a rapproachement. And, as an aside, the refreshments served to all those guests were paid for out of family funds.

The Mantzur clan, which numbers around 2,000 people, has lived for more than five centuries in Osafiya, and Kam'al lives in the house in which he was born. His grandfather, Sheik Suliman Has'an Mantzur, who died at age 97, was considered an exemplary figure and villagers from miles around would come to receive his blessing. Sheik Suliman was not sick a day in his life, read without eyeglasses until the day of his death, and made it a daily practice to take a three kilometer hike every morning. He divided all his land and possessions among his family white he was still alive and was grandfather to 114 grandchildren and great grandchildren, all of whom lived in Osafiya.

Kam'al's father, Sheik Najib Mantzur, now 78 years old, served for many years as mayor of Osafiya. He is a man full of life's joys and wisdom. He secretly aided the "Hagana," risking his own life from 1966 sic until the establishment of the State. ("We took food to Haifa, Yagur and Bet-Oren, because they simply had no bread there. When the British were searching for the mayor of Haifa, Aba Hushi, on the Black Sabbath, we dressed him like a Druze and smuggled him into the village. He hid there for a month!")

While we were speaking, a delegation of around a dozen prominent Druze figures arrived from the Hasbiyya area of Lebanon. They fondly embraced Kam'al and his father. A rich and varied assortment of food was served as the head of the delegation excitedly related how they uprooted a PLO base from the area. The recurring, persistent question is: What will happen when the IDF leaves? Will the Palestinians, who left through the front door, come back in through the window? Kam'al says that every week he hosts at least four such delegations, arranging for them to tour Israel so they can get to know the country, and often even arranging medical attention of those in need, treatment they cannot get in Lebanon.

Disband the Militias!

[Question] How would you describe the composition, essence, ideological back-ground and activities of the Phalangists?

[Answer] The Phalangists are divided into three groups: The first is led by the English widow of Bashir Jumayyil, who was murdered. It is the most extreme, nationalist group of them all. The second is headed by the current president of Lebanon, Amin Jumayyil, who has not yet established himself, and, in my opinion, is in many respects still feeling his way around in the dark. The third, the most violent of all both in ideology and in practice, is the group led by Edward Hani, who recently openly declared: "Lebanon is a Christian partrimony—and no one will touch it. As for the other ethnic groups, first of all, what's theirs is ours! If we want, we may give them something."

Of all the groups, the one led by Amin Jumayyil is the one to be considered as far as bilateral talks with the Druze. According to the information I have at my disposal, he is willing to make peace. I met with Sheik Muhamad Abu-Kasra, the spiritual leader of the Druze in Lebanon, who was ready and willing to meet with Bashir, and with the Maronite patriarch Anthony Harash, who is considered the spiritual leader of the Christians in Lebanon. To the best of my knowledge, the other side is also agreeable. Bashir's murder put a damper on everything. Sheik Abu-Kasra personally went to bless Bashir when he was elected president. As far as I know, all the necessary steps had been taken to arrange a reconciliation.

[Question] The Phalangists claim that their militias are a regular army. Do the Druze in Lebanon also have a permanent, organized and stable military body?

[Answer] First of all, the Phalangists have no right today to claim that they are a regular army. President Jumayyil would be doing a service to his people and to all of Lebanon if he disbanded all the armed organizations, including the Phalangists. As for our brothers in Lebanon, they do not have an organized army, but everyone is armed with weapons, from pistols to rockets and mortars. For years, they have trained well. Theoretically and in practice, it is within their power to stand up to the Phalangists. They will not be beaten!

[Question] How do you explain Jumayyil's announcement inviting 10,000 Moroccan soldiers to aid the police force in Lebanon—a suggestion which was warmly received.

[Answer] That declaration only proves once again how weak the President really is, and that he does not have the power to maintain order in the country via his army. What's more, the Phalangists themselves oppose the use of Moroccan forces in Lebanon. What surprises me even more is why we don't hear the voice of the seasoned, senior politician, Pierre Jumayyil, Amin's father, who knows all the secrets and political functionings in Lebanon. Many people claim, and in my opinion unjustly, that he is really running the internal politics, legal and defense matters, and that his son Amin is a mere puppet! From my discussions in Lebanon, it is clear to me that Amin is not capable, in any way, shape or form, of filling his father's shoes in terms of charisma and decision-making ability.

[Question] The Egyptian defense minister, Kam'al Hasan Ali, declared recently in Cairo that in a meeting with Amin Jumayyil in Rome, the Lebanese president told him that he would welcome a legitimate Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Jumayyil also revealed that he met with 'Arafat's deputy, Abu-Iyad, and it is possible that he will meet in the near future with 'Arafat himself. Shouldn't these events of necessity cause a red light to go on in our minds?

[Answer] If Amin really made the statement attributed to him, then it is a very troublesome situation, which may mean a renewed alliance between the PLO forces and the 400,000 Palestinians who remained in Lebanon. We have to follow these developments very closely!

A Political Insane Asylum

[Question] Aren't the Phalangists and the Christians in Lebanon indebted to Israel who liberated them from the Palestinian conquest?

[Answer] Lebanon is like one big insane asylum from a political point of view—the land of unlimited possibilities! In Beirut you could never know today if yesterday's friends will still be on your side tomorrow! It is possible—and such things have already occurred—that your best friend would knife you in the back without blinking an eyelash, if it would pay off for him at that moment! In the land of the cedars there is no trust among politicians, Israeli leaders should remember this mentality, if only so that the disappointment of being let down won't hurt too much when the time comes. The politicians and party activists in Beirut are already accustomed to these "tricks." Parties have always been bought and sold in Lebanon, like flour! It would not surprise me if in the near future the Phalangists were to enter into an agreement with their greatest enemy today—the PLO. It has happened before. For example, all the Lebanese newspapers are contorlled by Arab countries: AL-SAFIR is supported by Libya, AL-LIWA gets funds from Iraq, AL-ANWAR is controlled by the Palestinians and A-SAIJ is supported by the Saudis.

[Question] I have heard it said that Lebanon today is run by three women...

[Answer] You would be surprised to know that this is very true. One is Havla, wife of the Druze leader, Amir Majid Arslan, who reigned for many years as Lebanon's minister of defense. Today he is an old man, partially paralyzed. I met with them both. Havla is the one who makes policy decisions for the Arslan clan. She is 40 years old, a striking, intelligent woman, the niece of Kam'al Junblat, father of Walid Junblat, leader of the leftist Druze faction. The second is the sister of the Shiite leader Musa Sadr, who went to visit Lybia and disappeared mysteriously. Stubborn rumors persist to the effect that Qadafi ordered him eliminated. The third is Soulange Jumayyil, Bashir's widow. They say she wants to head the Phalangists. These three women hold the most central, key positions in Lebanon.

[Question] Is it true that the Druze leader Walid Junblat supported the PLO and today aids the Palestinians, while the Jumayyil family has always, mainly covertly, leaned in a por-Israeli direction?

[Answer] Kam'al Junblat, Walid's father, who headed the leftist Socialist party in Lebanon, was killed 3 years ago by the Syrians, due to political disagreements. But Walid, his son, has continued in his footsteps. I would say that only 10 percent of the Druze in Lebanon support him as party leader, but most of them do respect him as the head of one of the largest and most extended families in Lebanon, whether they identify with his position or not.

It must be understood once and for all that the political map in Lebanon is very fluid and completely lacking in stability. Lebanon is filled to overflowing with splinter parties endlessly seeking power alignments to maintain themselves. The Phalangists in 1978 supported the Syrians and simply invited them to come in, intervene and resolve the inter-ethnic conflicts in Lebanon! The Syrians jumped at the chance, entered Lebanon and helped the Phalangists fight the... Palestinians! But, when Jumblat saw an opportunity to buttress his political power, he started cultivating close ties with the PLO.

In addition, it is worth remembering that the Junblat family allowed right-of-way through its villages to terrorists. No PLO military base was ever established within the area controlled by Junblat. When the terrorists conducted the operation in Ma'alot, Walid Junblat was the only Druze leader in Lebanon who denounced the massacre publicly! At the beginning of the Galilee Peace operation, Walid, who resided in an elegant castle in el-Mukhtara in the Shuf area, ordered his people not to dare enter into violent conflict with IDF soldiers. In summary, anything that to a man with a healthy, political logic would appear absurd—in Lebanon is considered reasonable! Anything can happen. And what is today considered white may tomorrow be considered black!

Ben-Gurion's Question

In my opinion, Amin Jumayyil's recent moves show an increasing tendency toward rapproachement with the Arab world and a willingness to accept its dictums. This will require a fundamental re-evaluation of the entire network of our relations with and exceptations from the Christians in Lebanon. And I will say it again: The Phalangists must be disbanded immediately! Otherwise they will become "a state within a state." The Phalangists themselves did away with dozens of the former president's supporters. I'm referring to Camille Sham'un, who was a Maronite Christian. His son, Dani, lived until recently in London, out of fear of the Phalangists. And who killed Toni Franjiyya, the son of former Lebanese President Suliman Franjiyya? Phalangists! By the way, do you know how Suliman reacted when asked if he felt sorrow over Bashir's murder? He said: "I am only sorry about one thing—that I didn't do it myself!"

[Question] In 1954, the Druze leader Sultan al-Atras, began a revolt against the Syrian despot Adiv Shishkali. The Syrian army brutally squelched the revolt and he fled to Jordan. Is it true that the Druze in Israel turned to the government and asked for permission to allow the Druze serving in the IDF to help their brothers in Lebanon?

[Answer] Absolutely true. I was the youngest in a group of Druze leaders who approached Moshe Sharet. Sharet, the Prime Minister, managed to calm us down using sophisticated diplomatic tactics. There were also many Jews who expressed their desire to help, among them Moshe Dayan, may he rest in peace, who at the time was General of the northern command, and Yigal Alon. The matter was never taken any further because Shishkali's regime was toppled by Druze officers in the Syrian army. He escaped to Brazil where he was eliminated by a Druze who was sent in particular to revenge the massacre Shishkali prepetrated.

[Question] Was there also at one time a request from the Druze leaders in Israel to allow soldiers and officers to aid their brothers in Lebanon against the Phalangists?

[Answer] The leaders did not make such a request, but there were requests made by Druze citizens, on their own initiative. I strongly opposed the idea of armed Druze citizens from Israel entering Lebanon. It would have unnecessarily complicated our relatiosn with the Phalangists and perhaps even with the IDF. I told my people that I was sure that in the end the IDF soldiers in the area would succeed at calming the situation down.

[Question] Were there incidents where Druze officers and soldiers turned in their reserve cards in protest, because the IDF was not intervening forcefully enough for the Druze in Lebanon?

[Answer] I heard of only one isolated incident, of an officer who turned in is reserve card when there had been heavy fighting in Kfar Mata, claiming that he could not serve when his brothers were exposed to violence on the part of the Phalangists. If I were to compare that isolated incident with that is happening among our Jewish brothers, some of whom refuse to serve in the territories, others who refuse for reasons of religion or conscience, and senior officers who asked to be released at the beginning of the war because they did not want to enter Beirut—onbalance, the situation in the Druze community is not bad at all.

[Question] Is it true that your life dream is for a Druze minister in the Israeli government?

[Answer] That is truly my greatest dream. I suggested it in the fifties to Moshe Sharet, may he rest in peace, and he told me: "have a little patience, for the State is still very young." And Ben-Gurion told us: "I believe that a day will come when there will be a non-Jewish minister in the government, if the right man is found, of course!" At the same opportunity, he took me aside and whispered in my ear: "I know that your religion is secret, but perhaps you would be willing anyway to give me a hint of it?" I answered: "Mr. Prime Minister, how could I insult my tradition and tell you about our religion, when that is the strictest taboo imposed on us? But I will say that if I were to reveal a small secret, it might be so attractive to you that, with all due respect Mr. Prime Minister, you might want to become a Druze. And at that point, we would be in a difficult situation, because the gates of our religion are locked. We accept no converts of any kind. A Druze must be born a Druze! So why should I disappoint you Mr Ben-Gurion?" But Ben-Gurion did not back down and continued to ask: "Is it true that your religion

is based on fundamental principles taken from Judaism, Christianity and Islam?" I answered: Sir, even if it were true, we would not be allowed to say so, because then the Jews, Christians and Muslims might fight among themselves over which of them had contributed more to the Druze religion." At that point, Ben-Gurion stopped asking questions, but he did remain a faithful friend to the Druze community until his death, and that is how we remember him to this day.

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CSO: 4423/42

'AL-MAJALLAH' PUBLISHES PALESTINIAN 'PEACE DOCUMENT'

Text of 'Peace Document'

PM290935 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 25-31 Dec 82 p 23

[Unattributed report: "Palestinian Peace Document"]

[Text] AL-MAJALLAH publishes here below the text of the "peace document" prepared by Ilyas Frayj, the mayor of Bethlehem, and four former mayors of the occupied West Bank and Gaza [Rashad al-Shawwa, Hikmat al-Masri, Anwar al-Khatib and Nadim al-Zaru]. Because of internal Palestinian opposition to the document its authors were compelled to freeze it. This is the first time the document has been published:

Palestinian Peace Document

We the undersigned, residents of the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza sector, proceeding from our belief in the inevitability of lasting, just and comprehensive peace and from our aspiration and continuous work for the achievement of this noble objective, we declare our political stand to the whole world and affirm that we are a basic party to the peace process and realize that peace and the road to it requires from us boldness, preparedness, strong resolve and endurance much more than the road to war requires.

Consequently our stand is represented as follows:

First: The Palestinian people's right to determine its political future.

Second: We support and back the rapprochement and coordination between the Jordanian Government and the PLO and urge the PLO to recognize Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 and 338.

Third: We affirm our total support for the Fes summit resolutions and the positive initiatives contained in President Reagan's peace proposals for the Middle East.

Fourth: There is a need to halt the Israeli settlement drive in the occupied areas in view of the fact that the establishment of such settlements

constitutes a stumbling block to peace and leads to change in the historical, demographic, social and economic situation of the occupied areas.

Fifth: We call for and support mutual and simultaneous recognition between the PLO, our legitimate representative, and Israel on the grounds that the two sides are an integral part of the peace process just as was the case during the state of war.

Sixth: A peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem is the only foreseen means to overcome the conditions from which our Palestinian people are suffering, people who are looking forward to living in mutual peace with its neighbors.

In order to clarify our position to the whole world we are putting our signature to this document and the points contained therein.

Report on Peace Document

PM291337 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 25-31 Dec 82 pp 20-23

[Article by Muhammad Ma'tuq: "AL-MAJALLAH Talks to West Bank and Gaza Leaders: What Is the Story of the Palestinian Peace Document Calling for Mutual Palestinian-Israeli Recognition? How Is the United States Trying to Create a Substitute Palestinian Leadership for the PLO? What Is the Truth About Contacts Between the Reagan Administration and Palestinians?"]

[Excerpts] Last week AL-MAJALLAH held contacts with a number of West Bank and Gaza leaders and learned from them what is going on behind the U.S. attempts to create a Palestinian leadership inside the country in place of the PLO that would participate in future negotiations regarding the U.S. proposals for the Palestinian problem or to create a strong competitor for the PLO that would force it to make fundamental concessions and thus bring it closer to those proposals. The following investigative report is a summing up of these discussions and the information that AL-MAJALLAH garnered from Palestinian figures in the occupied territories.

"The Palestinian peace document" that was laid down by Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj and four former mayors and the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Muhammad Milhim, the expelled mayor of Halhul, were two aspects of the phenomenon of the acute struggle to win over the voice of the West Bank and Gaza, the parties to which are Israel, the United States and the PLO and its supporters in the occupied areas.

In the view of Palestinian observers in the West Bank the struggle began escalating following the announcement last September of President Reagan's proposals on solving the Palestinian problem. These observers believe that the struggle will further escalate with the imminent convening of the Palestine National Council [PNC] session which all observers, including leading political figures in the West Bank and Gaza, believe will be "historic" and will constitute "a qualitative step in the Palestinian national struggle."

We have put together the story of the "Palestinian peace document" through discussions with Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj, whose name has been linked with the document since it was announced, Rashad al-Shawwa, the dismissed mayor of Gaza and one of the five signatories to the document, and Bassam al-Shak'ah, the dismissed mayor of Nabulus.

Following a meeting that included Frayj, al-Shawwa, former Nabulus Mayor Hikmat al-Masri and 10 U.S. congressmen and their wives led by Congressman Lee Hamilton during which discussion dealt with Reagan's proposals, the Palestinian representatives at this meeting met in the offices of the AL-QUDS newspaper and came out with a document called a peace document which they submitted as representing their personal views. They then began obtaining signatures for it. A few West Bank and Gaza citizens signed it but it was met with statements and declarations opposing it. As a result, the authors of the document invited some of the moderates for a dialogue and together they discussed how it could be amended to make it more acceptable to the Palestinian circles in the occupied territories. Several amendments were suggested to the document which almost diverted it from its original course and as a result its authors were compelled to freeze it and to announce this publicly.

Al-Shawwa says that the meeting with the U.S. congressmen was by accident. He said he came to the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem where the meeting was held with the permission of the Israeli authorities which restrict his freedom of movement. Speaking about the meeting, al-Shawwa says that the debate was "heated" and lasted 2 and 1/2 hours. The Palestinian team at the meeting was "dismayed" by the views of the congressmen who were "more Jewish than the Jews." He said that the question of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and President Reagan's proposal to freeze them were the topic of discussion. He said: "We have insisted and still insist that the term 'freeze' does not indicate good will in the direction of finding a solution. If there was good will there would have been agreement to halt the building of settlements completely and finally after which discussions would follow. If discussions lasted 2 or 3 years then 'freezing' would mean the possibility of resuming the building of settlements. are against this and we believe that the building of settlements should stop completely. We also demand that no new settlements be built."

The question of settlement building is a central point in the peace document which calls upon the PLO to recognize Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positive aspects of President Reagan's initiative and for mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel.

Ilyas Frayj, who does not conceal his dismay because of the general negative response to his document, seems to say that the matter is about to be finally removed from the Arabs' hands. He says that the question of what is to be done now should have been asked 10 years ago. Like al-Shawwa, he continuously says: "Slogans will not liberate the land."

The document of Frayj and his company came under the slogan "salvaging what can be salvaged." Reagan's proposals contain "positive elements," as the document says. The "positive elements," in al-Shawwa's view,

"represent a great gain for us if carried out." On one hand the proposals, he says, call for imposing Arab sovereignty on the occupied territories, and, on the other, for stopping the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. "If we ensure the implementation of these two points," al-Shawwa adds, "we would gain time for thinking and planning and secure our existence here and remove the danger threatening our existence."

On the other hand Frayj believes that Reagan's proposals are "wider than Camp David and any other proposals submitted so far. It is preferable that we accept them, discuss them with the United States and negotiate over both the positive and negative aspects."

Al-Shawwa says that the "peace document" he laid down with his colleagues was the outcome of consultations with a number of personalities in the West Bank and Gaza "with the exception of the leftists." He declines to elaborate any further or mention names, but he says that he means those "who belong to the rejection front both inside and outside the country."

Despite the consultation, as al-Shawwa says, the proponents of the document were involved in difficult and critical argument with those to whom the document was submitted for acceptance in the West Bank and Gaza. Frayj admits that there were differences in views and argument over the wording of the document as well as suggestions for adding a phrase here and deleting one there. Afterwards it was decided to freeze the document and "to wait for those outside [the country] to decide and we would comply." Frayj added: "We are all spectators and the only actors are the PLO."

Bassam al-Shak'ah had his own observations on the document. He told AL-MAJALLAH that the document does not express Palestinian public opinion because it calls for a parallel or substitute leadership in the occupied territories. "It also denies our people's right to establish their own state under the PLO leadership. It also addresses demands to world opinion instead of putting forward proposals to the PLO through the official channels. For this reason our people rejected it and did not sign it."

Al-Shak'ah describes the document as a "deviation," saying that "its authors want to give prominence to the Jordanian role under the guise of supporting and backing cooperation between Palestine and Jordan but, in my view, it harms Palestinian-Jordanian relations." He added: "The Palestinians aspire for unity with Jordan, but after an independent state is established so that it would provide means of democratic expression. There are those who do not care for unity as much as they care about aborting the results of the Palestinian people's struggle. For this reason they create the impression that there is a conflict regarding unity with Jordan even before the Palestinian has the freedom of expression. Any objective person would appreciate the importance of a link up between Jordan and Palestine, and any attempt to fabricate a battle over this issue does not aim at serving the Jordanian or the Palestinian interest."

Contrary to what al-Shawwa says, those who rejected the document were not "leftists," al-Shak'ah insists. He says: "The document was rejected first by the right--if such categorization is acceptable--because it failed even

before it was put to the progressive forces. It was never put to the progressive forces. I can say that the document did not go beyond its five authors and some people with ulterior motives. However it became more widely accepted as a result of amendments to it. But, as I have learned, the amendments were unacceptable to the document's authors and therefore, it was frozen."

AL-MAJALLAH has learned that the amendments introduced or proposed concerned deleting the clause considering the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants who signed the document as the "basic party" to the solution, dropping the call for recognizing resolutions 242 and 338, linking simultaneous recognition [between the PLO and Israel] to the implementation of the UN resolutions and adding a clause calling for the abolition of the settlements that have been built and not just freezing the building of new ones.

Al-Shak'ah says that despite the fact that authors of the document say that they have frozen it there are attempts to give expression to the views and policies of the same people. The aim is to lessen the PLO's role in the peace process. Al-Shak'ah says that "the document was born at night and died in the morning."

Despite the freezing of the document its authors continue to cling to the idea of "mutual and simultaneous recognition" between Israel and the PLO. Although the call for this type of recognition is criticized in form but not in essence, the Palestinian factions inside the country with their political leanings are not oblivious to the fact that such recognition is bound to happen if there is to be any hope for finding a peaceful solution for the Palestine problem.

Bassam al-Shak'ah considers that the PLO has taken the step required of it and now a step in return should be taken by the other side. He says: "We demand recognition of our rights and our leadership. We consider this to be the first step in response to the PLO's stand that emerged during the Fes summit and to Brother Yasir 'Arafat's signing in Beirut of the document [recognizing all UN resolutions relating to the Palestine problem] which a U.S. delegation carried with it. If simultaneous and mutual recognition is what is required, the ball is now in the court of the United States and Israel." "But," he added, "what we recognize should be a clear identity and not Israel as it stands now--occupying Lebanon and the Golan and demanding changes to the map of the area to make it agree with its expansionist ambitions and strategic alliance with the United States."

Muhammad Milhim, who met with George Shultz in the United States 2 weeks ago, told AL-MAJALLAH that he views the situation as follows: "The Palestinians, headed by the PLO, have recognized the UN resolutions which provide for a just solution of the problem. As for the boundaries of the Palestinian state and the state of Israel, these are matters to be discussed and defined at the negotiating table. When we talk about simultaneous or nonsimultaneous recognition the countries that support and back Israel and the state of Israel which is in control of the destiny of the Palestinian people and land should all recognize the Palestinian people's right to establish their

independent state on their own soil. It is inconceivable that the Palestinian people be asked to make any further concessions. We have made all the concessions and we have no more to make other than this "recognition.' At this stage, when the blood of the victims is still fresh and the sufferings of our people in the occupied territories are increasing, we have no concessions to make. If Israel is indeed interested in the cause of peace it is the one that should make concessions."

In a contact which AL-MAJALLAH held with Milhim in his headquarters in Amman he denied that he intends to play a role on behalf of the PLO. He said he is committed to one principle, namely that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He added that he is prepared to play any role that the PLO may assign to him if he can do so. He denied that the PLO charged him with visiting Washington and meeting with Shultz. He said: "I was invited by Shultz and I accepted the invitation after consulting with Abu 'Ammar and the leadership. I went to Washington via Tunisia."

Milhim said that he did not carry any message from 'Arafat to Shultz "but I have conveyed to Abu 'Ammar in Riyadh what I heard from Shultz." Milhim said that he heard U.S. officials "saying that they will follow up Reagan's initiative to the end. They will follow up every word the president said and they are serious about carrying the matter through to the end. I hope they are sincere in what they are saying."

Milhim said that in Washington he tried to explore the dimensions of the U.S. initiative. He gave his impressions of the initiative and his visit saying: "We the Palestinians and the Arabs have had a bitter experience with successive U.S. administrations, which have adopted an attitude of continued hostility toward us. Although President Reagan's recent initiative does not provide for the right of self-determination and does not explicitly speak about the establishment of a Palestinian state, no one can deny that it contains new elements at least with regard to settlements, withdrawal and the Palestinian people's rights. These elements are spelled out with words which must be backed by deeds, even if this should lead to imposing sanctions on Israel. We must feel the credibility of Reagan's initiative so that we will believe in it. It is the duty of the U.S. administration to take the appropriate steps in order to give credibility to its initiative."

Milhim is not optimistic but cautious. He says: "We must take into account the alternative to the possibility that these words are mere prattle and not backed by practical steps."

The call on the United States to show that it is serious is also echoed by Rashad al-Shawwa. However, he expresses his confidence that the United States is serious in its initiative just as it is serious about evacuating forces from Lebanon.

Bassam al-Shak'ah says that he held wide contacts in order to find out the Palestinian public opinion's views in the occupied territories with regard to Reagan's initiative. He described to AL-MAJALLAH the situation as

follows: "There are positive points in the proposals, including the non-recognition of the occupation as it stands at present. But the proposals do not support the removal of the objectives and principles of the occupation. The removal of these principles and objectives should be through recognizing our people's democratic freedom to establish a state of their own under the PLO's leadership. While Reagan calls for halting the building of settlements he makes this conditional upon the outcome of negotiations. Thus he does not support the removal of one of the objectives of occupation. There is also ambiguity with regard to borders and their alteration as well as with regard to the question of Jerusalem."

Nevertheless, al-Shak'ah is prepared to be "another Muhammad Milhim" if asked to be so. He says that he is banned from leaving the occupied territories and therefore cannot accept invitations he receives from abroad. But, he says, "If I went to the United States and Shultz asked to see me I would see him. But if Philip Habib comes to the area with the aim of promoting Camp David then I will not see him."

PLO'S 'ARAFAT INTERVIEWED BY ROSE AL-YUSUF'

PM051451 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 3 Jan 83 pp 8-14

[Interview with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat by Ahmad Hamrush in Tunis--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] What are the prospects for Jordanian-Palestinian relations?

[Answer] I have held talks with King Husayn on the special relations between the Palestinian and Jordanian people and the future relations between Jordan and Palestine. Our views were identical regarding federal relations after a Palestinian state is set up.

[Question] What shocked you during the siege of Beirut?

[Answer] Nothing shocked me.

[Question] Not even the Arab attitude?

[Answer] Not at all. Nothing surprised me. When I returned from the first Fes summit conference which rejected the Fahd initiative I said that we would pay the price and enter the dark tunnel. I was under no illusion.

[Question] Did you yourself support the Fahd plan at the Fes summit conference?

[Answer] Yes, as a basic principle. I made this public during my visit to Beijing. My position never changed. We were the ones who brought about the success of the second Fes summit conference. King Fahd had said that any amendment entered by the PLO would be acceptable. This is why the Fes plan spoke of the PLO, our right to repatriation, Jerusalem, self-determination, and other things. I believe that the Fes conference scored two victories. The first was that it achieved a unified Arab position and did not run after any foreign plans, and the second was that it prevented Bashir al-Jumayyil from attending the conference. He still had not assumed his presidential powers. I received the invitation when I was in Athens. I declared that I would not attend the conference attended by a president brought to power by Israeli tanks. I will never enter the Israeli area on my feet.

[Question] What about Lebanon's position today and what about its new President Amin al-Jumayyil?

[Answer] The situation is different now. Amin al-Jumayyil was elected by all the political forces in Lebanon and therefore it is unreasonable for us to object to him, especially since he has called for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon.

[Question] What gives you hope and confidence?

[Answer] Do you know that our military operations have not stopped and never will stop? In the past 3 months 361 military operations were carried out in southern Lebanon in which 340 Israeli soldiers were killed or wounded and 43 armored carriers were destroyed. The Israelis imagined that the resistance was finished, but it appeared in Tyre and Sidon. We spread a net. The timing of the Sidon operation was a reply to Sharon's testimony before the Commission [of Inquiry]. So, the military option is still there and the counterattack is continuing at all levels with various methods.

Here I must talk frankly from an Arab angle. I believe, I am sure, that it would be most dangerous to drop the military option. Such a step would lead to collapse and capitulation. I have been fighting Israel since 1947 but I never saw it weak except at the time of the siege, despite the tremendous American war machine supplied to Israel by the United States to turn the region into a field for testing new weapons.

We do not believe that the Beirut steadfastness was a miracle that has ended. No, another miracle has occurred.

[Question] What miracle could match the heroism during the battle?

[Answer] The miracle of redressing our ranks, uniting our forces, overcoming all the problems and difficulties which faced us and resuming military training. We have secured 70 percent of the housing units. We sent prefabricated houses from Kuwait to Sudan. There has been an improvement in everyone's living conditions. We are working for more improvement in order to be able then to devote all our time to the organization of our forces, as happened in al-Biqa' and the north.

The wheel is beginning to turn again and all our old organizations are operating and training again.

[Question] It has been said that the Palestinian revolution is beginning to change its objectives and that what happened after the Beirut war would affect your unity and your struggle.

[Answer] (Without hesitation) We have not dropped and we will never drop the military option. We consider war to be politics with a loud voice. This is the first thing. Second, we support everything positive in any initiative. Third, we know the real position of friend and foe. We realize that the Reagan administration has no desire whatsoever to put pressure on Israel, not even within the limits of its own plan. It suffices to say

that, acting against the recommendation of advisers, Reagan and the Congress approved \$450 million worth of additional aid for Israel. This sum will certainly be allocated for building new settlements in the West Bank. This shows that Israel and the U.S. administration are playing their designated roles. Fourth, we believe that what happened in Beirut was not all bad, otherwise how do you explain the fact the fighters left everything behind—their homes, families and everything they owned? I became sure of the revolution's purity when the fighters left with nothing but their guns and shoulder bags, undefeated by despair but revived by hope. Fifth, we are still strong if we coordinate with our Arab nation and if we play our cards realistically.

[Question] Abu 'Ammar, why have you not visited Cairo yet?

[Answer] You know how eager I am to visit Cairo. I grew up, studied and graduated there. I was a reserve officer in the army and I participated in the resistance against the tripartite aggression. I have memories and friends there. But, apart from the emotional and personal reasons which pull me to Egypt, I frankly say that Egypt has provided leadership for the Arab nation since the end of the Ottoman reign, since Muhammad 'Ali.

Nobody can deny the leading role played by Egypt and the Egyptian masses in the Arab liberation movement, with all their resources and very genuinely. Accordingly, our people, as they stand alone in this fierce battle, turn to their big brother—the people of Egypt—full of hope that they would stand with them in this confrontation. This is why I am fully prepared to come. The claims that I have certain demands or conditions are not true. There is no room for any of this. There is a difference between wishing something and making it a condition or request. I ask nothing of Egypt except what is satisfactory to the Egyptian people, because the cause is one, the fate is one and the future is one.

When Egypt recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv I sent a cable to President Husni Mubarak thanking him. I was constantly in contact with him during the Beirut siege. We are sure of his patriotism.

JERUSALEM DAILY ON ARAB STEADFASTNESS FRONT

JN271515 Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 23 Dec 82 p 1

[Editorial: "The Steadfastness Front...A New Attempt"]

[Text] Intensive moves were made this week by some leaders of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and several statements were issued by PDRY and Libyan officials on the possibility of holding a new summit of the front's leaders.

Although we always support any move aimed at unifying the nationalist Arab forces in the face of the hostile plans, we cannot forget this front's bitter experience in the past. Since its establishment after Egypt's departure from the Arab arena, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front has been a framework without any contents and a body without a soul. At a time when the Arab masses were looking forward to it as a leader unifying the Arab peoples' struggle, most of the front's members did nothing toward unifying and mobilizing their potential. Also at a time when the Palestinian officials were day and night warning against a possible Israeli invasion of Lebanon and calling for a meeting of the front's leaders or defense ministers, no action was taken except that of silence and disregard. When the invasion took place and when the Arab regimes' cowardice and collusion were exposed, more pain and disappointment were caused by the stand of most of the front's member states.

However, we stress that there is still a chance to undertake any unitary action among the nationalist Arab forces, but it should be clear that our peoples are not ready to tolerate another bitter experience. These peoples are awaiting an effective and serious action which will not be achieved unless the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front's states express their clear and tangible solidarity with the Palestinian people and the political stands and programs guiding them toward the attainment of their rights and the confrontation of the plots aimed against them as well as against the nationalist Arab states. What is required is a framework which can pool energies and crystallize a large-scale action [passage censored] sabotage Arab national work and bring our peoples a new disappointment.

In this regard we must again submit the following surprising paradox: How can the pro-U.S. Arab unify their ranks and energies—as is the case with the GCC for instance—at a time when the Arab nationalists fail to crystallize a minimum effective stand for confrontation and steadfastness?

SALAH KHALAF INTERVIEWED ON PALESTINIAN ISSUES

GF021818 Jidda AL-MADINAH in Arabic 27 Dec 82 p 19

[Telephone report from Tunis on interview with Palestinian official Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad--date not given]

[Text] In an interview with AL-MADINAH, Palestinian struggler Salah Khalaf, Abu Iyad, the number two man in the PLO, has lauded Saudi Arabia and the role it played and is still playing in the service of the Palestinian people's cause. The kingdom is not an ordinary Arab country. Rather, it is for us a country of political and economic weight in the world and it honestly played its role during the Lebanese war crisis. This role is considered the best among the Arab stands, he said.

Abu Iyad expressed the hope that a solution for the Palestinian cause will be found during the time of King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. He praised the Saudi leadership for its stand toward the Palestinian people.

Abu Iyad said he will visit Saudi Arabia in early January at an invitation from His Majesty King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz.

The Palestinian leader said after its exit from Beirut, the PLO still holds to the military option and will continue to do so until it attains its legitimate goals, represented by the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and establishing their free and independent state. In this regard, Abu Iyad said: If the PLO eliminates the military option, it will put an end to itself and it will eradicate 18 years of the Palestinian people's history, during which they sacrificed thousands of martyrs and wounded. The fighters' exit, he added, will enhance the armed struggle, referring to the fact that the Palestinian resistance has an armed presence in Tripoli and al-Biqa' and in the occupied Arab territories.

Abu Iyad said: Since the Palestine cause is an Arab and Islamic cause, the PLO and the Arab countries have to enhance the military option and not eliminate or belittle it because the political option cannot achieve progress without motivation and this motivation will be achieved only through the military option.

Abu Iyad continued: We did not eliminate the military option, and an indication of this is that we did not release the fighters. Our fighters are now carrying out intensive exercises in preparation for the next stage and we have a training center in Algeria which we did not dream of having before.

Regarding the recent meeting between Palestinian officials and envoys for Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil, Abu Iyad said: The delegation asked for facilitating the Lebanese delegation's mission concerning the great pressures Lebanon is being subjected to, particularly on the Israeli withdrawal. The Lebanese delegation discussed with us the possibility of introducing a Palestinian initiative on this withdrawal, which might assist Lebanon against the Zionist enemy.

Abu Iyad disclosed that the Palestinian side asked the Lebanese delegation that the Palestinian withdrawal paper remain in the hands of President al-Jumayyil to use as he wants, but without giving it up, and there is a Palestinian-Lebanese unanimity on the use of this paper.

Abu Iyad said: The Palestinian side asked the Lebanese delegation: After the Sabra and Shatila massacres and after Israel's violations of international agreements, particularly U.S. ones, if the Palestinians and the Syrians withdraw from al-Biqa' what guarantees will there be that this will not be an Israeli plan to enter al-Biqa' and Tripoli and what guarantees will there be that the Israelis will carry out another massacre? He continued: The Palestinian side also pointed out to the Lebanese delegation that the Palestinians have many camps in the north of Lebanon which are teeming with civilians who fled Beirut and if we withdraw, the Palestinian people will hold us greatly responsible.

In addition, Abu Iyad affirmed the PLO's readiness to support President Amin al-Jumayyil to accelerate the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces.

He added: We have great respect for President Amin al-Jumayyil, and we believe that his line is Arab, not Israeli.

Regarding Reagan's initiative, Abu Iyad said: Whatever decorations are added to it and regardless of what is said about its positive points, these positive points are also in Resolution 242. Moreover, the initiative did not provide, as Resolution 242 did, for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. This is important in our view.

Regarding Jordanian-Palestinian relations, Abu Iyad said: We have the sincere and true intention of having good relations with this fraternal country. We cannot authorize anyone in any negotiations on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We are major parties in this issue and the issue of representation is basic and important to us and we do not accept to be partners in an Arab delegation. We will accept a partnership with a Jordanian delegation or a joint PLO-Jordanian delegation to be led alternatively, by the PLO and Jordan. We will not accept less than that.

On the confederation with Jordan, Abu Iyad said: What is now busying us and is our utmost priority is the formation of an independent Palestinian state with its own flag, political representation and army.

Abu Iyad emphasized the need for having a Palestinian army because such state cannot be established without an army, which will not be used for aggression. He said the Israeli Army is threatening the entire region and it is not in need of guarantees because it is the Palestinians who really need guarantees. After this state is established, talks can be held on deepening relations with Jordan.

Concluding his interview, Abu Iyad called upon the Arab nation to unite, stop slander and hostile campaigns against each other and muster all Arab material, economic, military and human capabilities to serve their just causes.

PLO'S AL-LABADI VIEWS CURRENT SITUATION

PM061541 Brussels LE SOIR in French 4 Jan 83 p 3

[Interview with Mahmud al-Labadi, PLO Leader Yasir 'Arafat's spokesman, by Michel Dubuisson in Brussels--date not given]

[Excerpt] According to Mahmud al-Labadi, "the situation is still the same after the Beirut war. There has been no great change. The Palestinians have won at the political and moral level and lost in Lebanon. But there is still no solution to the Palestinian problem: Israel is still in the occupied territories, and is building settlements there; the United States is supporting Israel, Europe still has no clear position and is hiding behind Washington."

[Question] What can be done to make progress and to open up a political path?

[Answer] We believe that the Americans and Europeans who are asking us to recognize Israel are wrong.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because it is telling an occupied people to recognize their oppressor. What would the Europeans have thought during World War II if they had been given such advice? In addition, recognition does not necessarily mean an end to the state of war. Has recognition prevented wars in the past?

Recognition is our most precious card. Israel is opposed to the Palestinian people's political identity, even if the state was not led by the PLO. It does not want to solve the Palestinian problem by political means. It is looking for any excuse not to recognize our rights: To maintain that 'Arafat is a terrorist, that he is a communist, that a Palestinian state would be a new Cuba....Each time the question of our rights are raised, it exerts pressure on the Americans and Europeans. Read Carter's memoirs or even Dayan's memoirs.

[Question] Nonetheless the argument about the destruction of Israel is always put forward and even accepted by people who have some sympathy for the Palestinian cause....

[Answer] The Israelis want to look like a David fighting Goliath, surrounded and threatened by the Arabs, in order to obtain the West's sympathy. Similarly the holocaust is constantly recalled to make the West feel guilty and prompt it to support Israel. In fact Israel is the region's superpower. It demonstrated that during the Lebanon war. The Institute of Strategic Studies places it in fourth position in terms of armaments and military technology. How could the PLO destroy the state of Israel?

"As If We Were the Strongest"

[Question] There is your charter....

[Answer] The charter is not the bible or the Koran. It can be changed. It does not say that the state of Israel should be destroyed. The charter says that we do not accept what happened in Palestine in 1948. [Answer ends]

And Mahmud al-Labadi recalled various resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council (Parliament) since 1947 which make provision, in particular, for the creation of a state on any portion of Palestinian territory regained.

[Question] If the charter is not the gospel, why have you not changed it?

[Answer] Because we cannot trust an Israel which is oppressing us daily, which is killing us in Lebanon and which is responsible for the Beirut massacres. We cannot change our charter to please the Israelis. If they want to change they must recognize our right to self-determination. Who has asked the Israelis to change? Look what is happening on the West Bank. They must do something. People are dictating to us what concessions we must make, but not to them. We are prepared for solutions by political means, but what about them? We are asked to make the first gesture as if we were the strongest, whereas it is up to them to take at least one step forward.

"Talking With the Boss..."

[Question] It is a card to be exchanged for something substantial. However, hitherto nothing has been proposed to us because the United States is unwilling. The only prize offered so far is that the Americans would agree to talk with us. But nothing from the Israeli side. We could talk with the "boss," whereas nothing would be required of Israel. And what would be the result of those talks with Washington? And what would happen if Washington put an end to them 2 or 3 months later?

[Question] The fact remains that voices have been raised in the occupied territories, like that of Ilyas Frayj, mayor of Bethlehem, saying that the situation is urgent in view of the colonization, which is becoming virtually irreversible.

[Answer] We are aware of the danger. But what guarantee is there that the Israelis will stop their colonization and recognize our rights? They are not giving any encouragement to the "moderates." Although they want

nothing to do with 'Arafat the "terrorist," they want nothing to do with Ilyas Frayj as head of a government in the territories either. They do not want peace because peace would mean their withdrawal from the territories.

[Question] How should the rapprochement between Yasir 'Arafat and King Husayn be interpreted?

[Answer] 'Arafat is a pragmatist. What interests him are the territories, the homeland, not war for war's sake. If he can obtain the territories by political means, if Husayn can obtain them.... But if King Husayn does not succeed in convincing the United States of the need for Israeli withdrawal, it will spell failure for the Reagan plan, which specifically makes provision for a rapprochement between Jordan and Palestine.

A Historic Turning Point

[Question] What does the Arab peace plan adopted at the Fes summit represent for you?

[Answer] That plan is a turning point in the Arab world, a peace plan for the Arab countries and not only the Palestinians. All the Arab countries have accepted the security guarantees for all the countries in the region. Despite the absence of a positive reaction from the United States and Israel, the Arabs have implicitly recognized that Israel is in the region. That is a historic turning point for the latter. 'Arafat worked hard for that. The ball is now in the American and Israeli court until they recognize the Palestinians' rights. The Arabs, however, have done as much as they can before negotiations. What happens next depends on the U.S. and Israeli will to give a positive answer to the Arab countries and to work for a rapprochement between Palestinians and Israelis.

'ARAFAT ON KUWAIT TALKS, ARAB RELATIONS

LD070008 Algiers Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1702 GMT 6 Jan 83

[Excerpts] The brother leader Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] has held a series of political talks with a number of Kuwaiti officials at the forefront of whom was the amir of Kuwait. On these talks between Brother Abu 'Ammar and Kuwaiti officials our radio correspondent provided us with the following dispatch:

Brothers, speaking to you [word indistinct] Abdelkarim, correspondent of Radio Voice of Palestine, voice of the Palestinian revolution from Kuwait. The brother leader Abu 'Ammar, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and commander in chief of the Palestinian revolution forces, hailed yesterday evening Kuwait's stand in support of the Palestine revolution and its people and noted that his highness the Amir Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad of Kuwait and Shaykh S'ad al-'Abdallah, heir apparent and prime minister, promised yesterday to solve the problem of Palestinians carrying Lebanese documents with Lebanese officials, and to facilitate granting Kuwaiti residence to the [Palestinian] families and students in Kuwait.

In his speech Brother Abu 'Ammar stressed the development of the human being, [as heard] noting that the Palestinians are part of the Arab nation, and said that King Husayn has rejected a complete and comprehensive union with the Palestinians. This was said in a meeting at the PLO office in Kuwait with the representatives of the Palestinian popular organizations and the members of the Palestine National Council. It was attended by Brother Abu Iyad, member of Fatah Central Committee, Abu al-Adib, 'Awni Battash and 'Abbas Zaki, director of the organization's office in Aden.

Abu 'Ammar recalled once more and hailed the stand of the Lebanese people who supported the Palestinian revolution in its latest battle in Lebanon and said: The Arabs have wasted a golden opportunity to eliminate Israel and liberate Jerusalem, referring to the fact that 3/4 of the Israeli Army is fighting in Lebanon. The Arab regimes, he said, are capable of destroying the reputation of the Israeli myth, however the will to fight is more important than weapons and more important than the possible and the impossible. Brother Abu 'Ammar criticized the Arab regimes for hesitating in taking that stand in spite of the steadfastness of the Palestine revolution for 88 days in the face of Israel without technology or war machines. He

accused previous Lebanese President Ilias Sarkis of treason. He stressed that the Palestinians will escalate their military operations and concern themselves with the independence of the Palestinian decision.

Criticizing Arab affairs he said he is surprised that none of the Arab military men has contacted the Palestinian leadership to be briefed on its experience in the battle of Lebanon and to study its fortifications, at the time when military men from the majority of countries in the world have contacted the resistance leadership asking about this. He said that this is a grave indication. The Palestinians are using, he added, basic fortifications with complicated equipment which proves its existence and effectiveness. Abu 'Ammar stressed that the Palestinian artillery was the first Arab artillery to use a computer. The outcome of the war, he said, is great. One of its most significant results is that Israel has ordered the production of the highly developed and famous Merkava tanks to be stopped.

Concerning Egypt he said that there are plenty of al-Sadat's followers in the Arab homeland, and there are more under the table than over it. Abu 'Ammar also said [passange indistinct]. He said that King Husayn rejected a comprehensive and complete union with the Palestinians and that relations with Jordan at this stage are an opening among many openings for the Palestinian revolution after its eviction from Lebanon, stressing that the new relations with Jordan are now based on an equal footing and not [words indistinct]. He expressed his optimism for the future saying that he can still see the ruins of Arab Jerusalem at the end of the dark tunnel through which the revolution is passing. Abu Ammar said: On the 11th of this month I will go to Moscow to acquaint myself with the new Soviet leadership, remembering that any window which opens before the Palestinians will serve their cause. He criticized American policy in the area and noted that the boycott of the Arab Committee of Seven to Britain was an agreed Palestinian decision, and that he himself agreed on it with King Fahd and President Chadli Bendjedid at the Algiers summit.

PLO RADIO ON TUNIS HEADQUARTERS

JN041847 Baghdad Voice of PLO in Arabic 1630 GMT 4 Jan 83

[Unattributed talk]

[Text] In the last month we have received more than one letter dealing with the subject of why Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] chose Tunis and not any other city as his and the PLO Executive Committee's headquarters. Actually, we would have preferred not to answer these questions because it is not our policy to tackle such delicate issues in public but rather through bilateral meetings and contacts publishing only what serves the common interest, our battle against Israel.

It has been noticed, however, that Abu 'Ammar's choice of Tunis as his headquarters is being misinterpreted nowadays. Furthermore, a certain Arab intelligence service is actively launching a campaign against Abu 'Ammar's decision. This intelligence service in presenting explanations that suit its own interests and which are aimed at causing a rift in the Palestinian ranks.

We do not have to outline all the dimensions of this delicate issue, yet would like to say that the revolution's decision to choose Tunis as the temporary command headquarters came as the result of a lengthy, deep study of the various sides of the Arab situation. It is no longer important how far or near the command office should be from occupied Palestine. What is important now is that the place offers a better atmosphere for action and for freedom to enable the revolution to make its decisions. In other words, the nearest place to Palestine is that which suits the Palestinian command best.

Although now is not the time to publicize all the details behind the choice of an appropriate place to serve as the Palestinian command headquarters, we say that before its departure from Beirut the Palestinian command studied all the Arab stands and received official Arab messages defining the conditions for their acceptance of the Palestinian command and the Palestinian forces. Following a detailed study, it became clear to the Palestinian command that all the conditions presented to it categorically canceled out the freedom of Palestinian action and that the conditions meant complete containment of any Palestinian political or military action.

Therefore, the Palestinian revolution's decision was clear and direct:
Abu 'Ammar must settle in a place that allowed complete freedom for political,
military and organizational action. Such freedom symbolizes the revolution's independence and secures the healthiest atmosphere for Palestinian
national action free from all the pressures and ambushes from which the
revolution has been suffering.

Those who were annoyed by the revolution's decision to choose Tunis as its headquarters hoped that the revolution's command would give them carte blanche so they could do whatever they wished with the Palestinian cause. The restrictions imposed on Palestinian action clearly indicate that freedom of Palestinian action and movement would either be limited or completely restricted in all the Arab countries surrounding Palestine. By freedom of the Palestinian action and movement we mean the freedom to organize, mobilize, arm and train as well to launch military operations against the Israeli occupying forces from all the borders surrounding Palestine.

After the departure of the Palestinian command and forces from Beirut up to this moment we have been satisfied with silence, trying to solve the problems related to our forces and weapons through bilateral meetings and contacts. Meanwhile, those who hate to see our revolution victorious continue to issue statements and circulate rumors and irresponsible remarks. Actually, the Palestinian revolution is now concentrating all efforts on the reorganization of its forces and establishments on a new basis that might help the revolution to work freely, away from subjugation to the pressures of any side.

The Palestinian revolution found every possible facility it could think of in Tunis. Therefore, the revolution has been moving on all Arab and international levels without fear of being counted the protegee of this or that Arab side. When the situation in the Arab countries surrounding Palestine becomes harmonious with the minimum level of the requirements of Palestinian revolutionary action Abu 'Ammar will be the first to build a Fedayeen base that constitutes a new ground for the Palestinian armed struggle.

Those fabricating charges against us would do better to open the fighting fronts for our Fedayeen so that we can all fight the enemy. However, if the present conflict is intended to subjugate the Palestinian decision—making process then we say that Abu 'Ammar has covered this subject by saying: The Palestinian people have entrusted me with their independent decisionmaking and with the legitimacy of their struggle. I will remain faithful to this trust for the rest of my life. I will continue to struggle and defend this independent decisionmaking because it has restored life to my people and cause.

Hence, Abu 'Ammar's command headquarters will stay in Tunis until the circumstances and conditions that hinder or even prevent the revolution from moving, acting and deciding freely are changed.

We hope that those who have sent letters to us will be able to realize why the revolution's command has decided to choose Tunis as its temporary

headquarters. The crux of the issue is actually a struggle over the Palestinian decisionmaking process. Do we agree to subjugate this free decisionmaking? Do we agree to go back under Arab trusteeship or shall we exert all efforts and do the impossible in order to preserve the independence of Palestinian decisionmaking? Neither the revolution nor our cause can survive without this. In the absence of independent Palestinian decisionmaking there will be nothing more than mutual brinksmanship and deals between the [Arab] regimes and Israel.

We believe that our present relationship with our Palestinian and Arab masses can defuse all the mines planted by the agent forces aimed at destroying the confidence between the masses and the Palestinian revolution.

PALESTINE RADIO ON NEED FOR PEACEKEEPING FORCES

NCO60929 Cairo Palestine Radio in Arabic 0645 GMT 6 Jan 83

["Palestinian Popular Talk" by Mazin al-Shawwa]

[Text] PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat has called for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to protect the Palestinian people against Israeli suppressive measures. In fact, reports coming from the occupied Palestinian territory contain news of various types of pressures and practices and of suffering and bitterness. Despite the hardship of the occupation and the ugly practices by the occupation authorities, our people are firmly standing fast and resisting with all available capabilities.

Some may ask how long can our people maintain their steadfastness and to what extent can our people resist the hostile plans? The answers to these questions are contained in more than 15 years of occupation which our people endured with patience and steadfastness in spite of the hardship of the occupation and its violent practices.

The answers to these questions are contained in 35 years of homelessness and deprivation, which are the years of the catastrophe which our people have been enduring and in which they have felt all types of pain and deprivation.

The answers to these questions are contained in more than 85 years of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which our people recorded heroic and glorious action despite the hardship of ordeals and bitterness of affairs.

The answers to these questions are finally contained in Beirut trenches, in the Sabra and Shatila lanes and in the 'Ayn al-Hulwah and Burj al-Barajinah shanties.

The answers to these questions can be given by the children who confronted the tanks in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with pebbles, stones and empty bottles. These children have confronted the bombs and rockets which were aimed day and night at the towns, villages and camps in Lebanon.

Our Palestinian people are entitled to be supported and backed by the Arab nation. Our Palestinian people are entitled to fairness and support by

the international community. All the world peoples have the right to be free. All the world peoples have the right to get rid of occupation. All the nations have the right to enjoy independence and freedom. All the nations have the right to live in their homeland and in their land within secure and recognized borders. However, for how long will our people remain suppressed and dispersed? For how long will our people remain under occupation enjoying no security, rest or stability? For how long will our people continue suffering from coercion, oppression and terrorism?

Our Palestinian people are demanding their legitimate rights stipulated in all normal laws and in heavenly laws. International society calls for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to enable them to exercise their right to self-determination and to establish their independent state. The occupation authorities are continuing their suppressive, coercive and terrorist actions. The PLO chairman has called for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to protect the Palestinian people against Israel's suppressive measures.

We believe that this is a first step to settling the Palestinian question and the Middle East crisis and to their peaceful, just and comprehensive solution. There is no doubt that it is a positive step, as we see it, to put an end to the Judaization and Zionization of the occupied Palestinian territory.

If the United Nations and the international community succeeded in adopting such a step, whether they were forces belonging to the United Nations or multinational forces, there is no doubt that this would be the first step toward a peaceful settlement which the world is aspiring to and everybody is seeking and which our people are awaiting with great patience.

JORDANIAN DAILY INTERVIEWS WEST BANK LEADER ON PEACE MOVES

JN231152 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 23 Dec 82 p 7

[Dispatch by Nabil 'Amr]

[Excerpts] Hikmat al-Masri, former speaker of the Jordanian House of Representatives and chairman of the Council of Trustees of the National al-Najah University who comes from the occupied homeland, has said that the return of solidarity between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples and rapprochement and coordination between Jordan and the PLO, our legitimate and sole representative, is a basic requirement to facilitate the solution to the Palestine question. This, he added, will be in the interests of both peoples, because Jordan and Palestine are threatened by the same danger.

In an exclusive statement to AL-DUSTUR, al-Masri said: It is true that the question is primarily Palestinian, but it is also Jordanian by virtue of the distinguished relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples and the historical and geographical links between the two banks of the Jordan River. This gives Jordan a distinguished role and special and personal interest in finding a solution to the Palestine question different from the role and interest of any other Arab state or any other Arab or even international side.

Al-Masri added: The Palestine question is now at a major crossroad. Within the next few months we will witness events which will determine the destiny of the area and the question, whether in the interest of the question or otherwise. Naturally, we do not want to lose the opportunity so it will be said that the Palestinians have always been impractical and have rejected all the solutions which have been offered to them. He also said: After the Lebanon events, basic changes took place in the arena. This compels us to review our policy and to move realistically and objectively in order not to lose the opportunity as in 1939, when we lost the opportunity of the white paper at the London conference, which was attended by representatives of the Higher Arab Commission and Arab states. That opportunity gave us more than 60 percent representation in the government and banned emigration and confiscation of territories. He added: I believe that circumstances now are harsher than in 1939, because Palestine now is entirely under Israeli occupation, which means the danger is greater. can say that Palestine is now at the edge of an abyss, especially since it

is facing the Israeli settlement policy and the confiscation of territories. The Israelis now are stepping up their settlement policy and, since they cannot find new Jewish emigrants, they have started to bring Jewish citizens from the 1948-occupied part of Palestine and settle them in the West Bank and Gaza.

Al-Masri added: Solutions are being proposed such as the Fes and Reagan plans. We must exploit these circumstances so as to steer these plans in our interest without diverting from our demands for complete Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and the right of self-determination to the Palestinian people. These are the minimum Palestinian demands. By virtue of living in the occupied territory and the strong relations that I have with the different sectors of the Palestinian people there, I believe that these demands express the opinion of the majority. He also said: If there are any other opinions, then we believe in the freedom of expression and democratic and constructive dialogue on the basis of objectivity and reality and without vituperations, incrimination or defamation. I do not believe that there is a single Palestinian who does not want to get rid of occupation. Any diversions from this are of no value. Al-Masri said: The national Palestine charter states that national affiliation must supercede any other affiliation. Therefore, we must work with a scientific national mentality without demagogy and narrowmindedness.

In reply to a question about the Palestinian peace document which is being drafted in the occupied homeland, al-Masri said: The document is still being discussed. In essence, it does not depart from the general framework which I spoke about earlier.

On Reagan's plan and the U.S. guarantees and their availability for peace negotiations, al-Masri said: We must reveal the U.S. stand, its seriousness and ability to remove the occupation and stop Israeli settlement and confiscation and devouring of territories.

On the importance of Egypt's return to the Arab fold in these critical circumstances which the Arab nation is experiencing, he said: Our most cherished hope is to see Egypt return to the Arab fold as it was before Camp David. Any Arab move without Egypt will be incomplete. Egypt has a big role, and its return to Arab ranks is a basic requirement for surmounting this current extremely difficult phase.

PALESTINIAN CP REJECTS FEDERATION WITH JORDAN

AU271452 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 23 Dec 82 p 6

[Article by (Nayim Ashab), member of the Politburo of the Palestinian Communist Party Central Committee: "The Palestinian Movement in the Present Stage; Unity Is the Prerequisite for Overcoming Problems Successfully"--passages between slantlines are published in boldface]

[Text] /If we wanted to sum up the results of the heroic drama of Beirut, we would have to concentrate on two points: Owing to the heroism of the Palestinian fighters, demonstrated especially during the blockade of Beirut and in the course of the dangerous reversal in the correlation of forces, the Palestinian cause has won new supporters and achieved new political breakthroughs on the international forum. There has been a positive change in world public opinion, which has been demonstrated also during the latest popular uprising on the occupied Arab territories against the Israeli "civilian administration."/

It can thus be said that the heroic drama of Beirut has marked another victory for the just Palestinian cuase because it has exposed more than ever before the true essence of Zionism and the isolation of the Tel Aviv rulers and of American imperialism.

The second point is that this struggle has meant for the Palestinian movement the loss of a very important position that will not be easy to regain or to replace. However, the revolution has not lost the battle. After all, it lost Amman before yet it was able to cope with that situation.

It is becoming apparent today that the enemies of the Palestinian people from the ranks of Zionists, imperialists and the Arab reaction are banking on splitting up the Palestinian unity and setting up structures running parallel to the Palestinian resistance, which is organized in the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO]. They would like to take advantage of the loss of Beirut to divide the individual segments of the resistance movement, which are based in diverse Arab countries. /The Reagan plan is a concrete expression of these efforts./ The plan pertains only to Palestinians living in the occupied territories and completely ignores the population that lives in exile in various countries and is rallied around its sole

legitimate representative—the PLO. Incidentally, these were the goals of all imperialist—Zionist plans of the past, including the Camp David agreements.

In this atmosphere, two groups—both hostile to the Palestinian cause and to safeguarding the legitimate rights for the Palestinian people—have been formed on the occupied Arab territories.

The first is called "village leagues." It consists of small isolated groups that are made up of agents of the occupation authorities and of criminal elements. They are active especially in the Palestinian rural areas in the occupied territories. They are being equipped and paid by Israel. During the recent popular turmoil, these small groups were put on alert. During the aggression in Lebanon, they were engaged in feverish activity in the occupied territories. Recently they organized their first public congress in Hebron, with the occupation forces painstakingly ensuring their protection. The main slogan of the congress was hostility toward communism. /Their endeavor is to form a counterbalance to the PLO and to get the Palestinian cause where the Israeli occupiers would like to have it./ They fully advocate the so-called civilian administration.

The second group consists of minions of the Jordanian regime. They have become reactivated in connection with the Reagan plan and the plan for setting up a confederation with Jordan. /Such a solution is favored especially by the Palestinian bourgeoisie on the occupied territories,/ which would in this event enjoy Israel's full support. These segments of the Palestinian society do not insist on the withdrawal of Israeli weapons from the Palestinian territory and they do not mind the construction of militarized Jewish settlements and subversive actions against Palestinian economic facilities.

They also do not realize that a return to the Jordanian state would have a negative influence on their economic ambitions as enterpreneurs, nor do they understand that the plans submitted for solving the Palestinian issue cannot guarantee their protection against the Israeli occupiers' destructive attempts and cannot improve their present situation. However, the illusions indulged in by the Palestinain bourgeoisie help to weaken the united stand of the Arab people of Palestine in the struggle against the occupation.

/The Reagan plan not only ignores the PLO and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people but it also contains the principle that a return to the situation and to the borders recognized prior to 1967 is not possible./

As regards the plan for a confederation with Jordan, it is nothing but an Arab version of the Reagan plan because it does not consider the Palestinian people and their demand—to set up an independent Palestinian state. /The purpose of the plan is to deprive the Palestinians of their political independence and of the ability to speak on their own behalf. The Jordanian regime should become the spokesman for the Palestinian cause./

More than any other Arab nation, the Palestinian people are convinced of the essential need for Arab unity and of the fact that they cannot lead their just cause to a successful end without Arab assistance. However, should the Jordanian plan now be forced upon them, it will not be in their interest but will merely confirm the known fact that the Arab reaction is ganging up with imperialism and Zionism at the expense of the popular masses. This would endorse the argument of the Israeli expansionists that the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 are not Palestinian soil. It would also endorse the Zionist argument that the Jordanian territory is large enough to take in the Palestinians so that there is no need for the Israelis to return several thousand square kilometers for the benefit of the Palestinian people.

At the same time two slogans have emerged on the occupied Palestinian soil that meet with our party's sharp criticism.

The /first/ slogan calls for setting up a Palestinian state on any liberated part of Palestine. This is a gesture in the interest of expressing faith in the right to self-determination and the will to carry on the struggle. [Sentence as published] This proposal ignores the fact that the international community criticizes the unlawful annexation by force, as expressed in the declarations of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly. Fully legitimate and fully supported is only the struggle of the Palestinian people for liberating all territories occupied since 1967.

The /second/ slogan calls for saving the territories even by making concessions if necessary—for example, by giving up the right to self-determination. Regardless of the goals and intentions of the exponents of this slogan—it is a cloak for the Reagan plan and the planned Jordanian confederation. This would amount to giving up all the gains of our people, especially in the political and moral area, such as the recognition by the international community of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It would mean a return to the positions held by our people in 1948.

Our Palestinian Communist Party stresses that /the liberation of the occupied Palestinain territories, that is, territories that were seized in 1967, and the safeguarding of the right to self-determination are two sides of one and the same coin. They cannot be separated and neither one of them must be relinquished./

Under these conditions, our party regards it as essential to close the Palestinian ranks as firmly as possible, both externally and internally. The party regards unity as one of the factors making up for the loss of the strongholds of the Palestinian resistance in Beirut. That is why we, Palestinian communists, are working with all our strength, in cooperation with other patriotic segments of the Palestinian resistance movement, on restoring and reviving the Palestinian national front. This is particularly urgent because, following the events of Beirut, the Zionists are concentrating on subduing the Palestinian population of the occupied territories by means of the so-called civilian administration, which we regard as a

prelude to annexing the remaining Arab territories, continuing the crimes against the Palestinian people and building additional militarized settlements in the occupied territories.

Our party regards as very significant the call to convene an international conference to be attended by all interested parties including the PLO. The objective of the conference should be to achieve Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and the ensuring of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights on the basis of all UN resolutions. The supreme goal of the conference should be to ensure a just peace on the basis of security guarantees for an independent Palestinian state and for Israel. The proposals of Comrade Brezhnev and the conclusions of the summit in Fes form a realistic basis for holding such a conference.

As regards Washington's call on the PLO to recognize Israel without Israel and the United States committing themselves to recognize the PLO and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, it is blackmail and political pressure similar to the Camp David methods.

A high-principled stand would strengthen the ranks of our people and significantly buttress and enhance the gains of the Palestinian cause achieved on the international political forum so far. It would also reinforce the PLO's position and rally even more Palestinians around it.

When we rely on firm Palestinian unity and the friends of our people, especially the socialist community headed by the USSR, and when the world public's solidarity with our cause strengthens, then it will be possible to successfully overcome the problems that have arisen following the events of Beirut and to master all the conspiracies plotted against the legitimate rights of our people.

DFLP CALLS FOR ARMED STRUGGLE, OPPOSITION TO FEDERATED STATE

LD182010 Kuwait KUNA in English 1815 GMT 18 Dec 82

[Text] Damascus, 18 Dec (KUNA)--A (?radical) Palestinian commando organization called Saturday for escalating all forms of armed struggle against the Israeli occupation on the Palestinain territories and Lebanon and asked the PLO leadership to work for regrouping of Palestinian (?commandos) who were stationed in various Arab countries following their withdrawal from West Beirut last August.

The Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in the meantime emphasized that the Palestinian [word indistinct] should work out clear [word indistinct] its relations with various Arab [word indistinct] to ensure the continuity of the Palestinian national [word indistinct] self-determination and an independent state under the leadership of the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

[Word indistinct] in a communique the outcome of an expanded meeting of the front's Central Committee under its Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah. Regarding the Palestinian-Jordanian relations, the front said these relations must be based on the national interests of the two peoples in accordance with free and (?voluntary) choice, equality and democracy.

The front also called for confrontation against all proposals for a Palestinian-Jordanian state and urged "modification" of relations with [word indistinct] and coordination between the two sides regarding the Camp David accords, the Reagan proposals, the U.S.-Israeli alliance and all its expansionist and aggressive designs.

The front called for strengthening of relations between the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement to bring about withdrawal of the Israeli troops and to guarantee security of the Palestinian people in Lebanon.

The DFLP stressed unity among various Palestinian commando organizations within the framework of the [word indistinct] in order to foil pressures aimed at forcing the organization to give concessions which only serve the U.S. interests and designs.

COMPLAINTS OF UNRWA HOLDING BACK DONATED GOODS

TA050627 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 5 Jan 83

[Text] UNRWA has not transferred many goods donated by charitable organizations in the world to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The equipment includes clothes, thousands of pairs of boots and 1,500 stoves; it has been in the UNRWA stores in southern Lebanon for a long time. In at least three cases, UNRWA officials have been beaten by angry refugees in Tyre and Sidon; the background is difficulties in the allocation of funds and faulty functioning by the officials. Here is a report by Gabi Zohar:

[Zohar--apparently live] The Palestinian refugees in southern Lebanon are frustrated. They are being forced to live in the most difficult conditions while much equipment, which could have relieved their suffering, is stuck in the UNRWA organization's stores in Lebanon. The representatives of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon blame the UNRWA officials for the blunder and are raising suspicions of incorrect actions by several of these officials, among other things, the deliberate delay of the distribution of the equipment to the refugees. Thus, despite the hard winter, thousands of pairs of boots, warm clothes, stoves and even sacks of cement intended for the refugees to do their own construction have remained in the UNRWA stores; all of this comes from donations intended directly for the refugees. Israel is aware of the delay in the distribution of the equipment and cement to the Palestinian refugees. This is what Eli Tzur, in charge of the Ministry of Welfare's activities in southern Lebanon, has to say:

[Begin Tzur recording] It is my impression that the refugees are not very pleased with the way their officials in Sidon are organizing and distributing goods. That was our impression and we also know that they complained to us about that grave situation. [End recording]

[Zohar] Both the Ministry of Welfare and other elements in Israel do not intend to intervene in this affair, Eli Tzur emphasized. At the same time, it has been learned that yesterday the Israeli representatives connected with UNRWA demanded an immediate start to be made on distributing the equipment. The UNRWA director in Lebanon promised to do this and asked the IDF to guard the organization's officials against the Palestinians. The heads of the UNRWA organization in Lebanon have also claimed that the delay in the distribution of the equipment originates in a shortage of trained manpower, a fact that is vigorously denied by the Palestinians' representatives in southern Lebanon. Within the next few days, further fights are expected against this background between the Palestinian refugee and the UNRWA officials in Lebanon.

BRIEFS

JORDAN ACTS AGAINST W. BANKERS--The Jordanian Government is taking steps against West Bank figures who had been seen in the company of former civilian administration head Menahem Milson. Our correspondent has learned that under pressure from Jordan, the Supreme Muslim Council has fired a senior official who appeared beside Milson on Israeli television. [Text] [TA250714 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 25 Dec 82]

APPOINTMENT OF PLO OFFICIALS--London, 31 Dec (MENA)--The MENA correspondent in London has learned that it has been decided that Nabil al-Ramlawi will remain in charge of the PLO office in London in addition to his new job as PLO representative to the United Nations in Geneva. Al-Ramlawi is due to leave London for Geneva on 6 January to take up his new post. It was previously announced that Dawud Barakat, the present PLO representative in Geneva, was appointed head of the PLO office in London but MENA has learned from Palestinian sources here today that Barakat's reported transfer to London was incorrect. The Palestinian sources added that the appointment of a new PLO representative here to succeed al-Ramlawi will be considered in the near future. [Text] [NC311524 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1410 GMT 31 Dec 82]

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND--The United States has chosen the circumstances currently prevailing in the Arab region to announce the formation of a U.S. central command [qiyadah markaziyah amrikiyah] in the Middle East. More than 200,000 soldiers have been placed at the disposal of this command. These forces were previously known as the Rapid Intervention Forces [Quwwat al-Tadakhkhul al-Sari']. This U.S. announcement came while Washington was conducting large-scale military exercises in Morocco, Somalia and Oman. The formation of the Middle East command [Qiyadat al-Sharq al-Awsat] is a natural result of the Arab rightwing's defeatism and of providing bases and facilities to Washington, in addition to this wing's complete political subservience to U.S. imperialism and submission to its dictate. formation of this command is also additional evidence of the hireling regimes' instability and inability to face their peoples. It is, moreover, an expression of the U.S. hegemonic policy which Reagan is trying to cover up with his claims about the so-called Soviet danger. [Text] [JN200818 Jerusalem AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 9 Dec 82 pp 1, 11]

FATAH OFFICIALS ESCAPE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT--Ba'Labakk, 2 Jan (SANA)--A SANA correspondent said that this afternoon, Sunday, an assassination attempt was carried out at the al-Jalil camp near the city of Ba'Labakk against Brother Samih Abu Quwayk, alias Qadri, member of the Fatah Central Committee, and several senior leaders of the Fatah movement. The incident took place after Brother Qadri had concluded his address at the rally held on the 18th anniversary of the Palestinian revolution. Brother Qadri and his companions escaped this treacherous attempt. [Text] [JN022039 Damascus SANA in Arabic 2010 GMT 2 Jan 83]

SYRIAN DAILY QUESTIONS AIMS OF 'NEW U.S. FORCE'

JN071132 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0445 GMT 7 Jan 83

[From the press review]

[Text] AL-BA'TH says: The recent formation of the new U.S. force has aroused a group of questions in the Middle East and Europe, because this escalation in the arms race under the aegis of the Reagan administration was accompanied by U.S. military moves and an exacerbation of the tension in Africa and the Middle East. This escalation has increased the burdens on the U.S. budget and increased unemployment to 30 million. President Reagan is not behaving arbitrarily but according to a course prepared before he took power in the White House. All he has to do now is to translate this course into action.

AL-BA'TH adds: If the objectives of the force which was formed to intervene in the Middle East is to protect oil, which is the most important U.S. interest in the region, then we ask the following question: Is the United States not the only danger threatening oil through its rancorous practices against the Arabs? AL-BA'TH answers: The Arab nation, whose wounds are still bleeding from U.S. weapons and whose rights have been ignored by U.S. policy through its support for Israel, is a target, not only for its wealth, but also in all aspects of its existence.

The United States has another objective which goes far beyond this. With its fleets and hegemony over the Arab world, the United States is trying to turn the Arab territories into a battlefield similar to Western Europe. [as heard] Therefore, the United States can achieve two objectives: First, to satisfy its bloody greed, and second, to destroy the ancient Arab and European civilizations. The European peace advocates blame the Arab regimes who put their territories at the Pentagon's disposal for this serious trend in U.S. policy.

AL-BA'TH concludes: Those regimes have not realized that the United States, which claims that it protects its friends, will transform their territories into a ball of fire without their having any role in the hot war in the international arena. [as heard] Thus, it becomes clear that those who are eager to keep the United States [in the area] are in fact bringing destruction upon themselves. Therefore, the Arab citizen must rise against the United States presence in his land before the catastrophe occurs and before it is too late.

'AL-AHALI' ON SYRIAN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL SITUATION

PMO40855 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 22 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Aminah al-Naqqash from Damascus: "The Difficult Syrian Equation"]

[Excerpts] The question that is preoccupying observers and journalists in Damascus as well as Syrian opposition circles is: Can the internal economic and political situation endure the hardline Syrian foreign policy with regard to the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which calls for fighting against Zionist expansionism and confronting the U.S. plans in the Arab area?

One thing on which the two sides agree is that these slogans emanate from an internal situation that cannot be described as stable.

Official circles in Damascus affirm that, despite the economic difficulties resulting from the Israeli aggression against and occupation of Lebanon and the lack of internal resources for implementing projects, the economic situation is generally good. 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, assistant general secretary of the Ba'th Party, says that development plans in Syria are progressing satisfactorily; while they depend on self-financing, there is less reliance on foreign loans and aid, and while cooperation with East European countries in the implementation of projects is increasing, with West European countries it is decreasing. The public sector contributes effectively to the implementation of plans, and its investments total 85 percent. This is in addition to the contribution made by the private sector to the development plans.

This means, according to statements by officials, that the economic situation in Syria is capable of sustaining the implementation of the proposed political goals.

The Syrian opposition views what the Syrian economy is facing not merely as "difficulties" but rather as a basic flaw in its infrastructure. In this regard the opposition points to the difficulties which the Syrian economy is suffering as a result of increasing inflation, which has led to a reduction in the value of the Syrian pound and a similar reduction in the living standards of people with low and middle incomes as well as to the Syrian

balance of payments deficit, which reached 5.68 billion Syrian pounds in 1978. While imports totaled only 20 percent of national income in 1965, they increased to 55 percent in 1980. Opposition circles attribute this situation to the proliferation of the black market following the adoption of the open-door policy in 1971 and increasingly after the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, as a result of privileges given to the Syrian Army in Lebanon which fostered imports and smuggling. This is in addition to an increase in foreign loans to Syria, on which interest totaled 693.6 million Syrian pounds in 1981.

Despite the fact that the public sector plays an important role in developing the economic structure in Syria, the opposition points out that the lack of popular and government control over this sector has enabled the parasitic bourgeoisie, which is influential in Syrian society, to weaken and destroy it.

Opposition circles attribute the fault in the Syrian economic structure not to the lack of raw materials in Syria, which has been exploiting its oil resources since 1969, but to the failure to put into effect the Ba'thist slogans that call for equality and social justice. Opposition circles point in this regard to the large increase in the number of millionaires and the increasing political influence of the parasitic groups which have grown up under the ruling regime and to the existence of such groups among senior state officials who use their influence to accumulate wealth through commissions and bribery.

Opposition circles believe that a society suffering from such a basic fault in its economic structure and in which there is a wide discrepancy in the distribution of wealth and income is not fit to be a society of Confrontation and Steadfastness against Israel.

On the level of the question of democracy and political freedom, Syrian officials are unanimous in saying that the setting up of the National Progressive Front in Syria in 1972 was a pioneering, militant action in the field of front-building in the Third World countries. The fact that the front has been in existence for 10 years is the best evidence of its success.

While officials of the parties in the front speak about their actual participation in governing and about being represented in the ministries and official delegations, opposition circles observe that the participation of the front parties in the government is mere show. These parties are not allowed to publish their own independent newspapers and publications or to establish headquarters in the capital or the provinces, or to distribute their leaflets secretly. Meanwhile no newspaper has been published by the front despite the fact that 10 years have elapsed since it was established and that its charter provides for such a paper.

The formal role played by the ruling National Progressive Front headed by Hafiz al-Asad has, in the view of political observers, contributed to the emergence of a quasipublic opposition in the Syrian political field represented in the following:

The National Democratic Assembly [at-Tajammu' al-Watani ad-Dimuqrati], established in 1979 by splinters from national front parties disagreeing with the front's policy under the Ba'th leadership, which left their parties to join the opposition.

The National Alliance in Syria, which is led by the Muslim Brotherhood and in which some Iraqi Ba'thist elements are active. It also includes some of the supporters of Akram al-Hawrani Group and the remnants of the People's Party and the National Party, in addition to some independent figures. The alliance charter calls for "guaranteeing freedom of thought, expression and assembly and the formation of political parties." It also calls for total commitment to the liberation of Palestine from Zionist usurpation and imperialist domination.

The problem of the Muslim Brotherhood is considered the most serious internal problem faced by the Syrians. Syrian Information Minister Iskandar Ahmad (?said), "The brotherhood in Syria has been finally crushed, everything pertaining to it is finished, and its members are either dead or in prison." Iskandar added: "We believe that the actions perpetrated by the brotherhood in Syria—the killing of ulemas, senior army officers, professors and innocent citizens—were a basic part of the pressures exerted by the U.S.—Israeli—al—Sadat Camp David alliance against us. The brotherhood's actions escalated every time Syria's differences with al—Sadat became more acute. They began to escalate following the signing of the first disengagement agreement in 1975 and developed into hostility to the national progressive line we pursue. They say that our regime is isolated internally. We gave arms to the people's masses to defend themselves against the acts of terror. How can a regime be isolated when it allows the arming of the people to face their enemies?"

The Syrian opposition draws attention to the mishandling of the internal situation and points out in this regard how the army was trained and equipped as a means of crushing the Muslim Brotherhood, as happened in Hamah, instead of being prepared to face Israel. The opposition also affirms that the Muslim Brotherhood question is not yet over and that it is being treated by suspect elements in the regime in a sectarian and repressive manner, for, while the brotherhood raises the slogan that "the 'Alawites are unbelievers," those elements are arming the 'Alawites in various parts of the country and inciting them to stand against future risings by the brotherhood.

Muhammad Haydar, in charge of foreign relations in the Ba'th Party National Command, agrees with me that confronting terror with terror could further complicate matters. He said: "This situation was imposed on us and it has led to a social state that we do not desire. We have used political action, constitutional laws and courts set up to implement those laws to deal with an armed counterrevolution resisting the regime by means of armed violence, sedition and fighting."

Replying to a question, Haydar said: "Yes there are some leftist elements now in jail who split with the front parties and used illegal methods of

expressing themselves and who sympathize with the brotherhood even though they were the target of attacks by the latter."

Political observers have noted that in his recent speech al-Asad attacked parasitic capitalism, describing it as a disease destroying the cells of society. He declared his government's intention to eliminate it—something that heightened the optimism of those who wish to see Syria reconcile its ambitions with reality so that it will be able to face the Israeli enemy, on the grounds that it is the last Arab defense line. These people believe that their optimism will be vindicated if al-Asad's administration is able to provide a degree of democratic freedom that will enable the other nationalist forces in the Syrian arena to participate in creating the conditions suitable for confrontation.

This is the real challenge that is now facing President al-Asad's administration.

BRIEFS

AGREEMENTS WITH CSSR, INDIA--President Hafiz al-Asad has enacted Law No 44 for 1982 providing for the endorsement of the consular agreement signed between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the CSSR. The president also enacted Law No 47 for 1982 providing for the endorsement of the agreement concluded between the Syrian and Indian Governments to prevent double taxation between the two countries. [JN311424 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1215 GMT 31 Dec 82]

SOVIETS REPORTED RUNNING AFGHAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jan 83 p 3

[Text] According to deserters from the Afghan Army who arrived Monday, 3 January on the Pakistan border, some thirty Afghan officers and NCOs had reportedly been killed during a mutiny which took place on the night of 31 Dec 82/1 Jan 83 at an outpost defending the town of Khost in the eastern province of Paktia. The some 100 mutineers also reportedly set fire to the ammunition storehouse before joining the resistance.

Furthermore, Colonel Mohammad Ayyub 'Osmani who was an employee of the Ministry of Defense in Kabul before he fled to Pakistan stated that the Soviets were controlling this ministry completely, and even countersigning all its written orders. According to him, even Afghan generals are searched when they enter the ministry where there are reportedly 2,500 Soviet military personnel and 3,500 Afghans employed. Soviet Marshal Sergey Sokolov reportedly has the upper hand in the ministry. Colonel 'Osmani even said that the Soviets have undertaken to reorganize the Afghan governmental and administrative structures on the model of the Soviet Moslem republics of Asia.

CSO: 4619/17

TEHRAN ACCEPTS NEW PEACE MISSION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 p 2

[Text] The Tehran mullahs have accepted a plea to talk to a joint United Arab Emirates and Algeria peace mission in the latest bid to end the costly Gulf war. Agreement was finally obtained by Muslim organisation officials on Tehran's stipulation that delegates should come from only countries which had not taken a pro-Iraqi stance in the war.

One hopeful factor, according to sources in Tehran not connected with the regime, which could affect the mullahs' attitude to the war was the growing realisation that the failure of the final offensive against Iraq before winter set in had begun to accelerate the erosion of public support for the war. With little hope of decisive action for the next three months because of weather conditions, sources say the mullahs constant attempts to whip up euphoric feeling over the prospect of defeating the Iraqis could backfire seriously.

"The army commanders may have been aware of the fact that the actions at the front would have to remain limited but the public has been told regularly that the armed forces are on the verge of defeating Saddam," a source said. "The mullahs have so far not justified the great loss of life in the war."

REGIME MAY CRACK, BUT IRANIANS HAVE 'LITTLE FAITH IN OPPOSITION GROUPS'

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 pp 4-6

[Text] The Khomeini regime at present shows all the signs of total isolation at home. Yet it has managed to keep its head above water simply because it can rely on a sustained source of income through oil exports, and the absence of a well organised opposition force to drive it from power and take over the reins of government.

This is the considered opinion of the regime's opponents at home. They refer to the regime's increasing isolation from the masses in Iran by pointing to several indicators such as the recent public rejection of a twin election—the mid—term Majlis elections and the elections to the experts assembly.

"This is as good an indicator as any," says an analyst inside Iran. "This phenomenon must be seen against a background of constantly dwindling numbers attending Friday prayers, the way Khomeini himself has taken a defensive position in most of his speeches, the way all the prominent figures of the regime travel in bulletproof cars and shun public appearances, and finally in the way the authorities are completely cut off from realities of life inside Iran."

The same analyst claims that nearly everything which the leading members of the regime say in public is irrelevant to the facts of life inside Iran. "They approve rules and regulations, discuss bills in the Majlis, vote on budget figures and introduce new Islamic laws," he says. "They might as well introduce new regulations on how to live on Mars or how to swear at America in Saudi Arabia.

"The rules and regulations they approve, the budget figures they allocate and the new measures they adopt are valid within their own limited confines. They have nothing to do with us, the people," he says, claiming that people live their own isolated life as well.

"We live by our own wits, as if we have to contend with an army of occupation which has placed a number of inefficient individuals in government positions."

"Our main concern is to have nothing to do with the authorities," he says. "Some of us still draw a pension from offices where we used to work, some of us have set up small businesses, some are shopkeepers. We know that we have to get in touch with the authorities to get our rations, to get merchandise if we are shopkeepers; we use the banknotes printed by the mullahs, we use the postal services, electricity and water, but we are careful to minimise our contacts with the mullahs."

He says the mullahs control big business, import most of the lucrative lines of goods and try to force people to accept their authority. "As soon as the mullahs realise that we have found a way of circumventing the revolutionary committees to do some business they quickly enact a new law to require us to obtain a permit from the committees," he says. "But soon we find yet another way of getting round the mullah-controlled offices."

The essence of his argument is that the people are trying hard to live their lives as if the mullahs are an alien occupation force, a devil sent by God to punish Iranians but one with whom contact should be avoided as far as possible.

This shows how isolated the regime is. Few pay taxes—not that people try to avoid paying them; they simply do not do anything which is liable to taxation.

A kind of subterranean life has emerged in Iran which tries to ignore the mullahs existence. Few listen seriously to what Khomeini says. Few take notice of the radio or watch television. Not even the poor.

However, the regime continues to survive because of the constant flow of income from oil exports and the handsome sums it pays to a small group of its adherents who are ready to resort to murder and any other kindsof criminal act for the regime.

"The mullahs are so isolated at home that they have had to look to other countries to find some sort of support," another Tehran analyst says. He refers to the constant travels of the leading figures of the regime as well as the daily arrivals of foreign missions. Every day two or three official missions arrive in Tehran from mainly irrelevant countries like Malta, Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Arab Republic of Sahara.

The regime is so starved for friendship that it yearns to welcome missions from these places, its critics say. When a North Korean or Syrian mission arrives it is built up to look as if the world's biggest nation has sent a team.

It is constantly said in Tehran that it is still worthwhile for the mullahs to cling to power instead of escaping abroad to enjoy the riches which, like their predecessors, they have amassed. This is because there is no opposition force capable of replacing them.

"We inside Iran have done our part by frightening Khomeini and his criminals into an isolated life," says a member of the Irandin opposition group. "We don't care who claims credit for our acts of armed opposition to Khomeini," he says. "But inside Iran facts are well-known. Inside Iran everybody knows that none of the Paris-based opposition groups do not help us as effectively as they should. They could do a lot more if they would really organise themselves."

He claims that Irandin and similar organisations work so well that Khomeini's thugs have not been able to track them down. "In desperation they round up former members of the Mojahedin and put them in prison, but everybody knows that those who are in prisons were formerly supporters of the regime who subsequently did not support it. They had the misfortune of being known to the pasdars because they were at one time birds of the same feather. Those of us who force Khamenei and others to travel in bulletproof cars, who force Khomeini to live in a fortress surrounded by anti-aircraft defences, are not known to the pasdars, and we have made them so frightened that they cannot go on their rounds at night."

An economist who held senior positions in several government offices in the past says: "The situation has radically changed since the days of Bazargan as a prime minister and Bani-Sadr as a so-called president. Then it could have been possible to preserve the Islamic republican cover and work from inside the regime to improve conditions.

"Today, in the aftermath of Shariat-Madari's ignominious fall and with prospects of a clown like Montazeri being promoted to replace Khomeini both the Islamic and the republican labels of the regime have been totally disgraced. The republican label was already discredited when Bani-Sadr was chosen as a president who had to kiss Khomeini's hand in public to obtain the mantle of office from him.

"Since the day Bani-Sadr kissed Khomeini's hand at the Heart Diseases Hospital in Tehran, the title of Rais Jumhour (President of Republic) degenerated and Iran was officially made an Imamate. With Shariat-Madari's fall and Montazeri's imminent rise to preside over the Imamate the Islamic cover will also wear thin.

"That is why those Paris-based opposition groups who try to force us to forget 60 years of what we can now see was progressive Pahlavi reign, and who try to tell us that progressive regimes must either be Islamic or republican, are really out of touch with the realities of current politics at home."

The same economist concedes that the brave young people who have so courageously driven Khomeini and his ministers into isolation have no plans for governing Iran. He says conditions at home do not permit emergence of political leaders who might command respect among these young people. Any respectable politician at home who might be considered a possible leader would automatically be arrested and publicly humiliated.

Political leadership should come from outside the country, but it must be well aware of the present facts of political life at home, he added. Judging from statements made by exile politicians, one came to the conclusion that none of the present political leaders was aware of the present mood of Iranians. "They all talk about irrelevant topics in Paris," he says.

As long as outside politicians were not attuned to inside politics the mullahs can hope to survive despite their isolation. They have access to the radio, television and newspapers, and there they still rule. But the time could soon come when it was no longer worth the while of the mullahs to remain in power. Many of them were showing signs of cracking up under the strains of living inside bulletproof cages. They could also find it hard to go on sustaining their rank and file supporters. They might be tempted to take their money to a safe haven.

The political leadership outside the country must speedily adjust its position to the changes inside or else those inside will have to create their own political leadership, Tehran analysts say. Technocrats inside the country are not quite sure that the kind of political leadership which might emerge inside the country to capitalise on popular feeling against the Islamic republic would be half as democratic as even the two Pahlavis were. They believe that it would be a pity if political figures in exile failed to influence the transformation at home.

FORMER CONSCRIPTS TO GET 'ISLAMIC' GROUNDING

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 pp 6-7

[Text] An announcement that a number of volunteer army reserve battalions, made up of men who have received some military training and on the lines of reserve organisations in other countries, are to be set in Iran has intrigued military observers of the Iranian scene. The battalions will come under the army command.

Most Iranian observers feel this is one more move to ensure that the threat of a military takeover can be countered. They point out that the official announcement said that teaching "Islamic ethics" and ideology would take priority over technical military training.

"It seems that the fear of some action by the military is so strong among the mullahs that they want to ensure that even former conscripts are organised to resist the blandishments of ambitious officers," one told IPS. "The mullahs trust their own appointed military chiefs but not the rest of the officer crops, it seems. They want to put another possible source of manpower for a dissidents' coup out of reach. They feel that if they can keep the ordinary population, like these people, worked up about the revolution and Islam this is the safest way of obviating moves by ambitious dissidents."

The new army units are officially named Qods (Jerusalem) Reserve Battalions. They are manned by men who have already served as conscripts in the army. Some reserve officers will also be allowed to join, but the accent is placed on recruitment of former other ranks.

Only volunteers will be accepted in the units and Tehran radio reported this week a large number of former conscripts in Tehran and the provinces had volunteered to join. Five centres in Tehran have been opened up to cope with the rising numbers. Tehran radio appealed to those who had not gone through military training not to volunteer.

Officially, the new reserve units will be built up to be ready for liberation of Jerusalem. But officials have not said when the move against "Zionist occupation state" will be initiated.

Nor have officials spelled out any programme for the recruits. It seems they will be issued with uniforms and a code name to report when the time for action arrives. They will initially be called for a period of three months to be re-trained in Islamic ethics and new warfare techniques.

Ideological training would take priority over technical training and new ideological cadres would instruct the recruits on the importance of "mind over matter," the announcement on the new corps said. Exile sources point out that besides indoctrinating the former soldiers the new scheme would keep its officers and men busy in yet another gimmick designed to distract the professional soldiers' minds from daily problems at home but "correct" their thinking. Widespread unemployment is increasing the mullahs' anxieties in this respect.

IRANIAN, IRAQI WOMEN APPEAL FOR CONDEMNATION OF WAR

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 p 8

[Text] Women's organisations of Iran and Iraq have issued a joint appeal to the international community, and particularly to human rights and peace movements, to condemn the war between the two countries and help to bring about its end.

The appeal is signed by Manal Younis al-Aloosi for the Iraqi General Federation of Iraqi Women and Laleh Moin for the Association for the Defence of Women's Rights in Iran. It was published in Paris.

The full statement of the appeal was as follows:

"For two long years a war of the most atrocious proportions has been taking place between Iraq and Iran. Despite numerous entreaties, both international and regional, to begin serious negotiations the war continues to provoke the death of men, women, and children, and obviously burden the economies of these two peoples, who are both brothers and neighbours. We are:

"Aware of the ardent desire of the two peoples to live in peace and security;

"Aware of the human and economic disaster engendered by this war;

"Aware of the great consequences such a war can have on the sensitive region of the Middle East, and on world peace.

"We, the women of Iran and Iraq, united by the principles of the November 10th 1982 appeal launched by the Association for the Defence of Women's Rights in Iran, and the gracious response of the General Federation of Iraqi Women of November 18, 1982, invite all international personages: men, women, writers, scholars, artists, all champions of peace and human rights, to perform their humanitarian duty by condemning this war.

"We appeal to all free men and women to support the Iran-Iraq Peace Committee in its objective to use all efforts necessary to pressure the international community to finally and definitively bring an end to this horrible war."

MAHDAVI-KANI CHALLENGES KHAMENEI'S LEFT LEANING POLICIES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 p 3

[Text] Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, a leading supporter of Khomeini during the 20 years prior to the revolution and the man who created the notorious revolutionary committees in February 1979, has now publicly announced his opposition to President Ali Khamenei's left-leaning policies, especially the nationalisation of foreign trade.

In a statement printed in the Tehran daily Ettelaat Mahdavi-Kani said that nationalisation of foreign trade was in contravention of Islamic tenets and the spirit and letter of the Islamic constitution.

The statement of the 55-year-old mullah was made in his capacity as a member of the Council of Guardians, the body set up under the Islamic constitution to make sure that bills passed by the parliament conform with the articles of the constitution as well as Islamic tenets.

The Council of Guardians has formally rejected the Foreign Trade Bill enacted by the parliament. Its rejection is said to be on grounds that it neither conforms to the spirit of the revolution, nor to Islamic rules. Now Mahdavi-Kani stipulates that the constitution's article 44 on foreign trade did not provide for nationalisation, nor did it imply that the government should engage in export-import business.

Mahdavi-Kani said that leftist organisations, including communists, were behind designs to confuse the constitution's stipulation on foreign trade with nationalisation of export-import business. He said the constitution's aim was to empower the government to have direct control over policies regarding the export-import trade but it did not intend to make a business enterprise out of it for the government.

He warned against infiltration of counter-revolutionary forces who were determined to put their own stamp on the revolution. He said socialism, as well as capitalism, had no place in Islam.

"Islam has its own economic philosophy," he said. "We had this philosophy in mind when we set out to regulate our economic life. This philosophy is against capitalism but our opposition to capitalism should not lead us to another un-Islamic creed which is socialism."

Mahdavi-Kani responded to critics who have contended the Council of Guardians is devoted to capitalistic ideas and that was why it had rejected the foreign trade bill.

"We will not be intimidated by such charges," he said. "We know what we have to do and we stick by our convictions. Nobody can frighten us into doing what we do not believe in.

"We believe it is in our interests to allow the government to extend its control over the export and import of strategic goods, just as it is in our interests to allow the government to extend its control over big industry. But we are equally determined not to allow the government to interfere in the affairs of the Muslim people to prevent them from going about their ordinary business," he said.

MUSAVI ASSAILS KUWAIT, OMAN, FRANCE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 pp 3, 4

[Text] Iran's premier Mir-Hossain Mussavi this week assailed Kuwait for its "activities against the Islamic revolution" and warned that such anti-Islamic deeds would not remain unchallenged. He also said the Omani regime was in danger, and that the French regime was harbouring terrorists.

In what appeared to be an impromptu press conference last Sunday, the premier said Kuwaiti authorities were accomplices in a major international plot against the territorial integrity of Iran and the survival of the Islamic revolution in the region.

He referred to articles in the Kuwaiti press which it claimed were "against" Iran and said that the whole thing was an orchestrated campaign organised by imperialism and enforced by Iraq's Baathist regime. Unfortunately, he said, the Kuwaitis could not remain impartial. They had decided to play along with imperialism's dangerous game and would pay for it.

On Oman Mussavi said the joint manoeuvres being held by the Omani and the American armed forces were designed to maximise Pentagon intrigues against the Islamic republic. He said the revolution had cut off Washington's hands from Iran and alienated American imperialism in the region. So the Americans were finding ways of increasing their subversive activities.

"The recent development may on the surface show an American presence in the area," he said. "But in reality this will encourage Muslim activists to increase their efforts and create a solid front against America. In the final analysis the Islamic revolution will be the winner."

On France he said animosity between Tehran and Paris would continue. He promised Iran would fight strongly a French application to attend the non-aligned conference as an observer. France was an imperialist power, he said, adding that as such it was absurd for that country to be at the meeting.

"French colonialism of our brother country Algeria is fresh in our minds," Mussavi said. "How could we forget it? Besides, France has given a safe haven to terrorists and hypocrites and condoned their acts of terrorism.

The Islamic republic will fight with all its strength any imperialist plot to allow France to attend the non-aligned conference."

Iran's foreign minister Velayati, meanwhile, announced that the Islamic republic would open up embassies and political legations in nine African countries. He said Iran's Islamic revolution had a message to deliver to African masses and a mission to accomplish in that continent.

According to the plan the Islamic republic would open up an embassy in Zimbabwe and then explore possibilities for setting up legations in Zambia, Angola and other African countries "which are battling imperialism in its modern form."

Iran would also fight the new regime of Hassan Hebre in Chad and Morocco's aggression against the Arab Republic of Sahara, he said.

KHOMEYNI LAUNCHES NEW BID TO STABILIZE REGIME

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 103, 21 Dec 82 pp 1-2

[Text] In an unprecedented gesture Ayatollah Khomeini called on his administration last Thursday to allow the Iranian people to live in tranquillity, and not to bother them or confiscate their property while enforcing Islamic laws.

"Do not enter people's homes at will, do not enter their shops and business premises without proper permission, do not bother people in your efforts to preach Islam," Khomeini said in a message which was read by an announcer over Tehran radio. He also told his security authorities they must no longer tap people's telephones or bug their homes and business premises indiscriminately.

At the same time, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani announced at an open session of the Majlis that Khomeini's message marked a new phase in the continuation of the Iranian Islamic revolution. "This is an important phase in our revolution," he said. "This is the phase in which people need to live in peace and tranquillity in order to have time to devote to essential work," Rafsanjani said.

Observers believe that Khomeini's message has been prompted by an increase in public resentment over the way the revolutionary guards and young mullahs raid private homes in search of "un-Islamic and corrupt evidence."

Officially sanctioned Islamic vigilantes roam streets in jeeps and stop cars to search them for alcohol or other "means of corruption." They raid people's houses in search of such evidence. They try to stop people inviting guests or holding parties. They even enter homes and private clubs of non-Muslims to ensure that men and women do not socialise under the same roof. In recent weeks complaints about this have become more audible.

In his message Khomeini instructed revolutionary guards and other law enforcement officers not to search for un-Islamic activities. "If guards enter a house in search of terrorists and by chance come across alcohol, playing cards, gambling devices or other means of corruption they must not expose the people," he said.

"You should not spy on people because this is un-Islamic," he said. "It is not necessary to expose people, to humiliate them in public or to keep them under constant observation to deny them privacy. People must have some kind of privacy."

He also called for speedy action to introduce Islamic laws. He said the rules and regulations of the past regime which were introduced by un-Islamic minds should be replaced by God's own laws. But at the same time he said the introduction of God's laws must be executed with the utmost care.

Khomeini said that nobody had the right to confiscate private property or to deny people the right to engage in business unless the Islamic judge had already given an appropriate order. Revolutionary guards must also enter houses or premises only when they are in possession of valid orders from Islamic judges or they have hard evidence.

Khomeini then instructed the President of the Supreme Court, Mussavi Ardebili, and the prime minister, Hussain Mussavi, to set up special committees in Tehran and the provinces with whom people can lodge their valid complaints against officials who may be behaving wrongly.

"However, in purging undisciplined officials you should be careful not to allow personal considerations to influence your judgment," he said. "You must make sure that all corrupt elements are weeded out but at the same time you should not magnify some individuals' past records. If somebody had some minor errors in his record, such as being associated with the past regime in some small way, you should not punish him unduly. You would do better to base your assessment of people's records on what they are today rather than what they were in the past."

Since his return to assume the mantle of leadership in Iran in 1979, Khomeini, although he has made promises which have not been kept, has never conceded so much malpractice in his regime. He has also seldom used such language in his speeches or messages. At times Khomeini has used conciliatory language and has even resorted to cajolery to appease people but he has never personally humiliated himself in admitting openly to people so much malpractice in his administration. In the past he would order his aides to appease the people when some sort of trouble would brew up.

For instance, when in January 1980 there was an uprising in Tabriz, he sent Bani-Sadr, then president of the revolutionary council, to promise to the people of Tabriz that the constitution's clause on the velayat-e-faghih would be amended. When there was trouble in Kurdistan he sent Ayatollah Taleghani to talk to the people. This time he took the task upon himself. Many keen observers maintain that even with such conciliatory orders Khomeini is no longer capable of calming down the people. "For one thing, his instructions were vague; he instructs his guards and gunslingers to confine their activities within the bounds of Islamic laws but he fails to define their jurisdiction," one careful observer of Iranian scene said. He has promised some of this before.

"For another, he fails to strike at the root of the problem which is his Islamization of the laws. He wants his cake and to eat it at the same time. He cannot introduce tranquillity while also giving a free hand to his mullahs to rule. If he curbs his mullahs then he cannot have Islamization. He has built up his rule on terror and tension so he cannot allow the people to live in peace."

Observers believe that the designation of special teams to whom people may address their complaints may not work because people are far too frightened to complain about the mullahs and there are no guarantees that the special bodies set up would be staffed by officials in whom the ordinary people could have trust.

Signs that Khomeini himself was having second thoughts, or was under pressure following his speech, were evident on Sunday when he did some back-pedalling in the view of many people. He praised the revolutionary guards and other voluntary militia, commending them on their bravery and giving a strong impression that representations had been made to him to water down what had appeared a terrible indictment of his regime. Guards chief Mohsen Rezai told him that the guards did 80 per cent of the fighting in the war against Iraq and 100 per cent of the fighting against the heart of imperialism.

RELATIVES OF PRISONERS OF WAR DEMONSTRATE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 103, 21 Dec 82 pp 2, 3

[Text] Demonstrations against the regime in Tabriz, Isfahan and Mashad by relatives of soldiers and revolutionary guards who are being held in Iraqi prisoner of war camps have taken place in the past two weeks.

In Isfahan hundreds of relatives came to the polling stations, but instead of voting they shouted slogans against the regime demanding information about their sons, brothers and husbands. The situation was so tense that revolutionary guards fired in the air over the demonstrators, who were mainly women in Islamic cover.

Later, a group of women entered a polling station and beat up the officials and mullahs. Revolutionary guards were quickly sent to the residence of Ayatollah Taheri, Isfahan Friday prayer leader, to stop people entering the premises. Taheri himself was at the mosque to lead prayer.

In Mashad at least five newly initiated mullahs were beaten up when they were handing out pamphlets signed by Vaez-Tabasi, Khomeini's representative in Mashad, in which he had condemned Ayatollah Shariat-Madari.

Male preachers were also surrounded by chador-clad women in the vicinity of the Imam Reza Shrine last Friday. At least two preachers were stripped of their turbans and robes in freezing cold, reports say.

This is the first time that women in veils have joined together to attack mullahs and other revolutionary authorities. Informants said the women carried sticks and knives under their chadors to intimidate the mullahs. Sources said it was possible that the women in Mashad were of Azarbaijani origin; the Azarbaijanis are angry at the way Khomeini has disgraced their religious leader Ayatollah Shariat-Madari.

Meanwhile, in Tabriz a group of armed young men driving in cars on the evening of December 3, hooted their cars and shouted slogans supporting constitutional monarchy. They also distributed pictures of the young Reza II, as well as tracts in support of the constitution of 1906.

At the same time, reports from Tabriz indicate that the authorities have raided the homes of two well known communists in the city. Reports said that the owner of one house, Gholam Ali Ghahremani, was taken away by the guards. Earlier his house was attacked by nationalists and Ghahremani had asked for protection from the local revolutionary committee. Instead of receiving protection he was said to have been arrested.

PUBLIC REPORTEDLY SHOWS LITTLERINTEREST IN ASSEMBLY POLL

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 102, 16 Dec 82 p 1

[Text] Although the state radio claimed 13 million had voted in the elections to the assembly of experts to decide the succession to Ayatollah Khomeini reports from Iran all said that the public showed remarkably little interest in the occasion.

Heavy snow in some northern areas discouraged even enthusiastic people from going to the polls. The restrictions on transport in Tehran and other cities also kept many people away, though mobile polling stations managed to attract good numbers in some areas and the government extended the polling time because of bad weather. Ayatollahs Golpayegani and Marashi-Najafi, two of the grand ayatollahs who have gone along with Khomeini for most of the time, were said to have voted at their homes.

Heavy rain also hit many parts of the country and widespread flooding has led to the government announcing a flood relief programme.

If voters were deterred the Islamic republic authorities were not. As the results were announced this week it became clear that protocol was being observed as president Ali Khamenei, representing the executive, Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, representing the legislative branch, and prosecutor general Mussavi-Ardabili, topped the poll in that order in the capital. The same pattern was repeated elsewhere.

In some towns, however, the regime claimed results were inconclusive and polling must take place again. In many towns near the Caspian fear of violence caused cancellation of the polls. In Kurdestan fighting broke out in several places. Kurdish sources claimed 70 guardsmen had been killed in three days of fighting at Mahabad.

Observers pointed out that the voting had little interest for the public other than those who were ardent supporters of particular candidates or of the Khomeini republic. For one thing the candidates were nearly all office holders already and they had all been "vetted" so carefully there was little reason to consider voting for anything new. For another, officials had admitted that the assembly had nothing to do at the moment; finally, there was a general feeling that Ayatollah Montazeri had already been picked as Khomeini's successor.

Conservative religious leaders were said to have warned the government that holding the poll now could harden their attitudes in the future. These leaders are opposed to the idea of the supreme religious authority being vested in one man, something it was seen the new assembly would be used to obtain. And religious leader in exile, Ayatollah Mehdi Rouhani, described the elections as unconstitutional and against Shia principles and repeated accusations that Montazeri, in his writings, had veered from Shia orthodoxy in an unacceptable way.

CABINET MINISTERS SAID TO CULTIVATE TIES WITH MONTAZERI

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 102, 16 Dec 82 pp 2-4

[Text] Several cabinet ministers have already established direct ties with Ayatollah Montazeri in Qom in an effort to build up a solid political base with the new leader of the revolution.

Reliable sources in Iran have told IPS that Minister of Planning Mohamad Taqi Banki, Minister of Heavy Industries Behzad Nabavi and at least one other minister (the name of Energy Minister Ghafouri-Fard was mentioned), have set up a working arrangement with Montazeri and his close associates.

"This is a very significant development," the sources said. "It may well indicate that certain members of the cabinet are gradually moving away from Khamenei's Islamic Republican Party and consolidating their own power base."

It is not yet known whether Montazeri himself is receptive to the idea of setting up a new political power base which might encounter opposition from the IRP. In fact, informants say that Montazeri is assuming a position of being above party political squabbles.

Moreover, the IRP has kept a low profile during the elections to the experts assembly by refusing to field candidates of its own. President Khamenei has also publicly supported Montazeri as the ideal leader to succeed Khomeini.

But the gradual move by ministers like Nabavi and Banki to draw closer to Montazeri is regarded as highly significant. Plan Organisation sources, as well as contractors and businessmen in touch with the Plan Organisation, have told IPS sources in Iran that on various occasions Banki has introduced new measures and told his Islamic subordinates that these are instructions from Ayatollah Montazeri which must be carried out without fail. He is also a frequent visitor to Qom.

Behzad Nabavi has also been a frequent visitor to Qom where he often has long sessions with Montazeri. Nabavi was a favourite of assassinated President Mohamad Ali Rajai. He has sworn enemies among Majlis deputies and bazaar merchants.

Ghafouri-Fard's position is not yet known. He has also been paying repeated visits to Qom and on every visit he is received by Montazeri, the sources say. They point out that Ghafouri-Fard as Minister of Energy is in charge of Qom's new power and water projects and that is why he pays frequent visits to that city. Whatever the reason, he has established close contacts with Montazeri.

The significance of these visits is that the three ministers are said to be opposed to a full return to fundamental Islamic values. Rather, they favour a kind of institutionalisation of Islam along modern lines, with heavy injections of socialistic formalism.

Nabavi and Banki were the chief architects of the rationing scheme and they still believe that even after the end of the war with Iraq, the Iranian economy must be managed through a rigid control of consumption. They have also said that the means of production should be in government hands.

Both Nabavi and Banki were formerly associated with the now outlawed Mojahedin-e-Khalq group in the early 1970's. It is said that Nabavi's position was senior to that of Massoud Rajavi.

But in 1973, Nabavi broke away from the Mojahedin, protesting against the increasing Marxist inclinations of some Mojahedin leaders. Before formally making the break it is said Nabavi made every effort to preserve the organisation's unity and bring the Mojahedin under the overall control of the Islamic clerics. At the time when they were in prison (during the Shah's regime) Nabavi was a strong advocate of bringing Mullahs and Mojahedin together but at the end he lost to Rajavi who advocated a more Marxist line.

Later Nabavi said in a speech to his own supporters that while Rajavi was advocating a Marxist regime with Islamic cover, "I am proposing a regime which will have an Islamic content and a socialist formalism."

Last summer Nabavi told a group of his followers that an Islamic regime which failed to recognise the need for fundamental changes in its "instruments of power" was doomed to failure. He added that the ideal Islamic regime in Iran should strive to preserve Islamic values and to some extent Islam's form. "However," he said, "for practical reasons we must adopt a number of modern instruments and to do so we are forced to look to the experiences of the socialist regimes."

In the same speech he was quoted as saying: "Islam is in fundamental conflict with the present concept of life's philosophy as advocated by the West European philosophers. The Europeans value the existing life while we value the life hereafter. The European concept is based on pleasure and materialism while our concept is based on self-denial and martyrdom. We are in conflict with Western civilisation and for that reason we will encounter opposition from the West. Therefore, we must look for allies who are also in opposition to West. That would be a tactical alliance if our allies were not Islamic regimes. But on a strategic level we will have

to remain alert and strive for unity among all the deprived nations of the world."

On other occasions he has said that means of production must not be allowed to remain in the hands of individuals who have no commitment to the cause. Anything which produced wealth was an instrument of power. It could be used against the cause if it were allowed to be in the effective possession of those not directly controlled by the revolution.

Nabavi has also said that unlike Marxists, who are against private ownership of means of production, he was merely against control by the private section. "It does not matter who is the legal owner of means of production; what matters is who controls them," he said. In this way he believes Islam's acceptance of private ownership can be easily reconciled with the necessity of revolutionary control over means of wealth. "Let the private sector have legal ownership and let us have the effective control of the means of production," he has said.

As long as the assassinated president Rajai was in power, Nabavi was able to enforce his ideas into policies. With the coming to power of President Khamenei, it is believed Nabavi's influence was curtailed and a number of mullahs even tried to oust him from the cabinet. In the process he was moved to the ministry of heavy industries from the powerful position of deputy prime minister and chief of the economic mobilisation office.

Now Nabavi is seen as making a comeback. He has ambitions to become prime minister under a president who would be content with a ceremonial role. His moves to establish direct contacts with Montazeri may well be directed towards the goal of preparing ground for his own premiership.

Informed sources do not see any basic differences between ideas put forward by Nabavi and those advocated by President Khamenei's Islamic Republican Party. However, they say that Nabavi is more clear-cut in his ideas; he knows what he wants and he goes about getting them. But IRP leaders lack Nabavi's drive and precision in formulating their ideas into attainable goals. Moreover, IRP leaders are mainly clerics who attach more importance to Islamic formalism than Nabavi does.

Already Montazeri has succeeded in institutionalising some Islamic ideas and traditions. He has set up a Council of Friday Prayer Leaders with a central secretariat. He has also institutionalised a number of Islamic schools into quasi-modern institutions. His office is responsible for the training and accrediting of Islamic judges.

More important than that Montazeri has set up an office to formulate economic policies for the nation. This office has declared that no single theologian is competent to declare what economic policy is Islamic or what policy is not. Rather, it is the office which is the sole competent body to introduce economic policies along Islamic lines.

These are all efforts to eliminate the traditional Shia practice of individual theologians giving independent opinions on matters of daily life. For over 1000 years the Shia establishment has survived through its flexibility and by allowing a good measure of independence to its top theologians in expressing their opinion. Now this flexibility is proving a hindrance to the smooth running of the Khomeini-style Islamic regime.

Nabavi and Banki are in favour of accelerating the break with this tradition and the formalisation of Shia tenets. They argue that the traditional Shia disorganisation, which served a good purpose throughout history, would now play into the hands of the enemies of revolution.

To prevent such a possibility they advocate measures such as borrowing ideas and instruments from other totalitarian regimes but retaining the contents and values of Islam. Where they part ways with the Mojahedin is that they say the Mojahedin are Marxists with an Islamic cover, while they are Muslims with open minds who can borrow some instruments from socialists.

MUSSAVI SEEKS 'COMMITTED' IRANIANS FROM ABROAD

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 102, 16 Dec 82 p 5

[Text] Premier Mir Hossain Mussavi has set up a unit at his office whose task will be to attract Iranian professionals to go home to build a revolutionary Iran, Tehran radio has reported.

"All government departments and other organisations which are in need of specialised skills and intend to employ Iranian experts now living abroad should contact the prime minister's office," the radio said.

All experts invited to Iran must prove their loyalty to the Islamic republic and the principles of Velayat-e-Faghih." "Experts who are committed will be needed," it said.

"We will look around in foreign universities and identify those Iranians who are committed experts," the radio said.

Tehran papers carry advertisements in which such industries as petro chemicals and manufacturing works advertise vacancies for top chemists and engineers. Above the advertisements a statement by Khomeini is quoted which reads: "We want experts, but experts who have a sense of commitment."

IRANIANS IN DIASPORA

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 103, 21 Dec 82 pp 4-6

[Article by Teezbin]

[Text] The dawning of 1983 finds Iranians in exile facing a situation that at least is more hopeful for their return home than at any new year since the uprising of 1978. Not only is the regime at home showing signs of new awareness of its own precarious position but there are at last some stirrings of a new pragmatic approach to their situation among the Iranians in diaspora.

The prospect remains of a rapid change inside Iran with the death of Khomeini—and if there is a God, then that must come soon for the deity has surely proved his point in punishing the Iranians enough for their stupidity four years ago. His supporters themselves are divided and most pundits agree that there's a fair chance they will do their damnedest to destroy each other once the old man dies.

But even if the change does not come quickly there are at last signs that the better brains among Iranians outside Iran are finally becoming aware that they can still perform an important function by realising that they are compatriots and have a common interest with many of the people who are still back at home. The steady growth of Iranian community activities wherever there are sizable communities, a fresh wind of debate among those who for so long seemed to be suffering from a form of mental paralysis following the shock of what befell them, perhaps even the final realisation that the rest of the world is not going to take a hand in encouraging beneficial change inside Iran and that it is solely the responsibility of Iranians to decide on what they can do about their future—all this is coming very late on but still perhaps in the nick of time.

Although Khomeini has promised some return to law and order and a sane way of life on a number of occasions before his speech the other day in which he called for an end of abuses of innocent people's rights when they are in their own homes and to the lawlessness of the hezbollahis and their friends, he has never before so clearly put his reputation on the line. If the komitehs and the guards continue to behave with the same lawlessness as before, the loss of face for Khomeini could be enormous. Majlis Speaker

Hashemi Rafsanjani said it marked the opening of a period of tranquillity and consolidation of the revolution; a new phase in which people would get back to essential work.

The recent elections showed the mullahs that the revolutionary fervour of the majority of Iranians is dissipated. There was remarkably little interest in them, and even the most radical are said to be convinced that it is time to offer the donkey a carrot to get it back on the road. Once it had settled into its paces it would be easy, they feel, to jump on its back again and guide it the way the radicals want it to go.

Khomeini's speech was full of unfinished sentences and the presence of "farangi" expressions like "organhah" (organs) and similar terms suggested to some observers that he was merely setting out what he had been asked to read. Perhaps he really is past it, as so many reports have hinted, and the regime is desperate to use him to try to ensure some return to a normal way of life before his influence is removed by his death. Whoever takes over will want to have the people with sufficient stake in supporting him for the continuation of a tranquil life.

If there is no clean clearing away of the mullahs' regime by some military or other form of violent action then the process of restoring normal life to this ancient land will be a more subtle, longer battle. For this Iranians both inside and outside the country must work together to bring about a return to the comparative freedoms of the Shah's days, albeit without the corruption and excesses.

The foolishness of aloofness, the bickering, the obsession with personal egos which has been the barrier to Iranians in exile coming together in a meaningful way can be appreciated now in the light of the new approach being made by the Tehran regime to doctors and other badly needed professional people in the hope of getting them to return to Iran. Tehran still sees the chance to lure back desperate exiles whose funds are running out or who find the impersonal, almost brutal way of life in western industrialised societies too tough for them.

What the exiles must do is to stick together, to treat with the regime together, to force it to accept certain basic demands if it wants to have qualified Iranians return to their society. Any piecemeal drifting back will only leave them exposed to new terror, new pressures which will drive them out once more. There are signs from Tehran that the regime realises it cannot go on for ever living off oil revenues without getting the country back to work again and the non-oil economy back to some kind of level where it provides income and prospects for the millions it did before. The huge drop in exports, except for oil, in recent months, confirmed by the latest Central Bank figures, reflects more vividly than anything the fact that all the optimistic stories about factories working again, etcetera, etcetera are just new attempts to put a brave face on a real crisis situation.

The truth is the mullahs cannot survive much longer if more Iranians with skills and abilities do not return home. The alternative will be to employ

foreigners to carry out the jobs instead—but not only would that conflict with the declared policy of the regime but it would almost certainly be too costly. It would also alienate those Iranians who are still working in the ministries and other jobs back home in the same way as resentment of so many foreigners in the country helped the Shah's enemies significantly in their campaign to whip up feeling against him.

It can only be a united front of the people of Iran which can show the mullahs finally that their time is up and that they risk violent obliteration. The signs that there are enough Iranians who want to see change are there, even that the mullahs themselves have seen this. In the next few months all Iranians must think seriously about their country and their own future. There's no time left for divisions, for selfishness. Iranians in diaspora must now show their mettle, show their determination to influence events in their country as much as they can, to build themselves into a real community which the rulers of their country cannot ignore.

If they do that, and encourage the great majority of their compatriots at home to stand firm against the small minority whose brutality and thuggishness has dragged the proud name of Iran and Iranians in the dirt of universal opprobrium, then change may be around the corner. Every single Iranian has a responsibility to this end, even those young who have continued to lead indulgent lives in the West since the revolution just as they did before. Now is the time for those strong heads to give a lead, to weld Iranians together once more, to allow them to show the world that the flame of Iran burns brightly. If they do this then there is plenty of hope for in 1983.

FURTHER REPORTAGE ON IRANIANS IN DIASPORA

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 102, 16 Dec 82 p 6

[Article by Teezbin]

[Text] "We must accept the reality that terrorism still pays and that democratic countries which in the past unwittingly helped Hitler, today are also inadvertently helping Khomeini in his inhuman and evilish designs," an angry Shahpour Bakhtiar, leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran said recently after the Belgians had told him that he must not delve into politics or religion if he came to give a lecture and a television interview in Brussels. Bakhtiar sensibly didn't go for an exercise that would only have helped people to think the Iranian opposition in exile is a lost cause.

Actually he should have said democratically elected governments, not countries, for it is fear of losing a contract to sell expensively-made goods which bolster the high standard of living of their workers that allows politicians today to bolster Khomeini and his killers. Modern politicians do not have the commitment that their predecessors had to the human cause.

Margaret Thatcher was prepared to send soldiers to get killed to save a handful of people in the South Atlantic from having to put up with a little inconvenience in their lives but she won't publicly condemn Khomeini for killing thousands of his compatriots. She might lose her job if Britain loses its Persian market one can be excused for thinking. Britain doesn't, after all, need Argentina. Why don't the Iranians in Britain say these things and try to get the public aroused instead of just crying? Are they so afraid of the Home Office? Other nationalities don't seem to be deterred like Iranians, do they?

'ISLAMIC BANKING' DENOUNCED AS CAMOUFLAGE FOR CAPITALISM

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 26 Dec 82 p 3

[Article by Fateh M. Sandeela]

[Text]

Those who see the existing world economy as an extension of the Western Culture and see also the errors and injustices which it has inevitably implicated mankind, look up to Islam with great expectations. Their expectations are excited, not only by Islam's claims to comprehensiveness and universality, but also by the current upsurge of Islam. This places upon the protagonists of Islam a very spoecial responsibility. If it provides an opportunity, it also offers a challenge. The future of Islam and the Muslims as also of the world depends greatly on how the Muslims respond.

The Muslim response in the economic field has centered largely — if not wholly — on what has come to be so ambitiously styled as 'Islamic Banking.' It is necessary to examine this idea and to scrutinize its claims and contentions lest the name of Islam be misused, processes and purposes of history be misdirected, and the destiny of the Muslim Ummah and of mankind be distracted. Where stakes are so high, no concessions are

permissible, and no courtesies necessary.

Nothing, of course, becomes Islamic merely because that appellation is so fondly added ot it. And, if only we take away the appellation 'Islamic,' we have nothing but capitalism staring us in the face. For, banking as such is an essentially capitalist institution. It is, indeed, central to capitalism. Although a bank can, and does, do other business as well, it is primarily the storehouse of capital. In the business of capitalism, it does the middleman's job. It collects capital from one end and passes it to the other without adding any positive value of its own and plays, thus, the parasite in the parasitical business.

It has seemed sufficient to the promoters of 'Islamic Banking' that it shall be interest-free. That it is not really so, we shall presently see. What needs to be immediately stressed is that 'interest-free banking' itself is an absurd abstraction. It is as absurd as 'silent music' and 'still dance.' Interest is as integral to banking as sound is to music and movement to dance. You cannot have the one without the other. The only choice you

have is either to have both or to reject both.

The so-called 'Islamic Banking' has not really been able to do without interest. It has only offered to use a different label. Where, if at all, it has ventured beyond, it has wholly failed. Such marginal and provisional successes as it has been able to simulate have been due to the enthusiasm that it has been able

to evoke among the unsuspecting masses by invoking the name of Islam.

Banking, in any case, does not become Islamic merely because it has managed to do without interest. There are other even more formidable obstacles in its way. Howsoever evil interest may be, it need not involve State and law in any willful wrongdoing. Interest-trading, in other words, could possibly go on without active assistance of State and law. There are other aspects of banking that the banking enthusiast has learnt to take for granted, thanks to his capitalist inheritance, which need active support of State and law and which cannot possibly be provided in Islam.

In the first place bank needs to be a corporation. This, though not a theoretical need, is a paramount practical need. The banking enthusiast will soon find this out, if he were to try to do without incorporation, the element of personal trust and confidence that will then enter the situation will seriously limit the scope of his business. He will be reduced to the size of the private money-lender who already operates, though only surreptitiously.

There are at least three reasons why Islam cannot provide the facility of incorporation. In the first place, corporate personality is a fiction and the religion of truth cannot support and sustain a fiction. Secondly, incorporation is intended and designed to transfer liability and to absolve the human person actually undertaking it, which is not permissible in Islam. And, above all, the liability is transferred to the fictitious person who is inherently immune to the sanctions of Heaven and Hell and the transcendent discipline generally which is so central to Islam.

Even if the facility of incorporation were available, it will not suffice for a bank. It will need yet another artificial prop. It will need to be a 'Limited Liability Company.' This, again, is a practical, not a theoretical, necessity. But the banking enthusiast is welcome to try to do without it, if he can. The very fact that he has not tried so far to do without it would seem to show tht there is an inherent compulsion in the situation. The Islamic State and law, in any case, cannot support or sustain Limitation of Liability.

The Quran clearly, categorically and repeatedly insists that promises must be fulfilled, argreements duly honored, and trusts fully discharged. And the State, far from being able to help evade or overreach any liability, is saddled with the responsibility to help discharge the liabilities that cannot be discharged by those primarily responsible for them. That is one of the express purposes enumerated by the Quran which public funds are to be devoted.

The State whose duty it is to discharge the debts that the debtors themselves are unable to discharge cannot possibly say that, by reason of its writ, debts shall be discharged so far, and not beyond, as the law of liability purports to do. The common believer is not aware of this catch in the corporate business simply because it is not commonly called into action. But its potentiality, is always lurking in the background which can be, and occasionally is, called into action, suffices make it un-Islamic.

Banking business, furthermore, feeds on savings. In the absence of that fee it cannot but starve out of existence. That feed, moreover, needs to be available to the banking business and not merely exist in private lockers. It needs to be invested. These, to the capitalist quite natural operations, feed in their turn upon attitudes, ideals and expectations, which need not always obtain. Where they do obtain, as in the capitalist society, the bankers' need is automatically satisfied and is not suspected even to exist.

In the Muslim society, on the other hand, attitudes as well as ideals and expectations have had to be artificially conditioned. Habits of saving and investment have had to be deliberately cultivated. While advertising is the most obvious means of doing so, the most evil of them is the income-tax rebate on investment. In and through the latter exercise. State and law subserve, and oblige the ordinary citizen to subserve the causes and concernsof capitalism.

The Quran, on its part, commends the very opposite of saving: spending. So important, indeed, is spending by the Islamic reckoning that the Quran purports to be the Guidance specifically to the Muttaqis who, among other things, spend. The Ouran, in this particular context, does not qualify spending. This invests the act of spending as such, in and by itself, with virtue. Those who truly believe in the providence of God, who are fully responsive to the needs of others, cannot but spend rather than save.

These considerations, and many others that cannot be enumerated in this limited context, make the so-called Islamic

Banking' nothing but a camouflage for capitalism.

If only the advocates of 'Islamic Banking' could read the Quran as students, rather than as advocates, they could not possibly fail to see this plain truth.

MULLAHS SUPPORT OPEC OIL PRICE ON PAPER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 102, 16 Dec 82 pp 5, 6

[Text] The Ministry of Petroleum in Tehran released a statement strongly condemning moves by "certain quarters" to lower the price of crude or to increase output by OPEC countries.

The statement supported the OPEC market price of \$34 a barrel and the level of 17.5 million barrels a day as the maximum for output by OPEC member countries. But it also said that the quotas of some OPEC members must be raised.

Meanwhile, un-named Ministry of Petroleum officials were quoted by Tehran radio as saying that OPEC should not be allowed to weaken as an international organisation. They said imperialist quarters were working to destroy OPEC.

Observers were surprised by the absence of any reference to Saudi Arabia in the official's statement. This was seen as all the more interesting because anti-Saudi propaganda abounded in the Tehran press. The attacks were directed at Saudi Arabia's American connections and the House of Saudi's alleged unfitness to be guardians of the holy shrines.

The Islamic authorities said nothing about their own over-production of oil and undercutting of OPEC prices.

NATION STANDS FIRM AT OPEC MEETING

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 103, 21 Dec 82 p 6

[Text] The presidency of OPEC must go to Iran, a Tehran radio commentary said this week after the meeting of the oil producers' organisation had shelved the issue of quota allocations for individual countries.

The radio said that Saudi Arabia's quota should be reduced to 2 million barrels a day, while Iran's should be increased to 3.5 million. It said Saudi Arabia's vast reserves and small population in comparison to a number of other countries demanded this. Algeria and Libya were mentioned as countries like Iran which needed money for their development projects; the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were other countries it said must have their quotas reduced.

Saudi Arabia's chief delegate Shaikh Yamani said after the meeting broke up that the outcome was the "best I can get." Iran's Ali Shams-Ardekani, who is also his country's envoy in Kuwait, said, "We agreed to disagree."

But Iranian officials were adamant later that they would press on with boosting their output as much as possible, as did several other countries. As a result prices are expected to weaken further in the months ahead, experts said.

Oil barter deals are expected to feature prominently in Iran's economic deals in the coming months, as in the past year, sources said. North Korea has been taking sizable quantities of oil as payment for arms in recent months. An American department of defence official said this week that about half of the payment for supplies of arms which had put North Korea at the top of the list of sources for weapons for the Iranian forces had been made in oil and the remainder in cash.

OIL MINISTER'S OPEC STAND ELABORATED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 82 p 2
[Editorial: "Defeat of Dictatorial Policies in OPEC"]
[Text]

The dictatorial policies of Saudi Arabia in OPEC, which have American support, were shattered during the 66th conference of the organization in Vienna. The defeat of the Saudi policies was due to the strength of the independent faction of OPEC.

The imperialist news media as usual reported it as the breakdown of the conference and declared OPEC a dead issue. The conference press declaration was contrary to the Zionist imperialists disinformation.

In Vienna, despite the pandemonium in the conference, there was a positive achievement: Saudi Arabia's representative failed in imposing its conditions on the conference. Thus, despondent over the conference's results, the representative spoke of OPEC being on the verge of collapse.

This attitude of Ahmed Zaki Yamani is an old U.S. policy. It stems from the opportunistic attitude of global imperialism that considers the entire resources of the world as its own. It should be pointed out that this policy of monopolization is carried out with the help of traitors, such as Zaki Yamani.

Mr. Gharazi, the Iranian oil minister in a press interview regarding the nonsensical statements of Yamani, explicitly declared that Yamani's statements stemmed from his miserable failure in imposing his will on OPEC. It has become clear that henceforth Saudi Arabia will not be able to impose its policies on OPEC. To consider this as a defeat for the

Vienna conference is erroneous. It is Saudi Arabia's defeat which is apparently, the defeat of the U.S.

The Vienna conference decided that under no circumstances would total OPEC production exceed 18.5 million barrels daily in 1983. However, the conference could not reach a decision regarding a program for allotment of production shares to each OPEC member, according to its needs.

The Islamic Republic of Iran put forth a proposal for a minimum increased production that was backed by Yenezuela, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, However, Saudi Arabia, even though it is not a signatory to the production allotment agreement, is not prepared to produce less than 5 million barrels daily.

This aggressive stance of Saudi Arabia results in the disregard of the production allotment, and if any member raises its production, it violates the balance of the total production. This will result in an oil glut with the resultant drop in the price of oil (at present it is \$34 a barrel). This is exactly in line with imperialism's policy of consolidating its substantial oil storage plans and in this way plundering this black gold.

Iran's proposal is the most logical system for the allotment of higher production shares. Instead of increased production those member nations whose populations and current expenditures are lower than other members, should have their allotment share reduced.

The chief of the Vienna conference, made an interesting speech, and said: "OPEC had a tussle for a year over production allotments and preserving the pricing system. The message is clear, we must close our ranks and plan a logical and just production allotment and set prices in such a way as to enable all members to sell their export quota and voluntarily adhere to the production limit."

This statement was made with the hope that Saudi Arabia and its collaborators might become aware of the necessity that OPEC should follow a wise and sensible policy. However, the influence of the great satan and other western countries on OPEC which is made possible through their intermediaries such as Saudi Arabia is causing great damage to the organization.

What went on in the Vienna conference was a clear indication of the end of superpower influence in such international organizations. Undoubtedly, the forthcoming July 1983 OPEC conference will prove that the politics of Saudi Arabia will not in any way affect the determined and independent decisions of the majority of the members. OPEC will emerge stronger and more united, God willing.

ANXIETY OVER MEDICAL SERVICES; ECONOMY OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES URGED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 103, 21 Dec 82 p 3

[Text] Deputy minister of health Kalantar Motamedi has told a press conference that Iran needs 40,000 doctors but there are only 14,000 serving doctors in the country.

"If we train 4,500 doctors a year it will be 17 years before we can have sufficient doctors," he said, adding that at present the number of students at medical schools was far less than that.

In his remarks, published in KAYHAN, he said it was difficult to enforce a Majlis law or ceilings for fees which doctors were allowed to charge. "There are so many snags involved that it is impossible to have a watchdog at every doctor's clinic to ensure that he does not overcharge," Motamedi said.

He believed the nation would not suffer from a shortage of medical supplies provided doctors and patients economised in their use. He repeated the usual claims that Western countries have embargoed sales of medicines to Iran.

He called on Iranian doctors abroad to return home. "If the government provides them with necessary means of life, housing, transport and so on I am sure they will return home," he said.

Finally, he asked the people not to request to go abroad for medical treatment because, as he put it "no miracles are performed by foreign doctors."

GUARDS SEIZE WAREHOUSES, STOCKS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 102, 16 Dec 82 pp 4, 5

[Text] Revolutionary guards have taken over a number of private warehouses in Tehran and Isfahan in what mullahs describe as a coordinated plan to crack down on "economic terrorists".

Reports from Tehran indicate that stocks of textiles, chemicals and construction materials belonging to well-known Isfahani merchants have been confiscated by guardsmen.

In Tehran the warehouse of a prominent importer of electrical appliances has been taken over. Stocks of radio sets and television parts have also been impounded.

Some informants in Tehran say that Minister of the Revolutionary Army Mohsen Rafiqdoost master-minded the operation in an effort to hurt his business rivals. Rafiqdoost is notorious as a corrupt element in the Khomeini regime, being a major importer of radio sets, electric appliances and building materials as well as having the sole rights to import video equipment, sources in Tehran claim.

However, the authorities have said that the operation is a move against profiteering and "economic terrorism". Tehran papers have recently taken up a campaign against profiteers.

In their press campaign the mullahs are trying to convince the public that the acute shortage and high prices of commodities is due to hoarding and profiteering by those merchants who were at one time collaborators with the former regime and who have not yet been eliminated.

Newspapers have also accused a number of merchants of participation in a plot against the Islamic republic. These are mainly merchants who used to pay their religious donations to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. They are being accused of collaboration with "counter-revolutionaries".

Ironically most of these merchants were supporters of the Islamic revolution because they were opposed to the previous regime's industrialisation and modernisation programmes, which were drawing away both the bazaar's strength and its profits.

Informed sources in Tehran report that many merchants have no doubt that the recent crackdown is part of an attempt by the supporters of Khomeini to monopolise all trading activities.

The same sources say that the Khomeini supporters were hoping to extend control over business activity through the foreign trade bill, but since the bill was vetoed by the Council of Guardians they have resorted to new action.

Some people claim that Khomeini has already managed to break the back of Iran's powerful merchant community by sheer brute force.

The irony is that the bazaar helped Khomeini in the hope that an Islamic regime would restore the merchant community's former privileges.

CHRONIC PROBLEM OF SMOKERS IN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 103, 21 Dec 82 pp 3, 4

[Text] Islamic regulations have failed to solve the chronic problem of the cigarette shortage in Iran because shopkeepers, the designated agents of the state-owned tobacco company, lack sufficient degree of Islamic morality.

This is the conclusion of an irate smoker who has telephoned the KAYHAN daily newspaper to voice his opinion and present a plan to improve cigarette distribution.

"When we go to a shop to buy cigarettes the shopkeeper says he has run out," the smoker said. "But we know that only an hour before he has taken delivery of his quota from the authorities. Then we see that the street vendor in front of the shop has plenty of cigarettes to sell. The snag is that he demands 25 tomans for a pack which must officially sell at five tomans."

The angry smoker says that both the shopkeeper and the vendor claim to be good Muslims and have prominent beards. But he doubts their sincerity.

So he asks: "Why not stamp the name of each shopkeeper who is allowed to sell cigarettes on each pack, then if we find out that a street vendor is selling packs marked with the name of the original distributor, we will know how and from whom he has got them?"

The Mashad revolutionary committee has its own method of dealing with unauthorised cigarette vendors. According to the same copy of KAYHAN the street vendors are not supposed to sell cigarettes so those found in their possession must be contraband. In one swoop on street vendors in Mashad the revolutionary guards confiscated 50,000 packs of cigarettes.

Unfortunately, the problem was not solved because, according to another issue of KAYHAN, cigarettes found on street vendors were made in the USA and smuggled into the country. So these Winston cigarettes did not belong to authorised distributors.

"Authorised distributors are targets of false accusations," the unsigned article says. "They are blamed for the supply of foreign cigarettes sold by street vendors."

It seems the flow of Winston cigarettes being smuggled into the country cannot be stemmed. KAYHAN reports that revolutionary guards in Tehran Pars, an eastern suburb of the capital, noticed a tanker lorry parked at a garage was surrounded by a number of delivery vans.

"On close examination the guards discovered 5,000 cartons of Winston cigarettes inside the tank," KAYHAN reports. "They confiscated the cigarettes as well as 50,000 tomans in cash which the smugglers offered in an effort to bribe the pasdars."

Confiscated Winston cigarettes are distributed among Islamic zealots who organise official rallies. This is their reward for being supporters of Islam. They sell these cigarettes to street vendors who in turn sell them to the smokers who can afford to pay often up to 60 tomans (about 8 dollars) per pack of 20.

MORE CLUES TO ARMS FOR HEROIN SCANDAL

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 102, 16 Dec 82 p 6

[Text] Is the Islamic republic once again at the centre of a huge mafiosi affair?

A month ago Italian police unmasked a massive arms for heroin deal involving international networks. The arms were going to an unidentified Middle East country via Turkey and, it was claimed, heroin was coming via the same country but originating in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

At the same time Iranian exile opposition sources claimed to have located offices of a number of dummy companies, registered in Hong Kong, the Seychelles, Malagasy and similar smaller countries, in Ankara and Istanbul. Each was said to have retired Turkish generals or other officers as directors and all were involved in selling arms to Iran.

Not only has this information been confirmed, but the man directing the huge barter deal of arms and drugs, a Syrian national who had lived in Milan for 20 years, is said to have had "very good" business relations with the Banco D'Ambrosiano, now being investigated, its now dead boss Calvi and members of the notorious P2 Lodge in the Milan area. Iranian sources in Rome have claimed that Iran's ambassador to the Vatican, Hojatoleslam Khosrowshahi, was also known to have contacts with Syrian.

The arms involved in the deal are said to have been surprisingly sophisticated items like West German Leopard tanks, Italian-made Auguste helicopters, US made M 16 sub machine guns, Soviet-made Kalashnikov rifles, missiles and other items. The arms were said to have been shipped to Bulgaria and then to Turkey. Bulgarian trade with Iran has increased fourfold in recent months to reach a total of 200 million US dollars in value and this figure is set for doubling in the coming year.

Iranian opposition sources in Turkey say that traffic between that country and Iran has increased enormously in the last six months. Intelligence sources have said there are signs that Iran may be completely re-equipping its forces for a final, all-out offensive in the coming spring.

BRIEFS

PAKISTAN RELATIONS——Sources in Tehran this week hinted that Pakistani president Zia ul—Haq may be sounding out U.S. officials on the question of improving relations between Washington and the Islamic republic. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 p 8]

NATIONAL FRONT SHAKEUP--National Front sources in Europe claim that former leaders, including Karim Sanjabi, Darioush Forouhar, Kazem Hassibi, Dr. Hejazi and Dr. Azar, have been "put aside" and a new leadership will probably be announced shortly. No confirmation has been possible of reports circulating inside Iran that the Mojahedin leadership there plans to disown Masoud Rajavi. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 p 8]

NIOC EXECUTIVE DIES--Reza Fallah, deputy head of the National Iranian Oil Company during much of the period when it was developing into one of the outstanding organisations of its kind in the world, died early this week in Britain. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 101, 9 Dec 82 p 8]

PLEA FOR ELECTIONS MADE

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Dec 82 p 7

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec 28: A member of the defunct PPP Central Committee and former National Assembly Speaker, Sahabzada Faruq Ali, today appealed to the Martial Law Government to hold general elections without further delay as, he said, "present political deadlock and continuation of Martial Law may prove fatal for the country".

In an informal chat with newsmen, majority of them representing foreign agencies, he said the political process was blocked successfully by Gen Ayub Khan for 10 long years, but what it led to could not be stopped by him. Continuation of Martial Law for more than five years was again leading the country to a situation which might prove difficult to control, he added.

Replying to questions, he said President Zia-ul-Haq should hold a referendum if he believed, as he claimed, that the majority of the 80 million people of the country were in favour of continuation of Martial Law. Without going to the people for their opinion, Sahabzada Faruq added, no such claim could be entertained as valid. Besides, it could not lead the country out of its present political deadlock.

Sahabzada Faruq was sure that the PPP, which he claimed was the

main political force in the country, at present, would agree to keep out of the next elections if it could help the present rulers to hold elections: However, he said, there was consensus among all political parties on the question of holding elections. Even the defunct Jamaat-i-Islami had supported the demand for elections, which showed that there was not a single political party in the country to oppose elections. Even in the past few years, he thought, no political party had opposed elections. And if there was any such party, he said, he would request the President to disclose its name so that the people could be taken into confidence about what was happening in the country.

CSO: 4200/277

COMMENTARY MARKS INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

BK280738 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1715 GMT 27 Dec 82

[Commentary by G. M. Mansoori]

[Text] Today 3 years ago, the Russian troops had marched into Afghanistan. The announcement that they had been invited by the Kabul government was made from the Central Asian city of Tashkent and the new president, Babrak Karmal, was at the time in Moscow. It was a highly planned military operation. Within a couple of days as many as 80,000 Russian troops and armor had been brought into Afghanistan by land and by air. It was military occupation of Afghanistan, plain and simple, and the Russians also installed a new president, Babrak Karmal, at Kabul. Babrak Karmal had announced that foreign intervention in his country had forced him to invite the Russians. In fact before this announcement neither Kabul nor Moscow had talked of any foreign intervention. The man in power in Kabul at the time, President Amin, had also not talked of any foreign intervention. He was killed while the foreign troops were landing at Kabul Airport.

Three years ago on this day a superpower had blatantly intervened in an Islamic nonaligned country. The new president, Babrak Karmal, had not come to power through any internal change or upheaval. He was and remains the nominee of Moscow.

The people of Afghanistan, who throughout their history had never been under any foreign domination and who are ferociously freedom-loving, did not accept the foreign occupation of the country as an accomplished fate. The entire country within hours of the Russian entry into Afghanistan was up in arms. All independent reports justify that excepting the major towns the entire countryside is in the hands of Afghan freedom fighters and they also operate in provincial towns and the capital city of Kabul as well. Kabul and other towns are under night curfew for all these 3 years. The freedom fighters move across the country in relative safety as they enjoy the full support and protection of the Afghan people, and the Afghan people have paid very heavy a price for their freedom. Hundreds of Afghan villages have been bombed and millions have been forced to leave their homes and seek safety in neighboring Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan alone the number of Afghan refugees has crossed the figure of 2.5 million.

Pakistan has been rendering all possible help to these Afghan refugees on humanitarian grounds. Pakistan considers it her religious duty to look after these victims of aggression. Pakistan spends every day \$1.5 million on relief. It is a heavy financial burden for Pakistan, but as President Ziaul Haq has repeatedly emphasized, Pakistan is proud to be of assistance to Afghan refugees who are neighbors and brother Muslims. It has now become more than clear that Afghanistan can never be conquered and the indomitable will of the freedom-loving Afghan is bound to prevail.

As President Ziaul Haq has been repeatedly stressing, there has to be a political solution of the Afghan issue. He has suggested a four-point formula. One: withdrawal of foreign troops; two: restoration of the Islamic and nonaligned status of Afghanistan; three: return of refugees to their homes with honor and dignity; and four: allowing the Afghan people to freely determine the type of government they want. This formula has been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Nonaligned Movement. In the words of President Ziaul Haq, Pakistan will continue its efforts for a political solution of the Afghan crisis that is equitable and just in the larger interests of peace in the region and world.

CSO: 4200/272

IRANIAN STAND ON AFGHANISTAN SUPPORTED

GF031321 Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jan 83 p 7

[Text] (PPI)—The Islamic Republic of Iran has reiterated its position on efforts to find out solution for Afghan problem and has maintained that it considers any negotiations conducted without the presence of the true representatives of Afghan people as ineffective.

In a statement released by the consulate-general of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with signature of consul-general, Mr Mohammad 'Ali Sadeqi (Niaraki), to mark third anniversary of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, has recalled the position of Iranian Foreign Ministry, which, while condemning the military aggression of super power of the East, had expressed admiration for the heroic struggles of Afghan Muslims.

The statement has once again called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, without being substituted by any other oppressive forces and the return of millions of Afghan refugees to their homeland, as well as the right of Afghan people to determine their destiny, as the only solution for the Afghan issue.

The statement pointed out that December 27, 1979, shall remind all of the hegemonist actions of the Soviet occupying forces taken against the Muslims and tyranised people of Afghanistan.

Three years ago, on such a day, the fully armed Soviet force, equipped with most sophisticated weaponry, invaded the territory of the Muslim and brotherly country, Afghanistan, with the hope of imposing an unwanted regime on the zealous Afghan Muslims and thus showed the aggressive visage and cleared the way for the intervention and presence of super power of the West in the region.

Paying rich tributes to the people of Afghanistan, the statement said the heroic people of Afghanistan have taken Holy Quran in the one hand and arms in the other, in accordance with lofty teachings of Islam to embark on a holy war against the invaders.

The statement referred to the brutalities resorted to by the occupying forces in Afghanistan, which included heavy bombardments and use of most sophisticated weaponry against the unarmed villagers, besides torture and execution. It has failed to terrorise Afghan Muslims, who have been motivated to continue their liberation struggle with more determination and iron will, the statement said.

CSO: 4200/272

CAUTION URGED IN NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH INDIA

GF310924 Karachi DAWN in English 27 Dec 82 p 7

[Editorial: "Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission"]

[Text] The Indo-Pakistan accord to establish a joint commission to promote cooperation between the two countries is a significant move forward in their bilateral relations. Until now, whatever little cooperation India and Pakistan have managed to achieve has been on an ad hoc basis. Their decision now to institutionalise cooperation through a joint commission could have a salutary effect on their relations. In the first place, it ensures that the foreign ministers of the two countries who will lead their respective delegations to the commission will meet at least once a year while other officials who are appointed to the sub-commissions could be meeting more frequently, if so decided. This should help to bridge the communications gap which has often led to misunderstanding and misgivings between India and Pakistan. Moreover, the establishment of the joint commission also facilitates cooperation in the economic, cultural and other fields which is often held up on account of bureaucratic delays and lack of contracts. There is no doubt that scope exists for more trade, exchange of information and joint action in science and technology, culture, education and other areas which should prove to be of mutual benefit to both India and Pakistan. An important result of greater cooperation between the two neighbours of the subcontinent should be the creation of a favourable environment for regional cooperation in South Asia. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have been working since 1981 to create a framework for regional cooperation but the pace has been rather slow mainly on account of the reservations entertained in New Delhi and Islamabad. With the two major members of this group having agreed in principle to strengthen bilateral cooperation, South Asian cooperation can also be expected to receive a fillip.

A word of caution would, however, not be out of place here. The establishment of the joint commission will give an impetus to Indo-Pakistan cooperation. But this should be allowed to set its own pace. Any move to unduly hasten the process could prove to be counterproductive since it could give rise to suspicions and misgivings on both sides. It is also important that the two countries proceed strictly on the basis of reciprocity and mutuality if their dealings are to acquire a basis in confidence and trust. It should

also be kept in mind that normalisation of relations is important but it can be placed on a stable and permanent footing only if political differences are also tackled in due course. The joint commission, as such bodies traditionally do, will be performing essentially non-political functions. Hence, it would be unrealistic to expect the commission to resolve political disputes which have marred relations between India and Pakistan for decades. It will certainly have a bearing on these questions by helping to create an improved climate of understanding and goodwill between the two countries. But the normalisation of relations should not be at the expense of the need for settlement of longstanding disputes. Better economic and cultural ties will really help when India and Pakistan finally decide to address themselves to the task of resolving the major disputes which divide them, such as Kashmir. Similarly, the dialogue on the no-war pact and the treaty of friendship and cooperation proposals, which came under discussion at New Delhi last week, will also have to be sustained separately as a parallel move. The establishment of the joint commission should not be allowed to weaken interest in the more important political issues confronting the two countries of South Asia.

CSO: 4200/272

HABIB CHATTI INTERVIEWED ON REGIONAL ISSUES

BK301158 Hong Kong AFP in English 1056 GMT 30 Dec 82

[Text] Islamabad, Dec. 30 (AFP)--Habib Chatti, Tunisian secretary-general of the Islamic Conference Organisation, said today he saw no difference in Moscow's policy over Afghanistan since Yuriy Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev.

There had been hopes of some change with Mr Andropov in power but "there has been nothing at all, we are where we were at the beginning," he said in an interview with AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE.

Mr Chatti has just visited four Islamic Asian countries--Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

He said it was still too early to say whether a change in Soviet policy on Afghanistan "was just a question of time" or "whether the Kremlin has in fact already decided to follow the same policy as Brezhnev."

He observed that the Soviet Union is meeting serious problems in Afghanistan, with most of the country, except for main towns, practically in the hands of the Mujahedeen rebels.

International pressure for a withdrawal of Soviet troops stretched from Western to Third World countries "and even to some socialist ones," he said.

Mr Chatti believed the Soviet Union, faced with difficulties in Afghanistan and international [words indistinct] unable to support this situation for an unlimited period."

Mr Chatti considered that in these conditions the Soviet Union "will end up by accepting the only possible way out--that is to say, the holding of an international conference on Afghanistan."

He said that President Mohammad Ziaul Haq of Pakistan, whom he met for talks on Tuesday, was in favour of such a conference.

Mr Chatti thought it should be attended by the big powers and Afghanistan's neighbours, as well as countries friendly to the Soviet Union so that it would not be in a minority.

The conference would meet without prior conditions, and it would aim at guaranteeing Afghanistan from foreign interference.

At the same time all Afghans in the country, from the rebels to President Babrak Karmal, would hold their own conference aimed at "national reconciliation."

On the Iran-Iraq war, Mr Chatti said that "a new peace initiative was not easy" because both sides were a long way from any agreement.

He said he was nevertheless continuing his contacts with member countries of the Islamic Conference's "Peace Committee," though he saw no date in sight for renewed direct contacts between Tehran and Baghdad "on the basis of new proposals."

Mr Chatti stressed that "a military victory seems impossible for either country," and regretted that "the longer it goes on, the further away is peace."

"We have never once seen the end of the tunnel" in peace moves, he added.

Mr Chatti confirmed that the "Al Qods" committee headed by King Hassan of Morocco would meet in Morocco on January 21 and 22, to study how the Moslem world could back resolutions approved by the recent Arab summit at Fes, Morocco, which produced a Middle East peace plan.

The upcoming meeting would seek greater cohesion between Arab and Moslem countries over the Fes recommendations, he said.

He also described the Reagan peace plan for the Middle East as having "a certain number of positive points," bearing in mind Israeli pressure on Washington.

It was a big step towards a better U.S. approach to the Palestinian problem, he said.

Mr Chatti said the United States and the Arab world would be wise to reach a compromise over a situation which had reached the stage that it threatened their own interests and world peace.

Mr Chatti was leaving here today for Jidda, Saudi Arabia, headquarters of the Islamic Conference Organisation.

CSO: 4200/272

MAHBUBUL HAQ DISCUSSES SIXTH PLAN, ENERGY

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Dec 82 pp 1, 7

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec 28: The preliminary outline of the Sixth Five-Year Plan is expected to be ready by the end of January 1983. This was disclosed here on Tuesday by the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Dr Mahbubul Haq while addressing a Press conference here:

The Plan, to be launched in July 1983, will be completed on schedule, he said.

Remarking that all the working groups entrusted with the task of mooting ideas and preparing reports, were working at a feverish pace, he said he would be meeting the chairman of the various working groups on Jan 2 and all the groups will submit their final reports by Jan 15.

Referring to the report on deregulation of economic and administrative controls, Dr Haq said that it was now with President Ziaul-Haq and would be made public in January.

Replying to a question he said that the report dealt with only industrial investment controls. He said that since the removal of controls was an enormous and complicated job, it was proposed to tackle it in several phases.

According to Dr Haq, in the first phase the industrial investment controls are proposed to be removed, while in the second phase credit and banking controls, price controls and rationing controls would be tackled. The remaining controls would be removed in the

third phase, he added.

He said the Deregulation Committee would meet on Jan 10 to discuss the controls to be removed in the second phase. The Planning Commission has received the draft of a mid-term Energy Planprepared by the International Energy Development Corporation (IEDC) which was assigned the task by the Government in April this year. This was stated here on Tuesday by Dr Mahbubul Haq,

He said the proposals would be discussed in detail by all the concerned Ministries and departments in January for the purpose of finalising a Mid-term Energy Plan which will be incorporated in the Sixth-Five-Year-Plan.

The IEDC draft proposal envisage an investment of around Rs 116 billion over the Plan period with 80 per cent of it going into electricity production and the rest for the development of coal, oil and gas and nuclear resources.

Dr Haq said in the light of new technologies perfected in recent years for improving the energy yeilds of low quality coal, the IEDC has proposed a fresh look at this source of energy substantial reserves of which are available in Pakistan.

Another major proposal, according to Dr Haq, concerns energy conservation. He said new technologies have been developed which help conserve energy with-

out interfering with its optimal use.
Another important mechanism proposed to be used in this connection is pricing. A rational pricing policy would help discourage wastage of energy, he pointed out.

According to IEDC estimates the country is faced with a commercial energy shortage of 5.6 million tons of oil equivalent, while domestic production of energy from all resources is expected to increase by 10 per cent annually.

The projections expect the energy deficit to widen by 15 per cent to 7.8 million tons of oil equivalent by the end of 1987-88.

The IEDC draft plan proposes to contain demand expansion to 9 pc a year during the Plan period.

Energy conservation programme alone is expected to save 3 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) by the end of 1987-88 and by the end of the Seventh Plan the saving would be to the tune of 8 million (MTOE).

Further projections show that oil-consumption in the country will increase by 10 pc a year from 5.1 MTOE in 1982-83 to 9.7 MTOE in 1987-88; gas by 6 pc from 6.5 MTOE to 9.9 MTOE; coal by 12 pc from 1.1 MTOE to 2.4 MTOE and hydel and nuclear by 9 pc from 2.2 MTOE to 4.0 MTOE. Total energy consumption will increase by 8.2 pc from 14.9 MTOE to 26.0 MTOE

Answering a question, Dr Haq said that the share of oil and gas together which is 77 pc of the total energy consumption at 11.6 MTOE at present will come down to 75 pc of the total by the end of the Plan period, according to the projections of the IEDC proposals.

Power demand in the country is expected to increase, according to projections, from 3,720 MW in 1982-83 to 6,600 MW in 1987-88 while the supply position is expected to improve from 4,440 MW in 1982-83 to 7,585 MW during the same period, leaving a surplus of around 985 MW. But after making allowances for spinning and maintenance reserves and for low hydel capacities during the three winter months, the expected shortage is estimated at 615 MW.

The additional 3,145 MW of electricity is expected to be supplied during the Plan period by 12 projects. Some of these projects are ongoing and some will be started during the 6th Plan period and will be completed during the 6th Plan.

Dr Haq said there will be further projects for which expenditure will be made during the 6th Plan, but they will be available in the 7th Plan like the Chashma Nuclear (900 MW), Tarbela 11 to 14 (1600 MW) and others.

By the end of the 7th Plan, electricity production is expected to go upto 12,785 MW against a projected demand of 11,240 MW.

When asked about the amount of fees charged by the IEDC for preparing the Mid-term Energy Plan, Dr Haq said that it was being kept confidential.

He said most of the plans prepared in the past on energy invariably made very optimistic projection regarding domestic energy production capacity due to which the country today was facing an acute energy crisis.

When asked to comment on IEDC's optimism about coal prospects, he said the potential of this resource was always underestimated in the past.

CSO: 4200/277

BRIEFS

WATER FOR REFUGEES -- Peshawar, Dec. 24 -- Elaborate arrangements have been made to supply drinking water to Afghan refugees in their tented villages located in 16 different districts and agencies of NWFP. Special reservoirs have been provided at the camps which are regularly filled by tankers with clean water. The refugees take water from these reservoirs according to their needs. In this connection a consignment of 28 water-tankers will be handed over on Dec. 30 to Mr. Abdullah, Commissioner, Afghan Refugees, by the representative of UNICEF at Peshawar. These tankers had been donated to the UNICEF by Prince Talal of Saudi Arabia. Ninety-five health units, under 85 experienced doctors, have been set up at the camps. These are in addition to 55 dispensaries established by 10 voluntary organisations. These organisations have put into operation 34 mobile health care units which go around various camps regularly. Besides, 15 independent immunisation units have been established for protecting the refugees diseases. A special mobile X-ray unit, under a medical officer, regularly visits the camps. Under the malaria control programme, the refugees are screened and their dwellings sprayed. The camps have also been supplied with ambulances for taking patients to nearby hospitals for treatment by specialists. -- PPI. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 27 Dec 82 p 6]

DETENTION EXTENDED-Bahawalpur, Dec 26-Martial Law authorities have extended the detention of Mr Shahid Mirza, President defunct Pakistan People's Party, district Bahawalpur, by three months. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 27 Dec 82 p 9]

MORE POWERS FOR COUNCILLORS--Muzaffargarh, Dec 28--President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq conferred various powers to Federal Councillors for the solution of people's problems and hardships and directed all the provincial, divisional and district heads of nation-building departments and administrations to receive Federal Councillors on priority basis and to honour their suggestions and special requests. It was stated here by Deputy Martial Law Administrator, Maj-Gen Shamim Alam, while addressing the Federal Councillors of D.G. Khan Division. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 29 Dec 82 p 4]

ASGHAR KHAN'S BIRTHDAY--Lahore, Dec 28--Defunct Tehrik Istiqlal, Punjab, will celebrate the birthday of its party chief on Feb 17 in a befitting manner. This was announced here on Tuesday by the provincial Information Secretary of the Party Ch. Safdar Ali. According to him meetings of party

office-bearers and workers will be held at district level throughout Punjab to mark the occasion.—PPI [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 29 Dec 82 p 7]

PROBE AGAINST DETAINED PERSONS—Sukkur, Dec 28—Thorough investigations are being made by the Railway Police against four arrested students and 110 other detained persons, who were travelling in a special bogey of Abbasseen Express from Peshawar to Karachi and from whose possession a large quantity of firearms and narcotics were recovered on Sunday night at Rohri, it was officially reported here today. All the 114 persons are still under police custody for thorough investigations. The Deputy Inspector—General of Police, Sukkur Range, Mr Aftab Nabi, has formed a four—member committee of experts police officers and placed them at the disposal of the Railway Police to assist it in carrying out investigation and submit their report. The said railway bogey which was to be detached from Abbasseen Express at Rohri and attached to Chenab Express for its onward journey to Karachi has been sealed.—APP. [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 29 Dec 82 p 8]

BENAZIR BARRED FROM GRAVESITE--Karachi, Pakistan, Jan. 1 (AFP)--Benazir Bhutto, a detained leader of the outlawed Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), has been refused government permission to visit the grave of her father, executed former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, family sources said here today. Miss Bhutto, who has been kept under detention for the past 20 months, is at present under house arrest here. She had sought permission to be taken to the grave of Mr. Bhutto in Larkana, 500 kms (300 miles) north of here, on the anniversary of his birth on January 5. Officials have refused to comment on the matter. Since Mr. Bhutto's execution, on charges brought by the martial law regime, members of his family and political supporters gather at his grave twice a year, to mark his birth and death. [Text] [BK011349 Hong Kong AFP in English 1134 GMT 1 Jan 83]

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